Market Microstructure: Intermediaries and the Theory of the Firm

Market Microstructure: Intermediaries and the Theory of the Firm

by Daniel F. Spulber
ISBN-10:
0521650259
ISBN-13:
9780521650250
Pub. Date:
04/13/1999
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
ISBN-10:
0521650259
ISBN-13:
9780521650250
Pub. Date:
04/13/1999
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Market Microstructure: Intermediaries and the Theory of the Firm

Market Microstructure: Intermediaries and the Theory of the Firm

by Daniel F. Spulber

Hardcover

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Overview

This book presents a theory of the firm based on its economic role as an intermediary between customers and suppliers. Professor Spulber demonstrates how the intermediation theory of the firm explains firm formation by showing how they arise in a market equilibrium. In addition, the theory helps explain how markets work by showing how firms select market-clearing prices. Models of intermediation and market microstructure from microeconomics and finance shed considerable light on the formation and market making activities of firms. The intermediation theory of the firm is compared to existing economic theories of the firm including the neoclassical, industrial organization, transaction cost, and principal-agent models.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780521650250
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 04/13/1999
Pages: 406
Product dimensions: 6.26(w) x 9.37(h) x 1.02(d)

Table of Contents

Preface and acknowledgements; Introduction; Part I. Market Microstructure and the Intermediation Theory of the Firm: 1. Market microstructure and intermediation; 2. Price setting and intermediation by firms 3. Competition Part II. Competition and Market Equilibrium: 3. Competition between intermediaries; 4. Intermediation and general equilibrium; Part III. Intermediation Versus Decentralized Trade: 5. Matching and intermediation by firms; 6. Search and intermediation by firms; Part IV. Intermediation under Asymmetric Information: 7. Adverse selection in product markets; 8. Adverse selection in financial markets; Part V. Intermediation and Transaction Costs: 9. Transaction costs and the contractual theory for the firm; 10. Transaction costs and the intermediation theory of the firm; Part VI. Intermediation and Agency: 11. Agency and the organizational-incentive theory of the firm; 12. Agency and the intermediation theory of the firm; Conclusion.
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