Hardcover New 0307266893 SERVING OUR CUSTOMERS WITH BEST PRICES. FROM A COMPANY YOU TRUST, HUGE SELECTION. RELIABLE CUSTOMER SERVICE! ! HASSLE FREE RETURN POLICY, SATISFACTION ...GURANTEED****Read moreShow Less
2009-04-14 Hardcover 1ST New 0307266893 Ships Within 24 Hours. Tracking Number available for all USA orders. Excellent Customer Service. Upto 15 Days 100% Money Back Gurantee. ...Try Our Fast! ! ! ! Shipping With Tracking Number.Read moreShow Less
NY 2009 Hard cover First edition. 1st edition / printing 2009. New in new dust jacket. Gift Quality. Pristine. Brand New. Fast Arrival. Collectors item. Carefuly packaged & ...shipped in bubble wrap. 1st edition / printing 2009. Glued binding. Paper over boards. With dust jacket. 271 p. Contains: Illustrations. Audience: General/trade. Gift Quality. Pristine. Brand New. Fast Arrival. Collectors item. Carefuly packaged & shipped in bubble wrap. 1st edition / printing 2009.Read moreShow Less
I have been writing about American families for three decades, but I began to develop the idea for this book only in the past few years. It seemed to me that family life in the United States was different from that of other Western countries-in a way no one really understood. In none of the other countries has marriage become a social and political battlefield. Nowhere else is the government spending money to promote marriage. In no other Western country would a person walking down the street see the advertisement I have seen on the sides of buses: a smiling couple proclaiming, "Marriage works."
Cherlin (public policy, Johns Hopkins Univ.) is a longtime observer of marriage, American-style: his 1983 book, Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, has been revised several times and is still in print, though the scope of the latest edition ends with the early 1990s. Picking up where that book left off, this volume looks at recent developments regarding same-sex marriage, changes in family court decisions, and newer models of marriage and family life. These developments trouble Cherlin, who suggests that Americans' apparently unique propensity to marry, remarry, and participate in short-term cohabiting relationships destabilizes families and takes a considerable toll on the children who are subject to a revolving door of household participants. Cherlin's most acute observations concern the tensions that arise as a result of Americans' high regard for marriage but also for self-expression and personal growth, which allows people to cast marriage aside easily. Cherlin calls his last chapter "Slow Down," counseling Americans to reflect more carefully on how to balance their sense of individuality with their expectations of the "fragile accomplishment" that is marriage. A scholarly treatment of American family life for students of the subject.
An authoritative report on the American way of partnering and raising children. Cherlin (Public Policy and Sociology/Johns Hopkins Univ.; Public and Private Families, 2005) offers an accessible analysis of the "great turbulence" in U.S. family life and the ingrained, often contradictory impulses that fuel it. Unlike people in other Western nations, he writes, Americans strongly value both marriage and personal fulfillment. We crave the security of marriages-and the right of unhappy individuals to end them. As a result, we "partner, unpartner, and repartner" frequently, creating stressful transitions that have long-lasting negative affects on children. Tracing the history of family life from colonial times, the author examines the pervasive pro-marriage influence of religion; the pre-20th century belief that marrying for romantic love was a risky proposition; the breadwinner-homemaker family dynamic of the 1950s; and how events of the '60s-the invention of the birth-control pill, married women's entry into the workforce, changes in family and divorce law-gave rise to the quest for personal fulfillment. By the early '90s, notes Cherlin, more than half of new marriages in the United States began as co-habiting relationships. The author's comparative analysis demonstrates that Americans partner earlier, turn partnerships into marriages more quickly and break up more often than Europeans. Cohabitation is far more common in France and Scandinavia than in the United States, and the U.S. government is the only one to provide funds for promoting marriage. Cherlin considers at length-and dismisses-the widespread notion that American "restlessness" causes frequent partner changes. He urges U.S.policymakers to find ways to slow hasty remarriages-through cash assistance to low-income families, for example-to assure stable ongoing care for the nation's children. A rewarding sociological study. Author tour to Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco and Washington, D.C.
From the Publisher
“A landmark new book.” —Time
“Intriguing. . . . Provocative. . . . Cherlin has come up with an original thesis [to explain] this peculiar paradox—we idealize marriage and yet we’re so bad at it.” —The New York Times
“A masterful comparative analysis. . . . Cherlin argues that Americans have a distinctive pattern . . . which stems from our simultaneous commitments to marriage and to self-expression and personal growth.” —The American Prospect
“Cherlin is one of America's leading experts on the family. . . . His book delivers a stern warning to this fast-paced conjugal culture: ‘Slow down—watch out for the children.’” —Commonweal
Andrew J. Cherlin is the Benjamin H. Griswold III Professor of Sociology and Public Policy at Johns Hopkins University and is the author of Public and Private Families. His articles have appeared in The New York Times Magazine, The Nation, and on the op-ed pages of The New York Times, The Washington Post, and other publications. He has been a recipient of a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship and the Distinguished Career Award from the Family Section of the American Sociological Association. He lives in Baltimore.
On Valentine’s Day in 2005, Governor Mike Huckabee of Arkansas, who would gain recognition in 2008 as a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, and his wife, Janet, converted their marriage to a covenant marriage in front of a crowd of 6,400 at an arena in North Little Rock. The governor was aware that few Arkansas couples were choosing the covenant option—of the first hundred thousand or so marriages that had begun since it was introduced in 2001, about six hundred couples had chosen it. In Louisiana and Arizona, the other states that offered covenant marriages, the take- up rate wasn’t much better. Advocates for covenant marriage claimed that many couples were unaware of it and that the laws had been poorly implemented. Even so, the numbers were far smaller than anyone expected. Those who chose Arkansas’s option agreed to undergo premarital counseling. They also agreed that if either spouse ever requested a divorce, they would attend marital counseling before splitting up. And they agreed that neither spouse could obtain a quick divorce based on “no-fault” grounds such as incompatibility. Only if the other spouse had committed a serious transgression such as adultery or physical or sexual abuse could a covenant-married person ask for an immediate divorce. Otherwise, the person who wanted out had to wait at least two years for a divorce.
In order to breathe life into this moribund option, the governor had announced his intention to enter into a covenant marriage and invited others to join him. “This law allows couples to choose to be held to a higher level of marital commitment,” he said in a radio address promoting his rally. At the event, thousands of married couples, many bused by their churches, filed into the arena as love songs played on the public address system. After the governor and his wife exchanged vows, they asked the couples in the audience to stand and face each other, and they led a mass recitation of vows. Only the Huckabees’ ceremony legally counted as a covenant marriage, however, because couples who are already married must submit an affidavit to the county clerk in order to convert their marriages, and according to news reports the logistics had proven too complicated for the churches that were supporting the rally. Nevertheless, the governor, a former Baptist pastor, had made his point: there was too much divorce in Arkansas and people’s commitment to their marriages needed to be strengthened.
Governor Huckabee’s concern about the divorce rate in Arkansas, which led him to sponsor the Valentine’s Day covenant marriage rally, was well-taken. In 2004, for instance, Arkansas had the second-highest number of divorces per person of any state (after Nevada, a divorce destination that does a brisk business with out-of-state visitors). But Governor Huckabee may not have known that Arkansas also had a large number of weddings. In 2004, it had the third-highest per capita rate of marriage (after Nevada and Hawaii, two popular wedding destinations). With much divorce and much marriage, Arkansas exemplifies the American pattern.
That a state in the Bible Belt—Arkansas is well above average in church membership—has a high rate of marriage may seem unremarkable; by contrast, its high divorce rate may seem odd. Yet six of the ten states with the highest divorce rates are in the South, and the other four are in the West. George W. Bush carried all ten states in the 2004 presidential election, which suggests that having a socially conservative electorate does not insulate a state from divorce. It is true that people who are religious are less likely to divorce, but religious Americans still have high divorce rates by international standards. Moreover, people in high-divorce states tend to have less education, to marry earlier, and not to be Catholic—all of which are risk factors for divorce. That’s why Arkansas stands out: it has one of the lowest percentages of high school graduates and of Catholics, and one of the lowest median ages at marriage, of any state.
Both marriage and divorce contribute to the larger picture of a country in which people partner, unpartner, and repartner faster than do people in any other Western nation. They form cohabiting relationships easily, but they end them after a shorter time than people in other nations. They tend to marry at younger ages. After a divorce, they tend to find a new partner more quickly. In other words, having several partnerships is more common in the United States not just because people exit intimate partnerships faster but also because they enter them faster and after a breakup reenter them faster. We know these facts from the work of demographers using the Fertility and Family Surveys, a remarkable set of surveys conducted between 1989 and 1997 in European countries, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States (as well as from other surveys in Great Britain and Australia, two countries that were not included). In each nation researchers asked a large, random sample of individuals comparable questions about their marriages, divorces, and cohabiting relationships.
Why, you might ask, did researchers go to the expense and trouble of carrying out these surveys throughout Western Europe and overseas English-speaking countries? The answer is that enormous changes have occurred in family life not only in the United States but also throughout the Western world in the past half century (and in much of the rest of the world, too, for that matter). People everywhere are concerned about the future of the family as they know it. In the Scandinavian countries and in France, cohabitation is even more common than in the United States, and a large proportion of all births occur to cohabiting couples—more than half of first births in Sweden. Divorce rates have increased, too, although not to the height seen in the United States. But what drives European concern is not the decline of marriage but rather the decline in births. It’s hard for Americans to understand this concern because we don’t share it. American women have enough children to maintain the size of our population, even ignoring immigration. In many European countries, in contrast, women are having fewer births. Countries such as France and Germany have long been concerned with keeping their populations up so that they can field armies large enough to defend themselves. More recently, they have been concerned about having enough working-age adults to care for their growing elderly populations.
In the United States, however, the concern is about marriage, and the Fertility and Family Surveys have much to say about it. To compare, say, current divorce rates across countries, ideally we would interview a sample of people who get married this year in each country, follow them for the next several decades, and see how many become divorced. But no mere mortal has the time to wait that long. Instead, demographers use the “life table” method, so called because one of its first uses was to estimate how long people would live so that insurance companies could determine how much to charge them for life insurance policies. It can be used to estimate the expected “survival” time of marriages, cohabiting relationships, or periods of singlehood. Its estimates will be inaccurate if conditions change greatly in the future. Essentially, the life table answers this question: if conditions stay the same as they have been recently, how long would we expect a marriage, a cohabiting relationship, or a spell of being single to last?
The American Difference
Here are some comparisons that can be made between women in the United States (the American survey did not include men) and in other Western nations in the mid-1990s, when most of the surveys were conducted:
• Americans marry and cohabit for the first time sooner than people in most other Western nations. Half of all first marriages occurred by age twenty-five in the United States, compared to age twenty-nine in Italy, thirty in France, thirty-one in Sweden, and thirty-two in the former West Germany. In part, ages of marriage are older in Europe because in some countries more young adults cohabit prior to marrying. Yet even if we consider the age at which half of all first partnerships of either kind (marital or cohabiting) occur, American women were relatively young: age twenty-two, compared to twenty-one in Sweden, age twenty-three in France, twenty-six in West Germany, and twenty-eight in Italy.
• A higher proportion of Americans marry at some point in their lives than in most other Western nations: 84 percent of American women are predicted to marry by age forty. In contrast, the forecast drops to 70 percent in Sweden and 68 percent in France. (For technical reasons, all of these forecasts are likely to be somewhat lower than the actual percentages who will ever marry.) If we consider both marital and cohabiting relationships, however, over 90 percent of women in nearly all countries will eventually begin an intimate partnership.
So Americans begin to have partners at a relatively young age, whereas many Europeans wait longer. And Americans turn those partnerships into marriages—or marry without living together beforehand—much more quickly. In France and the Nordic countries, in contrast, young adults tend to live with partners for several years before marrying, if they marry at all. In some southern European countries, such as Spain and Italy, living together prior to marrying is less common, and many young adults live with their parents well into their twenties before marrying. Other English-speaking countries are more similar to the United States, but people there still marry at somewhat older ages and are less likely to ever marry over their lifetimes.
• Marriages and cohabiting relationships in the United States are far more fragile than elsewhere. After only five years, more than one-fifth of Americans who marry had separated or divorced, compared to half that many or even fewer in other Western nations. And among Americans who began a cohabiting relationship, over half had broken up five years later (as opposed to remaining together, whether they subsequently married or not), which is a substantially higher figure than in other nations. Whether they started a partnership by marrying or by living together, Americans were less likely to be living with that partner five years later.
• Because of these fragile partnerships, American children born to married or cohabiting parents are more likely to see their parents’ partnership break up than are children in most other countries. Forty percent experienced a breakup by age fifteen. About the same percentage experienced a breakup in New Zealand. In Sweden, the country with the next-highest rate, the comparable figure was 30 percent; it was in the high twenties in western Germany and Canada, and the low twenties in France and Australia. Children born to cohabiting parents in the United States and New Zealand faced exceptionally high risks of experiencing a breakup: about three- fourths no longer lived with both parents at age fifteen. But even if we look just at children born to married couples, American children were more likely to see their parents break up. In fact, children born to married parents in the United States were more likely to experience their parents’ breakup than were children born to cohabiting parents in Sweden.
Without doubt, then, there are more breakups of married and cohabiting couples in the United States than in any other Western country with the possible exception of New Zealand. So not only do Americans marry more, they also divorce more. Moreover, they end their cohabiting relationships more quickly. So they start and end partnerships with a speed that is virtually unmatched.
• After their breakups, American parents are more likely to repartner. Consequently, children in the United States who have seen their parents’ partnership end are more likely to have another adult partner (cohabiting or married) enter their household than are children living elsewhere. In the United States, nearly half of children who had experienced the breakup of their parents’ marriage or cohabiting relationship saw the entry of another partner into their household within three years, a much higher proportion than in Sweden (where one-third see a new partner within three years), West Germany
(29 percent), France (23 percent), or Italy (8 percent). In fact, American children spent more of their childhoods in stepfamilies than did children in continental Europe, Canada, or New Zealand. As a result, American children experienced not only more breakups but also more new adults moving in with the biological parent who cared for them.
• American women become parents at an earlier age and are much more likely to spend time as lone parents in their teens or twenties than are women in Western Europe. By age thirty, one-third of American women had spent time as lone mothers; in European countries such as France, Sweden, and the western part of Germany the comparable percentages were half as large or even less. But children born to lone parents in the United States are also more likely to experience a parent’s new partner moving into the household than in some other countries, including France, Sweden, and Germany. So more lone-parent families started, and more ended.
What all these statistics mean is that family life in the United States involves more transitions than anywhere else. There is more marriage but also more divorce. There are more lone parents but also more repartnering. Cohabiting relationships are shorter. Over the course of people’s adult lives, there is more movement into and out of marriages and cohabiting relationships than in other countries. The sheer number of partners people experience during their lives is greater. Jeffrey Timberlake has estimated the percentage of women in each country who had three or more live-in partners (married or cohabiting) by age thirty-five. These were women who may have lived with a man and then perhaps married him and had children, divorced him, lived with another man (partner number two), ended that relationship, and then lived with or married yet another man (partner number three). In most countries, the percentage of women who accomplished this feat by age thirty-five is negligible: almost no one in Italy or Spain, less than 2 percent in France or Canada, and 3 percent in Germany. The highest figures elsewhere were 4.5 percent in Sweden and 4 percent in New Zealand. But in the United States, 10 percent of women had three or more husbands or live-in partners by age thirty-five, more than twice the percentage in Sweden and New Zealand and several times the percentage anywhere else.
From a child’s perspective, experiencing three or more parental partnerships would imply a scenario such as being born to a lone mother who later marries the child’s father, then divorces him and starts a cohabiting relationship, then ends that relationship and lives with someone else. The percentage of children who experienced three or more mother’s partners by age fifteen in the mid-1990s was less than
2 percent in every other country except for Sweden, where it was 3 percent. But in the United States, it was 8 percent. So about one out of twelve American children saw at least this many transitions in their living arrangements. The number of children who experienced exactly two parental partnerships (but not three) is considerably higher, and again the United States led with 21 percent, compared to 16 percent in Sweden, 11 percent in Canada, and 8 percent in France. Nowhere else did children see so many adults come and go.
The author gives a non-biased overlook on how the family has changed since the beginnings of America.
The author has enough credentials to write such a book and he stands true to the sociologist outlook and the structural functionalist point of view. The statistics on like-countries and specific court dates are just two examples of the details of information used to provide strength to the overall purpose. He attempts to mesh historical accounts of all kinds, making clarity suffer, but there was not a lack of organization which did allow for easier reading. Overall, the book was well written and the theories were sound. A good read for professionals and students alike who are interested in the time line of the American family and why divorce is a hot-button topic today.
Was this review helpful? YesNoThank you for your feedback.Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.