Metaphysicians of Meaning: Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation / Edition 1

Metaphysicians of Meaning: Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation / Edition 1

by Gideon Makin
     
 

ISBN-10: 0415242266

ISBN-13: 9780415242264

Pub. Date: 01/28/2001

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

Russell's On Denoting and Frege's On Sense and Reference are now widely held to be two of the founding papers of twentieth century philosophy and form the heart of the famous "linguistic turn". The Metaphysicians of Meaning is the first book to challenge the accepted secondary work on these two seminal papers, forcing us to reconsider the

Overview

Russell's On Denoting and Frege's On Sense and Reference are now widely held to be two of the founding papers of twentieth century philosophy and form the heart of the famous "linguistic turn". The Metaphysicians of Meaning is the first book to challenge the accepted secondary work on these two seminal papers, forcing us to reconsider the interpretation of these two vitally important works on meaning.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780415242264
Publisher:
Taylor & Francis
Publication date:
01/28/2001
Series:
International Library of Philosophy Series
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
240
Product dimensions:
6.10(w) x 9.10(h) x 0.70(d)

Table of Contents

List of abbreviationsix
Introduction1
Part IRussell9
1Russell's first theory of denoting11
IThe elements11
IIThe mathematical context13
IIIDenoting, definition and identity16
IVThree essential elements17
VPost-PoM developments20
2The collapse of the first theory and the discovery of the theory of descriptions22
IIntroduction: the obscure passage in 'On Denoting'22
IIThe argument: the 'substantial' round24
(i)C2 is a different entity from C125
(ii)C1 cannot be a constituent of C226
(iii)'But this cannot be an explanation', I28
(iv)The third charge32
IIIThe argument: the 'symbolic' round33
(i)The twin phenomena34
(ii)Use and mention37
IV'But this cannot be an explanation', II38
(i)The burden of proof38
(ii)A survey of theoretical possibilities38
(iii)C2 as a description of C139
(iv)Denoting and other logical relations41
VThe transition42
VIThe discovery of the theory of descriptions45
3The place of 'On Denoting' in Russell's development52
I'On Denoting' and Russell's ontological development: some preliminaries53
IIRussell's case against Meinong58
IIIRussell's ontology in PoM reconsidered61
IVMethodological developments: 'every word must have some meaning'66
VContextual definition68
VIThe notion of an incomplete symbol69
VIIThe role of language73
VIIISome positive remarks76
Part IIFrege79
4From Begriffsschrift to sense and reference81
IIntroduction81
IIThe problem82
IIIFrege's solution in Bs.90
IV'Sinn und Bedeutung': the collapse of the first theory94
V'Sinn und Bedeutung': the new solution101
5Further considerations regarding sense and reference106
IThe priority of the distinction for proper names106
IISense and indirect speech109
IIISense as a route and empty senses112
IVSense determines reference, I: the question of relativization117
VSense determines reference, II: the conceptual model121
VIThe application of Russell's argument in OD to Frege's distinction127
Part IIIRussell and Frege133
6Russell and Frege compared135
IIntroduction: the strategy135
IIThe PoM theory of denoting and the theory of sense and reference: some preliminaries137
IIIThe common ground: propositionalism, sensism and the implied metaphysical model139
IVThe differences, and further similarities, in relation to the metaphysical model144
VAn apparent gap in Frege's argument148
VICan all expressions have sense?151
VIIThe taxonomic difference: a diagnosis of Frege's position155
VIIIFrege's suppressed premise: are all names on a par?157
IXThe theory of descriptions versus sense and reference: an adjustment on the Russellian side164
XFrege's description operator and the theory of descriptions169
XIThe progression towards transparency173
7The Russell-Frege enterprise and natural language179
IIntroduction179
IIOrdinary names and logically proper names180
IIIWhat morals can we draw from illustration?182
IVThe revisionary nature of the Russell-Frege enterprise187
VLogic as metaphysics191
VIThe latency of the metaphysical facet197
VIIConcluding remarks: the nature of the enterprise199
Appendix A203
The text of the obscure passage from 'On Denoting'203
Appendix B206
Russell's example in the latter half of paragraph (D) of the obscure passage206
Appendix C208
Some recent discussions of the obscure passage208
ISearle, Blackburn and Code, and Hylton208
IIPakaluk210
IIIKremer213
IVNoonan219
Bibliography223
Index227

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