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Since 9/11, deployed U.S. troops have experienced many things. Though the war in Afghanistan is still going, their hard-won lessons have yet to be assimilated by the Stateside bureaucracy. To help, Militant Tricks recounts America's progress in countering East Asian deception. Both Iraq and Afghanistan were part of the Mongol Empire for over 200 years and thus prone to every sort of ancient Chinese illusion. Militant Tricks also contains the tactical "techniques" with which to counter a Muslim urban offensive. ...
Since 9/11, deployed U.S. troops have experienced many things. Though the war in Afghanistan is still going, their hard-won lessons have yet to be assimilated by the Stateside bureaucracy. To help, Militant Tricks recounts America's progress in countering East Asian deception. Both Iraq and Afghanistan were part of the Mongol Empire for over 200 years and thus prone to every sort of ancient Chinese illusion. Militant Tricks also contains the tactical "techniques" with which to counter a Muslim urban offensive. While some of these nontraditional methods were risked during the Baghdad Surge, they may all too soon be forgotten.
While ostensibly crude, the Muslim militant's method has never been defeated. Through multiple deception and continual mutation, it has so far bested Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya, Israel in Southern Lebanon and Gaza, and the United States in Beirut and Mogadishu. To finally defeat that method, every deployed (or about-to-be-deployed) GI must become thoroughly familiar with its latest configuration. That will take a good, hard look at all that has happened over the last year.
In Iraq, U.S. forces have won every firefight and killed thousands of Islamic fighters. (See Map 1.1.) Unfortunately, wars are not won by occupying nonstrategic ground or killing opposition soldiers. They are won by destroying the enemy's "strategic assets." Eastern insurgents don't have many strategic assets. Whatever they need, they can generally take from a well-supplied adversary. To make matters worse, they have the edge in a 4th-generation-warfare (4GW) environment—one in which combat/tactics, religion/psychology, politics/media, and economics/infrastructure all come into play. In a densely populated area, they are virtually immune to electronic surveillance and precision bombardment. Every time their pursuer overreacts, he damages local infrastructure and loses popular support. As such, Eastern insurgents develop a full portfolio of battlefield feints.
What has, or has not, occurred in Iraq deserves a closer look from this perspective. Marco Polo did, after all, warn of the diabolical mysteries of Upper Persia. Could U.S. forces have "won" every firefight in Iraq and still be losing the war? They were equally lethal andnever driven from the field in Vietnam.
Within the context of Eastern intrigue, Iraq's future looks far less certain than one might think. The U.S. military has had trouble countering its new foe's propensity for chaos and deception. To do so now, it must identify, analyze, and compare every one of his strategic initiatives between September 2004 to September 2005. For many, there was a hidden objective, subtle diversion, and secret maneuver.
The Muslim Militants' So-Far-Successful Equation
The Iraqi "insurgency" is not the first regional jihad against a "high-tech" invader. Its architects have drawn on the lessons of Southern Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Chechnya. Their initial strategy is the same as it was there—to create chaos. By so doing, they hope to bankrupt the occupier, discredit the government, and manipulate the people. Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the opposition has done whatever it could to disrupt the everyday workings of that country. It has crippled the infrastructure, discouraged foreign aid, and terrorized the population. All the while, it has managed to create the impression that someone else was to blame. For the U.S. to succeed in Iraq, it must first discover how this "projection" of complicity has been accomplished.
|List of Illustrations||ix|
|Part One:||The Ongoing "War on Terror”|
|Chapter 1:||The Deteriorating Situation in Iraq||3|
|Chapter 2:||The Iraqi Insurgents' Tactical Methods||35|
|Chapter 3:||The Iraqi Militants' Point of Origin||55|
|Chapter 4:||Developments in Afghanistan||91|
|Chapter 5:||The Afghan Guerrillas' Tactical Trends||101|
|Chapter 6:||The Afghan Rebels' Base of Support||111|
|Part Two:||Part Two: Insurgent Tricks of the Militant Muslim|
|Chapter 7:||Stratagems When in a Superior Position||151|
|Chapter 8:||Stratagems for Confrontation||163|
|Chapter 9:||Stratagems for Attack||175|
|Chapter 10:||Stratagems for Confused Cases||189|
|Chapter 11:||Stratagems for Gaining Ground||201|
|Chapter 12:||Stratagems for Desperate Times||217|
|Part Three:||Part Three: Combating the Deception|
|Chapter13:||Ways to Turn the Tide in Iraq||233|
|Chapter 14:||Things to Do for Afghanistan||257|
|Chapter 15:||Averting a Wider Conflict||267|
|About the Author||383|
Posted July 16, 2010
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