Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails

Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails

by Judith G. Kelley
     
 

ISBN-10: 0691152780

ISBN-13: 9780691152783

Pub. Date: 03/25/2012

Publisher: Princeton University Press

In recent decades, governments and NGOs—in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world—have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors…  See more details below

Overview

In recent decades, governments and NGOs—in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world—have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monitoring Democracy argues that the practice of international election monitoring is broken, but still worth fixing. By analyzing the evolving interaction between domestic and international politics, Judith Kelley refutes prevailing arguments that international efforts cannot curb government behavior and that democratization is entirely a domestic process. Yet, she also shows that democracy promotion efforts are deficient and that outside actors often have no power and sometimes even do harm.

Analyzing original data on over 600 monitoring missions and 1,300 elections, Kelley grounds her investigation in solid historical context as well as studies of long-term developments over several elections in fifteen countries. She pinpoints the weaknesses of international election monitoring and looks at how practitioners and policymakers might help to improve them.

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Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780691152783
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
Publication date:
03/25/2012
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
352
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 9.10(h) x 0.80(d)

Table of Contents

Illustrations xi

Tables xiii

Preface xv

Abbreviations xix

PART I

Chapter 1: Introduction 3

Two Questions 6

Methods of Analysis 12

Chapter 2: Th e Rise of a New Norm 16

The Changing Normative Environment 21

Contestation 23

Increased Supply and Demand 26

The Popularization of Monitoring 28

Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation 34

Summary 41

Chapter 3: Th e Shadow Market 43

Disagreements about Contested Elections 47

Who Invites Whom? 54

Discussion 56

Chapter 4: What Infl uences Monitors? Assessments? 59

Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments 60

Five Types of Bias 63

Discussion 75

Chapter 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism? 77

What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor- Induced Shift ? 78

What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating? 80

Data: Th e Varieties of Irregularities 82

The Record 84

Discussion 92

PART II

Chapter 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement 97

Altering Incentives to Cheat 99

Altering Domestic Conditions 104

If It Works, When Should It Work? 107

Summary 109

Chapter 7: Are Monitored Elections Better? 112

Measures of Election Quality 112

An Overview of the Record 115

Statistical Analysis 121

Discussion 129

Chapter 8: Long- Term Eff ects 131

Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis 133

Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time? 136

When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors? 141

Discussion 151

Conclusion: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 155

Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively? 156

Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections? 166

Closing Th oughts 176

Appendix A: Data Description 181

Two Datasets 181

Variables 184

Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3 195

Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4 197

Dependent Variable 197

Analysis 197

Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7 199

with Mark Buntaine

Additional Description of Matching Process 199

Appendix E: Case Summaries 211

with Kiril Kolev

Albania: Th e Importance of Leverage 211

Armenia: Paper Compliance 214

Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely? 218

Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow 221

El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad 223

Georgia: Not So Rosy 228

Guyana: Uphill Battle 232

Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth 237

Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 242

Lesotho: Deadlock 245

Mexico: Constructive Engagement 247

Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making 252

Panama: Both a Will and a Way 256

Russia: Goliath Beats David 258

South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable 261

Notes 265

References 293

Index 321

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