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Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character / Edition 1
     

Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character / Edition 1

by Robert Audi
 

ISBN-10: 0195114698

ISBN-13: 9780195114690

Pub. Date: 08/28/1997

Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA

This book offers a unified collection of published and unpublished papers by Robert Audi, a renowned defender of the rationalist position in ethics. Taken together, the essays present a vigorous, broadly-based argument in moral epistemology and a related account of reasons for action and their bearing on moral justification and moral character. Part I details

Overview

This book offers a unified collection of published and unpublished papers by Robert Audi, a renowned defender of the rationalist position in ethics. Taken together, the essays present a vigorous, broadly-based argument in moral epistemology and a related account of reasons for action and their bearing on moral justification and moral character. Part I details Audi's compelling moral epistemology while Part II offers a unique vision of ethical concepts and an account of moral explanation, as well as a powerful model of moral realism. Part III extends this account of moral explanation to moral responsibility for both actions and character and to the relation between virtue and the actions that express it. Part IV elaborates a theory of reasons for action that locates them in relation to three of their traditionally major sources: desire, moral judgment, and value.

Clear and illuminating, Audi's introduction outlines and interconnects the self-contained but cumulatively arranged essays. It also places them in relation to classical and contemporary literature, and directs readers to large segments of thematically connected material spread throughout the book. Audi ends with a powerfully synthetic final essay.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780195114690
Publisher:
Oxford University Press, USA
Publication date:
08/28/1997
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
320
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.90(d)

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION: Four Dimensions of Ethical Theory 3(8)
I. Ethical Knowledge, Intuition, and Moral Skepticism 3(1)
II. Moral Concepts and the Natural Order 4(1)
III. Moral Psychology and Ethical Character 5(1)
IV. Reason, Judgment, and Value 6(5)
I. MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY 11(82)
1. Internalism and Externalism in Moral Epistemology
11(21)
I. Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology
11(2)
II. Internalism and Externalism in Ethics
13(4)
III. The Range of Internalist and Externalist Moral Theories
17(4)
IV. The Moral Appraisal of Actions and Agents
21(11)
2. Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics
32(34)
I. Traditional Ethical Intuitionism
33(6)
II. Intuitions, Intuitionism, and Reflection
39(5)
III. Self-Evidence and the Systematization of Intuitions
44(5)
IV. Reflection as a Basis for Moral Judgments
49(5)
V. Modified Ethical Intuitionism
54(12)
3. Skepticism in Theory and Practice: Justification and Truth, Rationality and Goodness
66(27)
I. Skepticism about Theoretical Reason
67(1)
II. The Practical Analogy to Theoretical Skepticism
68(4)
III. Three Major Responses to Normative Skepticism
72(4)
IV. The Irreducibility of Truth and Goodness
76(4)
V. Internalist Objectivism and Reasons for Action
80(13)
II. ETHICAL CONCEPTS AND MORAL REALISM 93(38)
4. Moral Epistemology and the Supervenience of Ethical Concepts
93(19)
I. Some Major Aims of Moral Epistemology
93(2)
II. Cognitivism versus Noncognitivism in Moral Epistemology
95(1)
III. Rationalism, Empiricism, and Supervenience in Moral Epistemology
95(2)
IV. Empiricism and Reductive Naturalism
97(2)
V. Rationalism, Naturalism, and A Priori Supervenience
99(1)
VI. Prospects for a Rationalistic Moral Realism
100(12)
5. Ethical Naturalism and the Explanatory Power of Moral Concepts
112(19)
I. The Supervenience of the Moral
113(2)
II. Explanationist Moral Realism
115(7)
III. An Alternative Moral Realism
122(9)
III. CHARACTER, RESPONSIBILITY, AND VIRTUE 131(64)
6. Self-Deception, Rationalization, and the Ethics of Belief: An Essay in Moral Psychology
131(26)
I. Self-Deception and Rationalization
132(5)
II. The Self-Deceptive Rationalization of Actions and Attitudes
137(8)
III. Self-Deception and Reasons for Acting
145(12)
7. Responsible Action and Virtuous Character
157(17)
I. The Conceptual Territory
157(2)
II. Responsibility for Character
159(5)
III. Responsibility and Control
164(2)
IV. The Internality of Responsibility
166(8)
8. Acting from Virtue
174(21)
I. Aristotelian and Kantian Conceptions of Action from Virtue
174(3)
II. The Motivation and Range of Action from Virtue
177(3)
III. The Cognitive and Motivational Grounding of Action from Virtue
180(5)
IV. The Moral Scope of Acting from Virtue
185(10)
IV. PRACTICAL REASON AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 195(104)
9. Autonomy, Reason, and Desire
195(22)
I. Autonomy as Self-Government
195(10)
II. An Instrumentalist Conception of Autonomy
205(2)
III. An Objectivist Conception of Autonomy
207(2)
IV. Autonomy and the Role of Reason
209(8)
10. Moral Judgment and Reasons for Action
217(31)
I. The Issues: Judgments, Motives, and Reasons
218(6)
II. Motivational Reasons and Motivational Internalism
224(2)
III. Practical Judgment and the Diversity of Internal Motivation
226(3)
IV. Rational Agency and the Evidential Role of Moral Motivation
229(3)
V. Normative Reasons and Motivational Internalism
232(2)
VI. Reasons Internalism and Moral Motivation
234(3)
VII. Reasons Externalism and Moral Motivation
237(11)
11. Intrinsic Value and the Dignity of Persons
248(28)
I. An Aristotelian Case for Intrinsic Goodness
249(2)
II. The Range of Purportedly Intrinsic Goods
251(3)
III. Prospects for an Aristotelian Hedonism
254(1)
IV. Axiological Experientialism
255(5)
V. The Axiological and the Deontic
260(4)
VI. The Epistemology of Value
264(4)
VII. Problems for Valuational Pluralism
268(8)
12. CONCLUSION: The Moral Justification of Actions and the Ethical Character of Persons
276(23)
I. Ethics and the Theory of Reasons for Action
276(1)
II. Epistemology and Ethical Theory
277(2)
III. The Justification of Moral Judgments: A Kantian Intuitionism
279(7)
IV. The Descriptive and Explanatory Powers of Moral Concepts
286(2)
V. Ethics in Action, Morality in Character
288(2)
VI. Virtue in Character and Moral Worth in Action
290(1)
VII. Reason and Motivation
291(3)
VIII. The Place of Value in the Foundations of Ethics
294(5)
Index 299

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