Moral Psychology: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity

Moral Psychology: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity

by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
     
 

ISBN-10: 0262693577

ISBN-13: 9780262693578

Pub. Date: 01/31/2008

Publisher: MIT Press

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary

Overview

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The contributors to volume 2
discuss recent empirical research that uses the diverse methods of cognitive science to investigate moral judgments, emotions, and actions. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include moral intuitions as a kind of fast and frugal heuristics, framing effects in moral judgments, an analogy between Chomsky's universal grammar and moral principles, the role of emotions in moral beliefs, moral disagreements, the semantics of moral language, and moral responsibility.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Professor of
Philosophy and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies at Dartmouth
College.

Contributors to volume 2: Fredrik Bjorklund, James Blair,
Paul Bloomfield, Fiery Cushman, Justin D'Arms, John Deigh, John Doris, Julia Driver,
Ben Fraser, Gerd Gigerenzer, Michael Gill, Jonathan Haidt, Marc Hauser, Daniel
Jacobson, Joshua Knobe, Brian Leiter, Don Loeb, Ron Mallon, Darcia Narvaez, Shaun
Nichols, Alexandra Plakias, Jesse Prinz, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Russ Shafer-Landau,
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Cass Sunstein, William Tolhurst, Liane Young

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780262693578
Publisher:
MIT Press
Publication date:
01/31/2008
Series:
Bradford Books Series
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
608
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d)
Age Range:
18 Years

Table of Contents


Acknowledgments     xi
Introduction   Walter Sinnott-Armstrong     xiii
Moral Intuition = Fast and Frugal Heuristics?   Gerd Gigerenzer     1
Fast, Frugal, and (Sometimes) Wrong   Cass R. Sunstein     27
Moral Heuristics and Consequentialism   Julia Driver   Don Loeb     31
Reply to Comments   Gerd Gigerenzer     41
Framing Moral Intuitions   Walter Sinnott-Armstrong     47
Moral Intuitions Framed   William Tolhurst     77
Defending Ethical Intuitionism   Russ Shafer-Landau     83
How to Apply Generalities: Reply to Tolhurst and Shafer-Landau   Walter Sinnott-Armstrong     97
Reviving Rawls's Linguistic Analogy: Operative Principles and the Causal Structure of Moral Actions   Marc D. Hauser   Liane Young   Fiery Cushman     107
Reviving Rawls's Linguistic Analogy Inside and Out   Ron Mallon     145
Resisting the Linguistic Analogy: A Commentary on Hauser, Young, and Cushman   Jesse J. Prinz     157
On Misreading the Linguistic Analogy: Response to Jesse Prinz and Ron Mallon   Marc D. Hauser   Liane Young   Fiery Cushman     171
SocialIntuitionists Answer Six Questions about Moral Psychology   Jonathan Haidt   Fredrik Bjorklund     181
Does Social Intuitionism Flatter Morality or Challenge It?   Daniel Jacobson     219
The Social Intuitionist Model: Some Counter-Intuitions   Darcia Narvaez     233
Social Intuitionists Reason, in Conversation   Jonathan Haidt   Frederick Bjorklund     241
Sentimentalism Naturalized   Shaun Nichols     255
Normative Theory or Theory of Mind? A Response to Nichols   James Blair     275
Sentimental Rules and Moral Disagreement: Comment on Nichols   Justin D'Arms     279
Sentiment, Intention, and Disagreement: Replies to Blair and D'Arms   Shaun Nichols     291
How to Argue about Disagreement: Evaluative Diversity and Moral Realism   John M. Doris   Alexandra Plakias     303
Against Convergent Moral Realism: The Respective Roles of Philosophical Argument and Empirical Evidence   Brian Leiter     333
Disagreement about Disagreement   Paul Bloomfield     339
How to Find a Disagreement: Philosophical Diversity and Moral Realism   Alexandra Plakias   John M. Doris     345
Moral Incoherentism: How to Pull a Metaphysical Rabbit out of a Semantic Hat   Don Loeb     355
Metaethical Variability, Incoherence, and Error   Michael B. Gill     387
Moral Semantics and Empirical Inquiry   Geoffrey Sayre-McCord     403
Reply to Gill and Sayre-McCord   Don Loeb     413
Attributions of Causation and Moral Responsibility   Julia Driver     423
Causal Judgment and Moral Judgment: Two Experiments   Joshua Knobe   Ben Fraser     441
Can You Be Morally Responsible for Someone's Death If Nothing You Did Caused It?   John Deigh     449
Kinds of Norms and Legal Causation: Reply to Knobe and Fraser and Deigh   Julia Driver     459
References     463
Contributors     499
Index to Volume 1     501
Index to Volume 2     529
Index to Volume 3     559

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