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Moral Realism: A Defence / Edition 1
     

Moral Realism: A Defence / Edition 1

by Russ Shafer-Landau
 

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ISBN-10: 0199280207

ISBN-13: 9780199280209

Pub. Date: 07/14/2005

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. In the tradition of Plato and G. E. Moore, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. These principles are a fundamental aspect of reality, just as much as those that govern

Overview

Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. In the tradition of Plato and G. E. Moore, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. These principles are a fundamental aspect of reality, just as much as those that govern mathematics or the natural world. They may be true regardless of our ability to grasp them, and their truth is not a matter of their being ratified from any ideal standpoint, nor of being the object of actual or hypothetical consensus, nor of being an expression of our rational nature. Shafer-Landau accepts Plato's and Moore's contention that moral truths are sui generis. He rejects the currently popular efforts to conceive of ethics as a kind of science, and insists that moral truths and properties occupy a distinctive area in our ontology. Unlike scientific truths, the fundamental moral principles are knowable a priori. And unlike mathematical truths, they are essentially normative: intrinsically action-guiding, and supplying a justification for all who follow their counsel. Moral Realism is the first comprehensive treatise defending non-naturalistic moral realism in over a generation. It ranges over all of the central issues in contemporary metaethics, and will be an important source of discussion for philosophers and their students interested in issues concerning the foundations of ethics.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780199280209
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Publication date:
07/14/2005
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
332
Product dimensions:
9.10(w) x 6.10(h) x 0.80(d)

Table of Contents

I. REALISM AND ITS CRITICS
1. The Non-cognitivist Challenge
2. The Constructivist Challenge
II. MORAL METAPHYSICS
3. Ethical Non-naturalism
4. Supervenience and Causation
III. MORAL MOTIVATION
5. Motivational Humeanism
6. Motivational Judgement Internalism
IV. MORAL REASONS
7. Reasons Internalism
8. Moral Rationalism
9. Rationality and Disagreement
V. MORAL KNOWLEDGE
10. Moral Scepticism
11. The Justification of Moral Principles
12. The Justification of Verdictive Beliefs
References
Index

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