The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War I

The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War I

by John Mosier
The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War I

The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War I

by John Mosier

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Overview

Based on previously unused French and German sources, this challenging and controversial new analysis of the war on the Western front from 1914 to 1918 reveals how and why the Germans won the major battles with one-half to one-third fewer casualties than the Allies, and how American troops in 1918 saved the Allies from defeat and a negotiated peace with the Germans.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780062084118
Publisher: HarperCollins Publishers
Publication date: 01/17/2024
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 402
Sales rank: 167,024
File size: 3 MB

About the Author

John Mosier is the author of The Myth of the Great War. He is full professor of English at Loyola University in New Orleans, where, as chair of the English Department and associate dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, he taught primarily European literature and film. His background as a military historian dates from his role in developing an interdisciplinary curriculum for the study of the two world wars, a program funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities. From 1989 to 1992 he edited the New Orleans Review. He lives in Jefferson, Louisiana.

Read an Excerpt

Chapter One

France and the Failures of National Defense, 1870-1914

An examination of the army before 1914 reveals that it was ruled
more by confusion than by logic, afflicted by institutional malfunctioning rather
than from the neat application of a coherent but
wrongheaded system of thought inspired by professional principles
and right-wing sentiments.... In the final analysis, the radical
Republic got the army it deserved....

Douglas Porch

The issues that determined how the Great War would be fought stemmed from the French war with Germany in 1870, the postwar responses to the defeat by the new French government, and the responses of the German Army to meet France's constantly shifting war plans. France's confused and volatile national defense policies forced the German military to adopt a set of weapons, a military doctrine, and a plan of action that determined how it would fight a future war.

On 19 July 1870, France declared war on Prussia, which immediately caused the German states allied with Prussia to declare war on France. Although France had forced the war on Prussia (something Bismarck had skillfully encouraged), and was thus the aggressor, the country had no coherent plan of action. Engels, writing in a London newspaper, pointed out that it hardly made any sense to declare war without then launching an invasion, but this is exactly what had happened .2

Three weeks after the French declaration of war, the French were still organizing at their frontier. The initial battles of early August were all fought right on the border, andmostly inside France: Wissembourg (the fourth), Wörth (the sixth), and Spicheren (the sixth). The French Army of the Northeast, defeated in all three engagements, retired in the direction of Châlons, a city located on the Marne River to the southeast of Reims. On the fifteenth, the French Army of the Center, based around Metz, was defeated at Vionville, and then, on the eighteenth, at Gravelotte, both small towns to the west of Metz.

The surviving French regrouped in Metz, waiting to be relieved. When the Germans defeated the relief forces on the thirtieth (at Beaumont), MacMahon left Bazaine to hold out in Metz, and withdrew to Sedan. There, in September 1870, he was wounded at the start of what both sides hoped would be the decisive battle of the war. Unlike Metz, Sedan is a city located in a bowl. Troops penned up there were helpless. The next day the emperor, Napoleon 111, was forced to surrender, along with most of what was left of France's army.

Broadly put, after 1870, France had three aims: to develop the capability to mount an effective defense of the frontier, to strengthen France militarily through alliances, and to develop a loyal and effective military. The initial effort was impressive. The first military planners of the Third Republic, of whom the military engineer Raymond-Adolphe Séré de Riviéres was the most important, sought to build a coherent policy of national defense for the new post-1870 frontier. Séré de Riviéres, who from 1872 to 1880 was France's minister of war, laid down the basic plans that would determine France's defense policy- a belt of fortifications that would protect the country from an invasion and allow France time to bring its armies onto the field. Over the next thirty years, starting with an appropriation of the then staggering sum of eighty-eight million francs in 1874, France poured an unprecedented amount of its resources into this project.' By 1914 there were over one hundred independent forts on the northeastern frontier alone, and the Belgians, under the direction of another brilliant engineering officer, Brialmont, had mounted a parallel effort that they felt would ensure their neutrality in the event of a future conflict: the three most strategically important Belgian cities (Namur, Liége, and Antwerp) were encircled by no less than forty forts.

The main forts were supplemented by dozens of small reinforced structures, called fortins or ouvrages, and carefully sited so as to dominate the terrain. The French encircled key cities that lay at critical transportation junctures with fortifications. From north to southeast, the cities of Lille, Maubeuge, Reims, Verdun, Toul, Épinal, and Belfort were, like the three Belgian cities, turned into what the French termed Places fortifiées, or fortified positions. A town like Verdun was the unfortified administrative center of a two-hundred-square-kilometer area protected by some twenty major forts and about twice that many smaller ouvrages.

The most important path into France lay along the Meuse River, which began in the Vosges Mountains down by Switzerland and ran up through France and Belgium into Holland. Major rail and road links ran alongside, and the river itself, with its connecting canals, was an important transportation artery. In Belgium, the fortified areas surrounding Liége and Namur sat astride the Meuse, as did Verdun. But from Verdun on down the river there were no fewer than twelve isolated forts on the heights of the Meuse, guarding the major crossings.

In addition, there were fortified towns and single forts stretching along the Belgian frontier from Lille to the new German frontier, and along that frontier down to Switzerland. The scheme of fortifications gave the Germans difficult choices. From the easternmost fort of Reims (Pompelle) to the westernmost fort of Verdun (Bois Bourrus) was only about forty kilometers, most of which was taken up by the Argonne Forest, a rough and dense tract of the sort European armies had traditionally avoided.

Below Verdun, there was another stretch between the river forts along the Meuse and the Moselle. But the French considered this area, the plain of the Woëvre, a swamp as unsuitable for maneuver as the Argonne. And from Épinal on down to Belfort, the forts formed a dense barrier. An invader (which could only be Germany) would either have to...

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Author Essay
I do not expect to make friends with this book. Myth fundamentally challenges the accounts of two generations of distinguished historians -- among the best in the field -- arguing that their histories of the Great War are based on flawed premises, incomplete information, and dubious logic.

Slowly and painfully, over a dozen years of research, and through extensive field research, close examination of terrain, the casualty figures, and hundreds of neglected French and German accounts, mostly by veterans of the fighting, I have concluded that much of what we know about the First World War is simply and completely flat-out wrong. This book questions almost every received idea about this war, from the execution of the von Schlieffen plan to the combat at the Marne and Verdun to the great offensives at the end of the war. The conclusions are inescapable: The Allies were consistently beaten by the Germans and lied about the results.

A controversial book is often dismissed with the observation that what's new isn't true and what's true isn't new. In The Myth of the Great War, I've tried to retell the story of the First World War in a way that both conveys an often startlingly contrarian argument and engages the reader on a narrative level.

Previous histories of World War I give us only 15 percent of the story, focusing on the actions of the British Army on 70 miles of a 475-mile front. Myth is the first account in English of the fighting on the other 400 miles of the front. It relates major battles and bloody engagements never mentioned in any other history of the war. It also makes a rather bold statement: Without American aid and American soldiers, the Allies -- who lost virtually every battle -- would not have won the war.

My research has turned up surprising facts that run against the grain of the received history of the war: More than two Allied soldiers were killed for every German one; the Germans were much more successful in combat than the Allies; the Germans had better weapons, better training, and better tactics. I was dumbfounded by that, but the evidence from some of France's most distinguished officers is undeniable.

But, for me, the most fascinating discoveries were those showing how the Allies ignored the truth and believed their own propaganda, suppressing overwhelming evidence to the contrary and smearing their own experts as defeatists. As the death toll mounted, the need to believe in manufactured victories, to believe they were slaughtering their opponents, grew. I think readers will be surprised to find how much of what has been presented as historical truth is actually recycled Allied propaganda. I certainly was.

We need to reconsider our understanding of the Great War. Instead of seeing it as an exercise in futility, we need to see it as a fundamentally modern struggle that defined the century in ways that have not yet been adequately explored. The modern age began with a horrifyingly modern war. (John Mosier)

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