In 1797, eight years after the French Revolution, an obscure general, Napoleon Bonaparte, became a national hero after a brilliant campaign in Italy. Equally impressed with his own genius, he formed the idea of conquering Egypt and, like his idol, Alexander, marching on to India. Nonfiction author and award-winning novelist Strathern (Big Idea: Scientists Who Changed the World) turns up plenty of surprises in an enthralling history of the first of Napoleon's world-class debacles. With extraordinary logistical skill and luck, Napoleon led 40,000 men and hundreds of ships across the Mediterranean to Alexandria in 1798. Defeating local armies and occupying the capital, Cairo, proved easy, but difficulties arose despite genuine efforts to replace a corrupt government with French ideals of freedom and justice. A nasty insurgency developed; Admiral Nelson destroyed Napoleon's fleet; and the British also frustrated his invasion of Palestine. Abandoning his tattered army after a year under brutal desert conditions, Napoleon returned to France, pronouncing the invasion an unqualified success. Stories of powerful men making disastrous decisions have an endless fascination, and Strathern makes the most of it in this entertaining account. Illus., maps. (Oct. 21)Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Napoleon in Egyptby Paul Strathern
“Europe is a molehill….”
Everything here is worn out…tiny Europe has not enough to offer.
We must set off for the Orient; that is where all the greatest glory is to be achieved.” —Napoleon
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt was the first Western attack in modern times on a Middle Eastern country. In this/i>… See more details below
“Europe is a molehill….”
Everything here is worn out…tiny Europe has not enough to offer.
We must set off for the Orient; that is where all the greatest glory is to be achieved.” —Napoleon
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt was the first Western attack in modern times on a Middle Eastern country. In this remarkably rich and eminently readable historical account, acclaimed author Paul Strathern reconstructs a mission of conquest inspired by glory, executed in haste, and bound for disaster.
In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte, only twenty-eight, mounted the most audacious military campaign of his already spectacular career. With 335 ships, 40,000 soldiers, and a collection of scholars, artists, scientists, and inventors, he set sail for Egypt to establish an Eastern empire in emulation of Alexander the Great. Like everything Napoleon ever attempted, it was a plan marked by unquenchable ambition, heroic romanticism, and not a little madness.
Napoleon saw himself as a liberator, freeing the Egyptians from the oppression of their Mameluke overlords. But while Napoleon thought his army would be welcomed as heroes, he tragically misunderstood Muslim culture and grossly overestimated the “gratitude” he could expect from those he’d come to save. Instead Napoleon and his men would face a grim war of attrition against an ad hoc army of Muslims led by the feared Murad Bey. Marching across seemingly endless deserts in the shadow of the pyramids, suffering extremes of heat and thirst, and pushed to the limits of human endurance, they would be plagued by mirages, suicides, and the constant threat of ambush. A crusade begun in honor and intended for glory would degenerate toward chaos and atrocity.
But Napoleon’s grand failure in Egypt also yielded vast treasures of knowledge about a culture largely lost to the West, and through the recovery of artifacts like the Rosetta Stone, it prepared the way for the translation of hieroglyphics and modern Egyptology. And it tempered the complex leader who believed it his destiny to conquer the world.
A story of war, adventure, politics, and a clash of cultures, Paul Strathern’s Napoleon in Egypt is history at once relevant and impossible to put down.
From the Hardcover edition.
Here is a compelling narrative of an epic collision between two civilizations. In May 1798, Napoléon Bonaparte launched his ill-fated invasion of Egypt. Among his 40,000 invading troops (the Army of the Orient) was a small group of French scholars whom Napoléon included in the expedition for the sole purpose of examining all aspects of Egyptian culture. Although the French fought magnificently, the ravages of disease and British naval power brought them to their knees-but not before Napoléon's "savants" unveiled the grandeur of an ancient civilization and changed forever perceptions of the history of humankind. In this riveting account of that colossal campaign, British writer and philosopher Strathern ("Philosophers in 90 Minutes" series) evokes the incredible hardships endured by French soldiers in an unforgiving land. At the same time, he offers a poignant view of a Muslim society overwhelmed by invaders who brought death and destruction in the name of brotherhood and equality. Strathern's skillful use of memoir and other primary sources brings to life one of the most fascinating campaigns in military history. Libraries that have already purchased Juan Cole's Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East should still consider this more cohesive and less didactic account of a long-ignored Napoleonic misadventure. Specialists should also be intrigued by Strathern's analysis of the complex motives for France's invasion of Egypt. Highly recommended for both academic and public libraries.-Jim Doyle, Rome, GA
“In between the battle scenes, Strathern paints a portrait of Napoleon the man, sketching his humiliation over wife Josephine’s infidelities and his implausibly lofty ideals, which spawned a generation of Romantic artists.”—Kirkus Reviews
“Paul Strathern’s enthralling description of this bizarre imperial adventure reads like Conrad’s Heart of Darkness….As a piece of storytelling, it is a masterpiece.” —Daily Telegraph
“As a stirring narrative of doomed military endeavour, [Strathern’s] book could hardly be bettered.” —Sunday Times
“Ambitious and wonderfully detailed saga...Strathern admirably balances the various legacies of the expedition while keeping the focus on its military character.” —Financial Times Magazine
“Those looking for an exciting, comprehensive narrative history of the whole expedition are advised to hunt down [this book].” —Tom Reiss, author of The Orientalist
“Very entertaining and well-written book. Strathern is very careful about his sources . . . so that a finely balanced picture emerges.” —Times Literary Supplement
“A well-written, fast-paced narrative . . . This book is a welcome and readable addition to the ever-growing library of books about this French colossus.” —BBC History Magazine
“[Strathern] has written a stirring narrative of the Egyptian adventure, which simultaneously demonstrates how Napoleon’s experiences in Egypt foreshadowed many aspects of his later rule in France.…This is popular narrative history at its best.” — Independent
”Superb . . . Strathern tells the appalling tale of the forced marches across endless deserts . . . with commendable gusto.” —Sunday Telegraph
"Illuiminating.... Napoleon in Egypt is undoubtedly the finest account of the Savants and their contribution to the fields of archaeology, ancient history, and botany to date.... A necessary addition to any Napoleonic shelf."—Christian Science Monitor
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The Origins of the Egyptian Campaign
Since earliest times, Egypt had been a source of wonder to the European eye. The ancient Greek historian Herodotus, visiting the country in the mid fifth century BC, encountered the following scene: "During the flooding of the Nile only the towns are visible, rising above the surface of the water like the scattered islands of the Aegean Sea. While the inundation continues, boats no longer keep to the channels and rivers, but sail across the fields and plains. On a journey far inland you can even sail past the pyramids." Less than two centuries later, the Macedonian Greek Alexander the Great conquered Egypt, completing this task in a matter of months, but remaining long enough to found the city of Alexandria, whose site he selected in 331 BC at what was then the western mouth of the Nile delta. After this, in what appeared to be a characteristic act of hubris, but was in fact an attempt to win over the local priesthood, Alexander sacrificed to the sacred bull Apis and had himself crowned pharaoh. He then set off east on his campaign of conquest against the Persians, during which he planted the seeds of Greek culture across a great swath of Asia. Eight years later, having extended his conquests to the limits of the known world, Alexander died after a drinking bout in Babylon, and his body was brought back to Alexandria to be buried in a magnificent tomb, made of gold and glass, whose site has since been lost.
In Roman times, Egypt would become the granary of the Mediterranean world, providing over a third of the grain supplies for the entire Roman Empire. During the first century BC Alexandria would become the focus of stirring events which changed the fate of that empire, when the charms of Cleopatra, queen of Egypt, proved irresistible first to Julius Caesar and then to Mark Antony, while rivalry between these two ambitious men plunged the Roman Empire into civil war.
Under the Greeks, and then the Romans, Alexandria would become the intellectual capital of the Western world, the city that produced Euclid and educated Archimedes, its celebrated library a repository of all knowledge. It was here that Eratosthenes calculated the circumference of the earth and its distance from the sun. For the latter, he used the known fact that on a certain day the sun could be seen at the foot of a deep well in Aswan 500 miles to the south, and was thus directly overhead. He then measured the length of the shadow cast by a pole in Alexandria, and thus the angle of the sun's rays there; using trigonometry, he then calculated the distance of the sun within around 5 percent of the accepted modern figure. Such was the reach and achievement of Alexandrian learning at its prime. When its library burned down in two disastrous fires, the last of which was started by zealot Christians in AD 391, the ancient world lost over half a million scrolls, and with these as much as a quarter of the knowledge and cultural heritage of Western civilization vanished forever.
French interest in Egypt began with the Seventh Crusade in the thirteenth century, led by Louis IX (who partly on account of this became known as St. Louis). In 1248 the king and over 30,000 men disembarked from 100 ships near Damietta on the Nile delta. Here they encountered the full might of the Mameluke cavalry, which inflicted on them a crushing defeat, capturing Louis and holding him to ransom.
The Mameluke cavalry was arguably the greatest war machine of the period, certainly superior to any European militia. In 1260, just ten years after the debacle of the Seventh Crusade, the Mameluke cavalry would encounter the Mongol hordes of Genghis Khan's successor at the Battle of Ayn Jalut, just north of Jerusalem. Here they put the Mongol cavalry to flight, thus destroying for the first time the myth of their invincibility. Had the Mamelukes lost this battle, the Mongols could have pressed on across North Africa into Spain, encircling Europe. Not for nothing has this victory been reckoned as one of the great turning points of history, though it passed unnoticed in the medieval world it rescued. Meanwhile, to the European mind Egypt remained for the most part a land of Biblical legend: the setting of the plague of frogs, the Nile turning to blood, and Moses' parting of the Red Sea.
Four hundred years later, the German philosopher Leibniz would approach Louis XIV with a meticulously detailed plan for a French invasion of Egypt, including details of a Suez canal to facilitate trade with the Indies. Despite such lofty foresight, Leibniz's motive was in fact down to earth and devious: his employer, the Elector of Mainz, wished to divert the Sun King from invading the German states. But Louis rejected Leibniz's idea, informing him that "since the days of St. Louis, such expeditions have gone out of fashion." The papers detailing the scheme would gather dust in the archives at Hanover after Leibniz's death. It has been suggested that Napoleon might have been inspired by these plans, but it is now certain that he had no idea of their existence until he passed through Hanover in 1803, some years after his Egyptian expedition. When they were drawn to his attention, he remarked cryptically: "This work is very curious." Nonetheless, Leibniz's plans remain relevant; his scheme represented a trend that would flourish recurrently during the ensuing centuries: namely, the European habit of exporting internal conflicts to the territories of other continents.
Despite the rejection of Leibniz's scheme, during the ensuing century France expanded its colonial empire to Canada, Louisiana, the West Indies and India. Other European powers were engaged in similar enterprises, and this soon resulted in conflict, most notably between Britain and France. Britain's growing economic and maritime power eventually tipped the balance, with rapid and disastrous effect on the French colonies. In 1761 France lost Pondicherry and trading posts on the east coast of India; in 1762-3 it was forced to cede the Louisiana Territory to the Spanish and the British; and in 1763 it lost sovereignty over its Canadian colonies to Britain. France's valuable sugar-producing colonies in the West Indies—Martinique, Guadeloupe and Saint-Dominique (Haiti)—now looked particularly vulnerable. Mindful of this state of affairs, Louis XV's foreign minister, the Duc de Choiseul, came up with a scheme to take over Egypt in 1769, the very year Napoleon was born. Given Egypt's climate and its plentiful cheap labor, it was ideal for sugar plantations, and could easily supplant if not exceed France's imports from the West Indies. The fact that Egypt was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, a long-term ally of France, could easily be overcome by the simple expedient of buying it from the Turks. The following year the aging Louis XV took the courtesan Madame du Barry as his mistress, de Choiseul fell from favor, and his planned introduction of retail theory into foreign policy was shelved.
Yet France's colonial situation remained under threat, and in 1776 the idea of turning Egypt into a French colony was resurrected, when the Ministry of the Navy decided to dispatch an envoy there. The man chosen was Baron François de Tott, a Frenchman of Hungarian descent who had lived in the eastern Mediterranean for several years and had much experience of Levantine affairs. Yet this experience would prove of little avail. On his arrival in Cairo, de Tott was immediately escorted to the Citadel, the city's fortress, where he had an audience with the pasha "surrounded by all the pomp of his Vizirate." De Tott described how "the Pasha sent away the crowd which filled the hall of the Divan, [whereupon] he confided to me that there was a fermentation amongst the beys (a sure sign that a revolution was about to take place)." No sooner had de Tott arrived at the French consul's house than a revolt duly erupted and he found himself barricaded in for his own safety "while the ruling beys took possession of the Citadel, forcing the Pasha with a pistol under his throat to issue an order banishing the revolters into exile . . . but the rebels, despising such vain formalities, began firing at their enemies. . . . After several days of blasting their guns, with more noise than effect, the ruling beys fled from the Citadel into Upper Egypt . . . and a new group of beys declared themselves to be in charge." Such chaos had now become a regular feature of life in Egypt, with the pasha, who was nominally the Ottoman ruler, reduced to a mere figurehead at the mercy of the beys, the ruling provincial chieftains, all of whom were members of the warrior caste of Mamelukes.
The Mamelukes had a long history in Egypt. They were originally brought into the country around 1230 by the ruling Ayyubite sultan al-Malik, who purchased 12,000 youths from Turkey to strengthen his army. The word Mameluke derives from mamluk, the Arabic for "slave" or "bought man," though in this case the latter is closer to the actuality. In a remarkably short time the imported Mamelukes had molded themselves into the fearsome fighting force encountered by Louis IX and the Seventh Crusade in 1248. Ten years later they became the major power in the land, murdering al-Malik's successor and establishing their own dynasty. At this stage they appear to have been largely Turkic—non-Arab and non-Muslim in origin, often barely understanding Arabic. Yet curiously it was under this new dynasty that Egypt became established as the center of Arabic culture in the Muslim world, with the great Al-Azhar mosque as a beacon of learning, its medical and mathematical knowledge far outshining anything in medieval Europe. This was mainly due to the influx of refugee scholars from such places as Baghdad and Damascus, fleeing in the face of the Mongol hordes. Had the Mamelukes not defeated the Mongols at the Battle of Ayn Jalut in 1260, the Muslim world, much like medieval Europe, would not have survived.
Yet just twenty years later this invincible force would begin a long decline. Initially this was because its ethnic origins changed. From now on, the imported youths were of Caucasian origin—Georgians and Circassians from remote mountain villages who had had little contact with civilization. As a result, the Mamelukes became more tribalized and disorganized.
In 1517 Egypt was overrun by the Turks and became part of the expanding Ottoman Empire. Egypt was now ruled from Constantinople by the distant Sublime Porte, the Turkish administration under the sultan's vizier. A pasha was installed in Cairo, and the country was obliged to pay annual tribute (miry) to the Turkish sultan. But in fact, the power of the beys who ruled over the various regions, each with their company of young, freshly imported Mamelukes, remained largely unchanged. The Porte in faraway Constantinople was not concerned, as long as there was a semblance of peace and the sultan received his miry. Over 200 years later, this had degenerated into the farcical situation encountered by de Tott. Each time a new pasha was sent from Constantinople, he would be greeted ceremoniously by the ruling beys and escorted to the Citadel, where he would be installed in some style. Here he would remain under virtual house arrest with little power to do anything but issue the occasional imperial decree (firman), whose contents and effectiveness were entirely under the control of whichever group of beys held the upper hand. Should any pasha attempt to interfere with this arrangement, a request would be sent to the Porte for a replacement, and one would duly be sent.
The Mamelukes maintained their social position and ethnic purity by the simple expedient of not recognizing mixed offspring. Although their chieftains, the ruling beys, frequently kept harems of local Egyptian women, occasionally including darker Nubians or Abyssinians from the south, they only took wives of Mameluke stock, who were imported from the Caucasus for this purpose. These seldom produced children, owing to their habit of aborting themselves when pregnant, as they believed that not giving birth helped maintain their youth, beauty and attractiveness to their husbands.
The Mamelukes thus relied upon youths imported from the Caucasus region to keep up their population, which usually stood at between 10,000 and 12,000. When these youths arrived in Egypt, they were usually of prepubescent age, sometimes as young as eight years old, and were immediately subjected to a fierce disciplinary regimen aimed at instilling the warrior virtues of the Mamelukes. Only when a Mameluke reached a certain military rank, and took command of other warriors, did he achieve the status of a free man, whereupon he was allowed to grow a beard. From this time on, the mounted Mameluke was attended by two Egyptian serradj, attendants on foot, who accompanied him into battle, bearing his extra arms.
By the late eighteenth century, Egypt was divided into around two dozen regions, each ruled by its own Mameluke bey, assisted by what was virtually his own private Mameluke army, whose duties remained purely military. No Mameluke ever stooped to labor in the fields or gather the harvest. The beys kept a firm hold over the fellahin, the local peasantry of their own region, extracting taxes and maintaining a regime that kept the fellahin downtrodden and allowed little development of any sort—economic, social or cultural. The territory outside a bey's immediate domain was of little interest to him, which meant that the fierce nomadic Bedouin tribesmen had free rein over the extensive wilderness and desert regions of the country, thus further hindering the development of trade along the routes that passed through these regions.
The beys themselves formed groups of allegiance, creating a hierarchy that supported the two senior sheiks, who ruled from Cairo. One of these was the Sheik el-Beled (chief of the country), who took control of the Ottoman pasha and ensured that the necessary annual tribute was collected and dispatched to Constantinople. The other held the title of Emir el-Hadj (leader of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca), an important post, as the large numbers of pilgrims required protection from the Bedouin and other predators. In general, there were two great pilgrimages during this period. From the west came pilgrims from as far afield as Niger and Morocco, converging on Cairo. From the north, as many as 40,000 pilgrims accompanied by anything up to 35,000 camels converged on Damascus. These pilgrimages then joined up and made their way to Mecca. The organization of the Cairo pilgrimage involved considerable power and military resources, requiring widespread cooperation amongst the beys, a situation which was often placed under considerable strain by unruly Mameluke behavior.
De Tott's arrival in Cairo in 1777 had coincided with one of the frequent shifts of power in the Mameluke hierarchy. However, his eventual report to the French Ministry of the Navy was determinedly optimistic. Despite the little difficulty he had encountered in Cairo, he could see, or chose to see, no problem whatsoever in mounting an invasion, which would result in "the peaceful occupation of a defenseless country." This report was gratefully received in Paris, where it met with the fate of so many such reports: it was duly filed and ignored.
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