A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America's Relations with the Muslim World
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A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America's Relations with the Muslim World
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Overview
Intelligence insider Emile Nakhleh argues that an engagement with the Muslim world benefits the national interest of the United States. Therefore, the next administration should discard the terrorism prism through which the country has viewed political Islam since 9/11 and focus instead on the common interests of America and mainstream Muslims. Nakhleh investigates recent U.S. policy toward Islamic nations and offers the new administration a ten-point plan for rebuilding America's relationship with the Muslim world. The author demonstrates that winning over Arabs and Muslims requires a thorough knowledge of Arab and Muslim cultures and languages within our intelligence community, as well as a long-term American commitment of personnel and resources. While the success of these efforts will be incremental and hard to measure, Nakhleh believes that the current low standing of the United States in most Arab and Muslim countries can be reversed.
Stressing that effective public diplomacy must be a serious, coordinated effort pursued at the highest political levels, A Necessary Engagement charts a new course for future ties between the United States and the Islamic world.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780691135250 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Princeton University Press |
| Publication date: | 01/18/2009 |
| Series: | Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics , #27 |
| Pages: | 184 |
| Product dimensions: | 5.50(w) x 8.50(h) x 0.80(d) |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
A Necessary Engagement
REINVENTING AMERICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM WORLDBy Emile A. Nakhleh
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 2009 Princeton University PressAll right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-13525-0
Chapter One
POLITICAL ISLAM AND ISLAMIZATION
On my visits to Muslim countries, which in the business are known as TDYs or temporary duty visits, I entered numerous mosques (my colleagues used to joke that my TDYs involved "mosque hopping" or "mosque crashing") and spoke to dozens of imams and 'ulama (religious scholars). My Muslim interlocutors in these countries included ordinary people, mainstream thinkers, writers, journalists, and academics, political party activists, NGO officials, "establishment" (mostly adhering to the government line) and nonestablishment clerics, pro-democracy advocates, radical thinkers and jihadists, businessmen, restaurateurs, taxi drivers, farmers, and booksellers. During these visits, I also met government officials and interacted with allied intelligence services in dozens of countries. The analysis of what follows is informed primarily by these many discussions and interviews.
The goal of these visits was threefold: first, to track the growth of Islamization and Islamic activism across many countries, to study their manifestations, and to identify the factors that drive them; second, to compare and contrast the growth of Islamic activism in different Muslim countries and to develop a useful sense of the stages of Islamic activism; and third, to analyze how Islamic activists from different cultures, races, and sects understand the phenomenon of Islamization and use it as a basis for their political, economic, and social activism. My research focused on seeking answers to a range of questions: What theological arguments do Muslims advance to justify their activism as Muslims and as citizens of Muslim and non-Muslim countries? Why do some activists turn to Islam as an identity anchor, whereas others turn to nationalism? What factors determine the type of religious ideology-moderate and tolerant or radical and intolerant-they espouse as a foundation for their newfound activism? At the conclusion of each visit, I made recommendations to senior policymakers on the long-term implications of Islamic activism and assessed whether such a phenomenon poses a short- or long-term threat to the United States and to friendly countries and regimes. As an intelligence officer, the author upheld the intelligence community's golden rule that intelligence officers do not make policy; they only inform it.
In talking to activists from various Islamic political parties-whether the Islamic Party of Malaysia, AKP in Turkey, Justice and Development in Morocco, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, the Islamic Movement in Israel, or Hamas in Palestine-I was especially interested in learning whether their commitment to participatory government and democracy represented a tactical ploy to get them to power or a strategic shift toward accepting "man-made" democracy. Some argued they were genuinely committed to a pluralist form of government in which minorities-religious (Sunni or Shia), ethnic, and racial-would be afforded equal opportunities; others were not so categorical. The key question our policymakers asked about Islamic political parties was, Were they committed to a gradual, peaceful process of change and have they disavowed violence and terrorism as a means of pursuing their political goals?
In my interviews with a variety of Muslim activists, mainstreamers and radicals, I attempted to trace the process of radicalization and how young people in a particular country or community make the transition from moderation and tolerance to radicalism, the factors that drive this transformation, and how some of them ultimately translate their acquired radicalization and "jihadization" into acts of terror. That is to say, how does a young man move from being a nonpracticing Muslim to becoming a devout and observant Muslim and from there to a stage where he could justify the use of violence as part of his jihad in the service of his faith and global Islamic causes? When I asked a young Pakistani why he was going to Kashmir to do jihad against the Indians, he answered, "Why not? Kashmir is part of Islamic jihad." Then I asked, if the opportunity presented itself for him to go to Chechnya to fight against the Russians, would he go? "Of course," he replied. I turned to his father for an explanation. He said that his son's "jihad" would help him serve Islam and would give him an opportunity to leave that small village and make something of himself. If he is "martyred" in the process, he would be rewarded in eternal life. This might be a typical case of how a young man goes through the process of transformation from being a "normal" or "unremarkable" kid to becoming a jihadist. He drops out or, if lucky, graduates from high school, cannot find a job, starts frequenting the neighborhood mosque, gets indoctrinated by an activist imam or a cleric about the "enemies" of Islam and the duty to do jihad, meets a like-minded group, and is given useful contacts, papers, and some cash to travel to Kashmir or other places to do jihad.
This young man and others like him become ready recruits for terrorism. The jihadist-terrorist tendency is strengthened as the young man arrives at his destination and begins to interact with other jihadists, from Pakistan and elsewhere. Training, linkages with individuals and networks, and ideological indoctrination continue as the young jihadist becomes more engrossed in what he is made to believe is a rightful struggle in the defense of the faith. Many Muslim interlocutors correctly pointed out to me that jihad was not synonymous with terrorism. They argued that despite the fact that many non-Muslims equate jihad with terrorism, most Muslims view jihad as a religious effort-for example, fasting, prayer, and almsgiving-which aims at bringing Muslims closer to God. A Muslim journalist told me, "Jihad has nothing to do with terrorism."
Most of the Muslims I met, especially those who are members of political parties, movements, or groups or who work for NGOs, expressed strong interest in participating in a democratic political process and would like to see the American government exert more pressure on their governments to allow Islamic parties and movements to participate in elections openly, freely, and without harassment. I heard these calls for a stronger American push for democratization loudest in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, and Kenya. Islamic parties have already participated in elections in the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia, but in many countries-for example Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia-the governments and their security services tightly control the electoral process and prescribe only a narrow space within which Islamic political parties can operate. These regimes often speak in the language of democracy but resist genuine calls for political reforms. They paint all opposition-secular and Islamic-with the same broad brush and either exclude them from the political process or co-opt them into acquiescence. The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 gave many of these regimes an excuse to silence all forms of opposition in the name of fighting terrorism, and they have used their antiterrorism rhetoric to garner Western support of their repressive policies.
Islamization and Islamic Activism
Beginning in the early 1990s, when I started my visits to Muslim countries, I began to sense a growing awareness among Muslims, individuals and groups, of their faith as a moral compass of their daily lives, a guide for their social interactions and political activism, and a basis of their worldview. Their Muslim identity became dominant over other identities and began to drive many of their political and other activities. The growth of this phenomenon, which has come to be known as Islamization, varies from one country to the next and from one Muslim community to the next. Islamization initially was more visible in Muslim majority countries but in a few years spread to Muslim minority countries. Islamic activists in different countries have offered diverse definitions of Islamization, depending on their religious ideologies, historical experiences, sectarian affiliations, and legal schools of thought to which they belong.
For many activists I spoke with, Islam is total way of life that encompasses faith, the world community, and the state, or what they call the three Ds in Arabic-din (faith), dunya (world), and dawla (state)-and some activists also maintain that Islam is the solution, or Islam hua al-hal in Arabic, to their social, political, and economic ills. "Islam is the solution" has been a major slogan in the election campaigns of several Islamic political parties, especially the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, and in some cases the Islamic Party of Malaysia. Some Islamic activists, especially the radicals, also believe that the political, military, and economic weaknesses of Muslims in the modern era are due to Muslims having strayed from Islam and followed non-Islamic ideologies and values and that the renewal and reform of Muslim societies can be achieved only through an Islamic system of government and law.
On a visit to Turkey in the mid-1990s, I had an interesting discussion with a leading thinker of the Islamic political party Refah about the nature of Islamization and its relevance to Turkish political life, especially as "laicist" or "secular" Turkey was striving to acquire membership in the European Union. He said he viewed Islam as the moral compass of Turkey regardless of the pervasive control of the military, under the direction of the Turkish General Staff, and that secular Kemalism, which was introduced by Mustapha Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s, is an aberration, not the norm. He argued that Kemalism never took root beyond the thin sliver of university-educated elites in the urban centers of Ankara and Istanbul and that Turkey has always been an Ottoman Muslim state. Maintaining that Turkey has very little in common with Europe, he claimed that over the centuries the relationship between the two sides has been one of conquest and conflict and that Turkey should look south toward the Arab Muslim world, not to the Christian north. "Islamization is a good thing for Muslims," he said, because it helps them rediscover their Islamic traditions and heritage.
Islamic activists who have been involved in territorial conflicts, either against their governments or against a foreign occupation, have viewed the rise of Islamization among Muslims as a vehicle to mobilize their human and financial resources in the fight for their territory, either to gain autonomy from the central government or to liberate it from a foreign occupation. Islamic activists in Mindanao in the Philippines, in Xinjian Province in China, and in Aceh in Indonesia, for example, have struggled for territorial autonomy, whereas activists in Chechnya, Palestine, and Lebanon (before the Israeli withdrawal in 2000) have worked to liberate their territory from a perceived foreign occupation. These activists viewed Islamization as a source of their territorial-nationalist jihad, not as a path to global jihad advocated by al-Qa'ida, Usama Bin Ladin, or his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Between the "territorial" activists and the global jihadists, there are some groups that focus on creating a Sharia-based society in specific regions of the world transcending individual states. These movements, which include Jema'a Islamiya in Southeast Asia, Hizb al-Tahrir in Central Asia and the Middle East, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, view Islamization as a vehicle in their struggle to establish Islamic communities in those parts of the world. They tend to be closer ideologically and operationally to the global jihad paradigm than to the nationalist jihads of Hamas, the Chechens, and others. Hizb al-Tahrir, in particular, strives for the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate.
Islamic activists in Indonesia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Tunisia, Nigeria, and Jordan, for example, use Islamization to force their political leadership, which is ostensibly Muslim, to act more in accordance with Islamic law or Sharia. Muslim interlocutors in these countries have told me over the years that they strongly object to the "un-Islamic" behavior of their leaders; however, as these activists have come to realize that they could not dislodge their rulers from office, especially with the growing strength of the military and the security forces, they have turned their activism toward Islamizing their society from below. During a visit to Egypt, a Muslim Brotherhood member told me, "You Islamize society from below and the regimes will follow." The statement reminded me of the American baseball field story: "You build it, and they will come!" The governor of the Zamfara state in northern Nigeria gave a similar rationalization for his decision to institute Sharia in his state in the late 1990s.
In addition to mainstream Islamic activists, radical segments of Muslim societies have also pushed Islamization among their followers. As indicated in numerous interviews, "radical" is used in this context to reflect an exclusivist, narrow-minded, and rigid view of Islam and support for aggressive jihad, including the use of force. Several of the interlocutors who considered themselves radical claimed they did not engage in violence or illegal forms of jihad, but neither did they condemn the use of violence to further their cause. Other radical interlocutors justified the use of violence against perceived enemies of Islam. To these radicals, Islamization is a means to defend the faith in the face of the onslaught by the infidels. Radicals, whether in Indonesia or Uzbekistan, agreed on a few key points: many Muslim rulers and regimes engage in an un-Islamic behavior; Muslims are obliged to fight and overthrow such regimes and their Muslim supporters; jihad against unbelievers-Muslims and non-Muslims-is a religious duty that must be pursued by all means, including violence; opposition to perceived illegitimate Muslim governments often extends to the official clergy and state-supported mosques; and, while this jihad is country-specific, it is part and parcel of a global jihad against all enemies of Islam, near and far.
A critical difference between mainstream activists and radical jihadists is their approach to change. Mainstreamers often said that they believe in gradual change through peaceful means, including the ballot box, and that if they concentrate their efforts on social change, for example in the areas of education and judiciary, society will ultimately become more Sharia friendly. By contrast, radical activists-whether at Guantanamo or in a comfortable hotel lounge in Jakarta-make it clear they have given up on gradual change because entrenched regimes will not allow meaningful change to occur and that the electoral process in many Arab and Muslim countries is a farcical game designed to placate the populace while maintaining the regime's hold on power. To the radicals, the collusion between many Muslim regimes and the enemies of Islam-presumably the United States and Israel-have made them apostates who should be removed from power.
When I asked a radical jihadist at Guantanamo what he planned to do if and when he is released, he answered without hesitation that he would continue his jihad against the United States and pro-U.S. regimes, ticking off the names of Mubarak of Egypt, Saleh of Yemen, Musharraf of Pakistan, the two Abdallahs of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and Ben Ali of Tunisia. Other detainees at Guantanamo who were caught in the dragnet net after 9/11 did not share that jihadist's radical views against the United States or other countries. In a conversation I had with a Hizb al-Tahrir activist in Indonesia, he calmly told me over lunch that he justified the use of violence against the Americans and other enemies of Islam, even though such violence might lead to the killing of innocent bystanders. In his view, the United States and other Western countries have already employed this type of violence against Muslims throughout the Islamic world, including in Palestine, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Iraq.
(Continues...)
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Table of Contents
Author's Note ix
Introduction xi
Chapter 1: Political Islam and Islamization 1
Islamization and Islamic Activism 4
Stages of Islamization 8
Islamic Activism and Radicalization 12
Islamic Radicals and WMD 14
Manifestations of Islamization 17
Factors Contributing to Islamization 20
Education and Islamization 23
Shia Activism 26
Islamic Political Party Politics 30
Islamic Activism, CIA Briefings, and U.S. Policy Responses 33
Chapter 2: Intelligence, Political Islam, and Policymakers 37
Intelligence and Policy: Roots of Tension 38
Politics Trumps National Security 40
Building Expertise 41
Academic Outreach 43
Training of Analysts 46
Cultural Expertise and Intelligence Analysis 47
Open-Source Data Mining 50
Visiting Muslim Countries 51
Analytic Products, Briefings, and Policymakers' Response 53
Iraq: Critical Briefings before and aft er the Invasion 54
Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the American Response 61
Authoritarian Regimes and Political Reform 64
Bureaucratic Impediments 66
Collecting Data on Political Islam 68
Chapter 3: Public Diplomacy: Issues and Attitudes 71
Polls and Attitudes 73
Global War on Terror 80
Invading Muslim Countries 84
Democratization 90
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: An "Honest Broker" Role? 94
Unilateralism Resonates Poorly 98
Chapter 4: Public Diplomacy: A Blueprint 101
Caveats and Challenges 105
Secularists and Modernists 107
Traditionalists and Radical Salafis 112
Core Themes 120
A Blueprint 125
Conclusion
Looking Ahead 140
Acknowledgments 145
Glossary 147
Sources Cited 151
Index 155
What People are Saying About This
Nakhleh outlines a new and revitalized course for American public diplomacy among Muslims around the world. The importance and timeliness of the book's topic can hardly be exaggerated and A Necessary Engagement should be required reading for officials in the next administration.
— Sohail Hashmi, Mount Holyoke College
A Necessary Engagement reflects a rare expertise in the intelligence community on political Islam and Muslim cultures. Emile Nakhleh has produced a thoughtful and sophisticated analysis on a subject that is more important today than ever. It is a must read for policymakers in a new administration that will need a road map to both understand and engage the Islamic world.
— George J. Tenet, former CIA director
This is an informed and sobering assessment of the past, present, and future of America's relations with the Muslim world. Emile Nakhleh provides an incisive analysis of the myths and reality of the Islamic challenge facing America and how American policymakers have understood and reacted to that challenge. All those interested in the future of America's relations with the Muslim world will do well to pay close attention to this timely and informative book.
— Vali Nasr, author of "The Shia Revival"
This book offers fascinating insights into how intelligence bureaucracies operate and how organizational habits of thought can be challenged and changed. Making a strong case for the links between political intelligence and public diplomacy, Nakhleh offers intelligence professionals, policymakers, scholars, and the general public what they need to know in order to understand the cultural and religious dimensions of international politics.
— Dale F. Eickelman, author of "The Middle East and Central Asia"
On the key foreign policy issue of U.S. relations with the Muslim world, Nakhleh's conclusions are levelheaded, to the point, and eminently reasonable. The author's wealth of experience and rich sources make this book an important contribution to the public debate.
— Farhad Kazemi, New York University
"A Necessary Engagement reflects a rare expertise in the intelligence community on political Islam and Muslim cultures. Emile Nakhleh has produced a thoughtful and sophisticated analysis on a subject that is more important today than ever. It is a must read for policymakers in a new administration that will need a road map to both understand and engage the Islamic world."—George J. Tenet, former CIA director"This is an informed and sobering assessment of the past, present, and future of America's relations with the Muslim world. Emile Nakhleh provides an incisive analysis of the myths and reality of the Islamic challenge facing America and how American policymakers have understood and reacted to that challenge. All those interested in the future of America's relations with the Muslim world will do well to pay close attention to this timely and informative book."—Vali Nasr, author of The Shia Revival"This book offers fascinating insights into how intelligence bureaucracies operate and how organizational habits of thought can be challenged and changed. Making a strong case for the links between political intelligence and public diplomacy, Nakhleh offers intelligence professionals, policymakers, scholars, and the general public what they need to know in order to understand the cultural and religious dimensions of international politics."—Dale F. Eickelman, author of The Middle East and Central Asia"On the key foreign policy issue of U.S. relations with the Muslim world, Nakhleh's conclusions are levelheaded, to the point, and eminently reasonable. The author's wealth of experience and rich sources make this book an important contribution to the public debate."—Farhad Kazemi, New York University"Nakhleh outlines a new and revitalized course for American public diplomacy among Muslims around the world. The importance and timeliness of the book's topic can hardly be exaggerated and A Necessary Engagement should be required reading for officials in the next administration."—Sohail Hashmi, Mount Holyoke College