Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East [NOOK Book]

Overview

Nuclear Logics examines why some states seek nuclear weapons while others renounce them. Looking closely at nine cases in East Asia and the Middle East, Etel Solingen finds two distinct regional patterns. In East Asia, the norm since the late 1960s has been to forswear nuclear weapons, and North Korea, which makes no secret of its nuclear ambitions, is the anomaly. In the Middle East the opposite is the case, with Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya suspected of pursuing nuclear-weapons capabilities, with Egypt as the ...

See more details below
Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East

Available on NOOK devices and apps  
  • NOOK Devices
  • NOOK HD/HD+ Tablet
  • NOOK
  • NOOK Color
  • NOOK Tablet
  • Tablet/Phone
  • NOOK for Windows 8 Tablet
  • NOOK for iOS
  • NOOK for Android
  • NOOK Kids for iPad
  • PC/Mac
  • NOOK for Windows 8
  • NOOK for PC
  • NOOK for Mac
  • NOOK Study
  • NOOK for Web

Want a NOOK? Explore Now

NOOK Book (eBook - Course Book)
$19.49
BN.com price
(Save 44%)$35.00 List Price

Overview

Nuclear Logics examines why some states seek nuclear weapons while others renounce them. Looking closely at nine cases in East Asia and the Middle East, Etel Solingen finds two distinct regional patterns. In East Asia, the norm since the late 1960s has been to forswear nuclear weapons, and North Korea, which makes no secret of its nuclear ambitions, is the anomaly. In the Middle East the opposite is the case, with Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya suspected of pursuing nuclear-weapons capabilities, with Egypt as the anomaly in recent decades.

Identifying the domestic conditions underlying these divergent paths, Solingen argues that there are clear differences between states whose leaders advocate integration in the global economy and those that reject it. Among the former are countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, whose leaders have had stronger incentives to avoid the political, economic, and other costs of acquiring nuclear weapons. The latter, as in most cases in the Middle East, have had stronger incentives to exploit nuclear weapons as tools in nationalist platforms geared to helping their leaders survive in power. Solingen complements her bold argument with other logics explaining nuclear behavior, including security dilemmas, international norms and institutions, and the role of democracy and authoritarianism. Her account charts the most important frontier in understanding nuclear proliferation: grasping the relationship between internal and external political survival. Nuclear Logics is a pioneering book that is certain to provide an invaluable resource for researchers, teachers, and practitioners while reframing the policy debate surrounding nonproliferation.

Read More Show Less

Editorial Reviews

International History Review
Debates about the relevance of systematic political science theory for the maker of concrete policy decisions will perhaps never end. Solingen is to be congratulated for creating an interesting vehicle for such debate.
— George H. Quester
Political Studies Review
Nuclear Logics is a ground-breaking work demonstrating how theory-oriented studies in political science should be conducted. Nuclear Logics is an admirable undertaking which makes an indispensable contribution to IR theory development.
— Shih-Yu Chou
International Studies Review
The most comprehensive, theoretical, and systematic challenge [to system-level imperatives] in years. . . . This is an impressive work . . . of primary value to experts and graduate students.
International Affairs
Solingen's argument is cogent and well researched . . . convincing and intuitive . . . demolishes the structural realist account. . . . It deserves a wide readership.
Survival
A serious, scholarly piece of work . . . reinvigorating the already rich theoretical debate on this issue. . . . Her methodological tools could prove useful in determining which Middle Eastern countries are more likely to go nuclear in reaction to Iran's programme.
International Security
The cutting edge of nonproliferation research . . . should be of great interest to both policy practitioners and scholars. [This book] display(s) a combination of theoretical sophistication, methodological rigor, focused comparative analysis involving original field research, and attention to hypothesis testing rarely found in the nonproliferation literature.
Political Science Quarterly
[A]mbitious, insightful, and informative. . . . The book is most impressive . . . in its deliberate and judicious assessment of explanations drawn from relevant realist, neoliberal, constructivist, and democracy literatures. Indeed, the reasoned assault on realist arguments gives this book considerable punch.
— James H. Lebovic
The Nonproliferation Review
Proliferation theory steps outside the ivory tower in Etel Solingen's recent book, Nuclear Logics.
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
As a work about International Relations theories of nuclear decisions, there should be little, if any, to be added to this remarkable achievement by Solingen.
— Matake Kamiya
Political Studies Review - Shih-Yu Chou
Nuclear Logics is a ground-breaking work demonstrating how theory-oriented studies in political science should be conducted. Nuclear Logics is an admirable undertaking which makes an indispensable contribution to IR theory development.
International Affairs - Michael Vance
Nuclear Logics is a timely study with important theoretical and practical implications. At the theoretical level, it encourages us to set aside monocausal explanations in favour of a more sophisticated but still transportable approach. At the practical level, the message that endogenous forces are vital to explaining the origins of nuclear behaviour can be incredibly valuable to policymakers who too often see proliferation as a simple action-reaction phenomenon driven by monolithic political forces. It deserves a wide readership.
Political Science Quarterly - James H. Lebovic
[A]mbitious, insightful, and informative. . . . The book is most impressive . . . in its deliberate and judicious assessment of explanations drawn from relevant realist, neoliberal, constructivist, and democracy literatures. Indeed, the reasoned assault on realist arguments gives this book considerable punch.
International History Review - George H. Quester
Debates about the relevance of systematic political science theory for the maker of concrete policy decisions will perhaps never end. Solingen is to be congratulated for creating an interesting vehicle for such debate.
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific - Matake Kamiya
As a work about International Relations theories of nuclear decisions, there should be little, if any, to be added to this remarkable achievement by Solingen.
"Journal of Peace Research tor Asal

In addition to her innovative argument, Solingen's research design and the way she carries it out are impressive. Solingen does a carefully focused comparison of nine states in East Asia and the Middle East and, in doing so, provides an excellent example of rigorous qualitative research that should appear on graduate method course syllabi.
From the Publisher
"In addition to her innovative argument, Solingen's research design and the way she carries it out are impressive. Solingen does a carefully focused comparison of nine states in East Asia and the Middle East and, in doing so, provides an excellent example of rigorous qualitative research that should appear on graduate method course syllabi."—Victor Asal,Journal of Peace Research

"As a work about International Relations theories of nuclear decisions, there should be little, if any, to be added to this remarkable achievement by Solingen."—Matake Kamiya, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific

Read More Show Less

Product Details

Meet the Author

Etel Solingen is professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine. Her books include "Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy" (Princeton) and "Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining: Designing Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil".

Read More Show Less

Read an Excerpt

Nuclear Logics Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East
By Etel Solingen Princeton University Press
Copyright © 2007
Princeton University Press
All right reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-691-13468-0


Chapter One Introduction

Why have some states sought nuclear weapons whereas others have shunned them? Why has the Middle East largely evolved toward nuclearization whereas East Asia has moved in the opposite direction since the 1970s? How have international power distribution, globalization, international institutions, or democracy affected those choices? Will these regional trends remain? This book seeks to answer these central questions in international politics by improving our understanding of "nuclear aspirants" or states that have considered, developed, abandoned, or acquired nuclear weapons programs since the conclusion of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, a period sometimes labeled the "second nuclear age."

Beyond their immediate policy relevance, the contrasting nuclear trajectories of East Asia and the Middle East offer an important analytical puzzle worthy of systematic analysis. In the Middle East, for example, Iraq, Libya, Israel, and Egypt until 1971 have allegedly pursued nuclear weapons relentlessly, and Iran has been widely suspected of similar intentions on the basis of its violations of NPT commitments. Iraq was precluded from acquiring a nuclear device (1981, 1991) by military force. Some sources even include Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Syria as plausiblelong-standing aspirants. Since 1971 Egypt-a leader in the Arab world- became an important exception to the region's nuclearizing trajectory. Recent concerns with a defiant Iranian nuclear program have arguably led Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE henceforth) to embark on nuclear power programs that could constitute potential precursors of nuclear weapons (Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss 2004). Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal declared, "We are urging Iran to accept the position that we have taken to make the Gulf, as part of the Middle East, nuclear-free and free of weapons of mass destruction. We hope they will join us in this policy and assure that no new threat or arms race happens in this region." By contrast, ever since China acquired nuclear weapons in 1964, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea renounced nuclear weapons and joined the NPT, while Southeast Asia established a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ). North Korea has been the exception, testing a nuclear weapon in 2006, the first East Asian state to do so in forty-two years, since China's 1964 test. Even prior to its test, North Korea's nuclear defiance raised fears that it could galvanize support for reactive proliferation in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, thus ending East Asia's progression away from proliferation. Yet the puzzle of contrasting historical trajectories across these two regions remains. Whereas the norm in East Asia has been an apparent evolution toward denuclearization, North Korea has been the anomaly. Conversely, the norm among core Middle East powers has been toward nuclearization, except for Egypt and, more recently, Libya. Egypt's Ambassador to the United States Nabil Fahmy described the Middle East as

a poster boy for the failure of global and regional nonproliferation efforts.... Like most regions, the majority of its member states are card-carrying and committed members of this salient international nonproliferation regime and regulations.... Yet very significant questions remain outstanding regarding the present state of play of nuclear nonproliferation in that region. More than a decade ago, Iraq was caught violating its safeguard in NPT obligations.... Today, its neighbor Iran, also NPT member, has questions raised about its nuclear program and the degree of its respect of its safeguard obligations. (CEW)

Both traditional and novel theories of nuclear behavior can be applied to explain these diverging trajectories. Neorealist literature in international relations has often traced nuclearization to international structure, relative power, balance of power, and self-help. It is crucial to distinguish between neorealist theory in international relations scholarship, pivoted in the concepts of structural or relative power, international anarchy, and self-help on the one hand, and the common use of the word "realism" in American politics on the other. The latter is frequently applied to visions or policies that are "realistic" or "feasible." Yet, a policy that some may consider "realistic" in the more colloquial sense can be diametrically opposed to structural or neorealist understandings of international politics. Throughout this book the term neorealism refers to its use in international relations scholarship as a structural theory of politics (and in particular to offensive neorealism), not as a policy that seems "realistic." While some rely on neorealism as the theory that explains nuclear policy, concerns with existential security are never perfunctory reflections of structural considerations invariably leading to aggression or power maximization, but rather the product of domestic filters that convert such considerations into different policies. The extent to which state-rather than regime security-is invariably the dominant source of nuclear behavior may have been overestimated, precluding alternative-and perhaps more incisive-understandings of what drives the acquisition or renunciation of nuclear weapons. One such alternative forces greater attention to domestic political considerations of nuclear aspirants. In particular, systematic differences in nuclear behavior can be observed between states whose leaders or ruling coalitions advocate integration in the global economy, and those whose leaders reject it. The former have incentives to avoid the political, economic, reputational, and opportunity costs of acquiring nuclear weapons because such costs impair a domestic agenda favoring internationalization. Conversely, leaders and ruling coalitions rejecting internationalization incur fewer such costs and have greater incentives to exploit nuclear weapons as tools in nationalist platforms of political competition and for staying in power. This insight may be extended to explain differences between nuclear aspirants in East Asia and the Middle East over nearly four decades. East Asian leaders pivoted their domestic political control on economic performance and integration into the global economy. Middle East leaders relied on inward-looking self-sufficiency and an emphasis on domestic markets and nationalist values for their political survival. These respective platforms created different incentives and constraints that influenced leaders' preferences for or against nuclear weapons.

Nuclear behavior should provide an easy arena for testing a theory uniquely pivoted on relative power and state security in an anarchic world, such as neorealism. Lying at the very heart of a state's security dilemma, nuclear policy loads the dice in favor of this approach. In other words, nuclear behavior provides the "most likely case" or most favorable domain for corroborating neorealist tenets. For that very reason nuclear behavior is perhaps not a crucial arena for validating those canons from a methodological standpoint. A good or crucial test of a theory is one that forces it to survive conditions that are not favorable to confirm it. On this basis, too many deviations from neorealist predictions regarding nuclear policy constitute potentially significant challenges to the theory. Conversely, nuclear behavior provides an extremely difficult arena for testing theories of domestic political survival as the one offered here. Political leaders can only portray their decisions for or against nuclear weapons as dictated by "reasons of state" rather than by domestic political expediency. Precisely because decisions regarding nuclear weapons are "least likely" to validate the role of domestic politics, they provide a crucial and tough arena for investigating such effects. Thus, even partial substantiation uncovering an important role for domestic considerations in this "unfriendly" terrain, where evidence is much harder to garner, gains particular significance.

From a methodological standpoint, the ability to corroborate that domestic approaches to political survival are more relevant to nuclear behavior than often suspected might be akin to a "Sinatra inference" (Levy 2002): if the theory can make it here, it can make it anywhere. One should certainly not be carried away with this prospect, however. The empirical chapters certainly provide sufficient reason to pay far more attention to this rather understudied source of nuclear behavior. At the same time, each case is explored through a much broader theoretical repertoire to assess the relative advantages and limitations of each approach for improving our understanding of nuclear outcomes. This is not a strict effort to test theories (in no less than nine cases!) but rather to illustrate theory-driven analysis of nuclear decisions in a defined empirical domain. To reiterate, balance-of-power considerations are certainly important but a better understanding of nuclear behavior and outcomes requires theoretical recalibration and a closer examination of competing and complementary perspectives to avoid overestimation of some theories and underestimation of others. As an early study by Meyer (1984) suggested, it is quite likely that some assumptions from different perspectives are valid; the task is identifying when and why. Furthermore, in his view, all motives of nuclear behavior are, in the end, filtered through the domestic politics within which decisions are made. A systematic understanding of these effects makes this approach analytically indispensable in the study of nuclear aspirants.

Nonproliferation: Past Predictions and Present Conundrum

Nuclear choices have wide-ranging implications for international security. The potential proliferation of nuclear weapons served as partial justification for the 2003 war in Iraq and continues to rank high in the foreign policy agenda of major powers and international institutions. The United States, the European Union, Japan, the G-8, and former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan have defined the problem as the preeminent threat to international security, with attending consequences for budgetary allocations and the need for collective action. Although Iran and North Korea are now focal cases, many regard this as a much broader problem, regardless of political persuasions. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved the minute hand of its "Doomsday Clock" from seven to five minutes, warning that "we stand at the brink of a second nuclear age." President George W. Bush has repeatedly asserted that more nations have nuclear weapons, and still more have nuclear aspirations. Campbell et al. (2004) suggested that we may be approaching a "tipping point" that will unleash a proliferation epidemic, and that we now stand on the verge of a new nuclear age with potentially more nuclear-weapons-states (NWS) and a much greater chance that these weapons will be used. Others regard the nonproliferation regime (NPR) as poised for collapse and fear that the "domino theory" of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear. Former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix declared that "certainly if Iran were to develop further in the wrong direction, there is a risk for other countries considering going for nuclear weapons. And if the North Koreans move on, well the risks are very, very great. If the North Koreans were to test a weapon, yes, it would be very, very serious" (ASAW). IAEA director general Mohammed El-Baradei declared that "we are reaching a point today where I think Kennedy's prediction is very much alive. Either we are going to ... move to nuclear disarmament or we are going to have 20 or 30 countries with nuclear weapons, and if we do have that, to me, this is the beginning of the end of our civilization" (CNSW). In 2006 these concerns appeared even more real as North Korea tested a nuclear weapon and fear of a defiant Iran arguably led to declarations by six Middle East countries that they would pursue nuclear energy programs.

Not all agree with this vision, and assessments of past progression vary with different benchmarks. President Kennedy's 1963 prediction of fifteen to twenty-five NWS by 1973 did not come about. The past three decades reflected declining nuclear aspirations even by technically capable states. As Rosecrance (1964:300) correctly predicted, nuclear weapons did not spread "as ineluctably as the instruments of modern industrialism." Most states (189) joined the NPT, the most widely subscribed international treaty in existence, including some that had rejected it for decades, as did Argentina and Brazil. Some gave up nuclear weapons, including Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and South Africa. Libya surrendered its program to U.S. and IAEA scrutiny in 2003. More states abandoned than acquired nuclear weapons programs during the past fifteen years (Roberts 1995; Wolfsthal 2005). Yet the number of NWS increased. India and Pakistan conducted tests in 1998 and, like Israel, remained outside the NPT. Israel's capabilities have been widely asserted although its formal policy of "not being the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region" remains in place. North Korea proclaimed possession of nuclear weapons in 2003 and tested one in 2006; Iran's record in acquiring weapons-suitable technologies has not been matched by dutiful reporting to the IAEA. Both North Korea and Iran are deemed to have breached their NPT commitments. The tally of NWS has thus risen from the five recognized by the NPT in 1968 (the United States, Britain, Russia, China, and France) to nine states in 2006.

What explains this variability in behavior, with some states renouncing nuclear weapons altogether, others reversing previous efforts in that direction, and yet others developing them in violation of international commitments? Three decades ago Economics Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling (1976:80) advised that "the emphasis has to shift from physical denial and technology secrecy to the things that determine incentives and expectations." Nearly three decades later Hans Blix recognized that the task of uncovering the sources of incentives for proliferation still constitutes a fundamental problem (CEW). As Brad Glosserman (2004) puts it, a key obstacle to efforts to counter nuclear proliferation is that "we still don't know why governments proliferate nuclear weapons. Several explanations have been offered ... but no single explanation convinces. Until we know why governments acquire nuclear weapons, it will be difficult to stop them from doing so." The theoretical literature in international relations on this issue is much less copious than the studies on nuclear deterrence, tends to advance mono-causal explanations (a single factor explains it all), and frequently involves case studies by country experts. This book's objective is to advance our understanding of nuclear behavior and revisit the way we study it. A controlled comparison between East Asia and the Middle East offers several advantages for achieving those objectives.

The Research Design

There are at least nine reasons why a focused comparison (George and McKeown 1985) between the two regions that is sensitive to methodological issues in comparative analysis, case selection, and research design, offers important benefits for improving our understanding of denuclearization:

First, the two regions are at the forefront of policy debates as potential nuclear dominoes. The North Korean and Iranian crises will continue to shape-and perhaps shake-the foundations of regional and international security. Both the Middle East and East Asia find themselves in the midst of a historical period with potentially profound transformational effects, providing a unique vantage point from which to evaluate the past and explore the future of nuclear proliferation.

(Continues...)



Excerpted from Nuclear Logics by Etel Solingen
Copyright © 2007 by Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
Read More Show Less

Table of Contents

Preface ix

Part One: Introduction and Conceptual Framework 1
Chapter One: Introduction 3
Chapter Two: Alternative Logics on Denuclearization 23

Part Two: East Asia: Denuclearization as the Norm, Nuclearization as the Anomaly 55
Chapter Three: Japan 57
Chapter Four: South Korea 82
Chapter Five: Taiwan (Republic of China) 100
Chapter Six: North Korea 118

Part Three: The Middle East: Nuclearization as the Norm, Denuclearization as the Anomaly 141
Chapter Seven: Iraq 143
Chapter Eight: Iran 164
Chapter Nine: Israel 187
Chapter Ten: Libya 213
Chapter Eleven: Egypt 229

Part Four: Conclusions 247
Chapter Twelve: Findings, Futures, and Policy Implications 249
Notes 301
References 351
Index 385

Read More Show Less

Customer Reviews

Average Rating 5
( 1 )
Rating Distribution

5 Star

(1)

4 Star

(0)

3 Star

(0)

2 Star

(0)

1 Star

(0)

Your Rating:

Your Name: Create a Pen Name or

Barnes & Noble.com Review Rules

Our reader reviews allow you to share your comments on titles you liked, or didn't, with others. By submitting an online review, you are representing to Barnes & Noble.com that all information contained in your review is original and accurate in all respects, and that the submission of such content by you and the posting of such content by Barnes & Noble.com does not and will not violate the rights of any third party. Please follow the rules below to help ensure that your review can be posted.

Reviews by Our Customers Under the Age of 13

We highly value and respect everyone's opinion concerning the titles we offer. However, we cannot allow persons under the age of 13 to have accounts at BN.com or to post customer reviews. Please see our Terms of Use for more details.

What to exclude from your review:

Please do not write about reviews, commentary, or information posted on the product page. If you see any errors in the information on the product page, please send us an email.

Reviews should not contain any of the following:

  • - HTML tags, profanity, obscenities, vulgarities, or comments that defame anyone
  • - Time-sensitive information such as tour dates, signings, lectures, etc.
  • - Single-word reviews. Other people will read your review to discover why you liked or didn't like the title. Be descriptive.
  • - Comments focusing on the author or that may ruin the ending for others
  • - Phone numbers, addresses, URLs
  • - Pricing and availability information or alternative ordering information
  • - Advertisements or commercial solicitation

Reminder:

  • - By submitting a review, you grant to Barnes & Noble.com and its sublicensees the royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable right and license to use the review in accordance with the Barnes & Noble.com Terms of Use.
  • - Barnes & Noble.com reserves the right not to post any review -- particularly those that do not follow the terms and conditions of these Rules. Barnes & Noble.com also reserves the right to remove any review at any time without notice.
  • - See Terms of Use for other conditions and disclaimers.
Search for Products You'd Like to Recommend

Recommend other products that relate to your review. Just search for them below and share!

Create a Pen Name

Your Pen Name is your unique identity on BN.com. It will appear on the reviews you write and other website activities. Your Pen Name cannot be edited, changed or deleted once submitted.

 
Your Pen Name can be any combination of alphanumeric characters (plus - and _), and must be at least two characters long.

Continue Anonymously
Sort by: Showing 1 – 2 of 1 Customer Reviews
  • Anonymous

    Posted June 3, 2011

    No text was provided for this review.

  • Anonymous

    Posted January 9, 2010

    No text was provided for this review.

Sort by: Showing 1 – 2 of 1 Customer Reviews

If you find inappropriate content, please report it to Barnes & Noble
Why is this product inappropriate?
Comments (optional)