On the Improvement of the Understanding

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This classic philosophical text seeks to define understanding, through the testing of ideas and perceptions.
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On the Improvement of the Understanding : (Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione)

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Overview

This classic philosophical text seeks to define understanding, through the testing of ideas and perceptions.
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Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9781406806847
  • Publisher: Echo Library
  • Publication date: 10/28/2006
  • Pages: 48
  • Product dimensions: 5.00 (w) x 8.00 (h) x 0.12 (d)

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On the Improvement of the Understanding the Ethics Correspondence


By Benedict De Spinoza, R. H. M. ELWES

Dover Publications, Inc.

Copyright © 1955 Dover Publications, Inc.
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-486-12108-6



CHAPTER 1

PART I. CONCERNING GOD.


DEFINITIONS.

I

BY that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.

II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

V. By mode, I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.

VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite—that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

Explanation.—I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes maybe denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.

VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.

VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.

Explanation.—Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.


AXIOMS.

I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.

II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself.

III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows ; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow.

IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.

V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.

VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence.


PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

Proof.—This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.

PROP. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common.

Proof.—Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in itself, and be conceived through itself ; in other words, the conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

PROP. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.

Proof.—If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and, therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.). Q.E.D.

PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

Proof.—Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else (Ax. i.),—that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications. Q.E.D.

PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

Proof.—If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications—as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.),—it follows that setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another,—that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q.E.D.

PROP. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Proof.—It is impossible that there should be in the universe two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop. iii.), one cannot be the cause of another, neither can one be produced by the other. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—Hence it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.). Now (by the last Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance, therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself. Q.E.D. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be substance.

PROP. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

Proof.—Substance cannot be produced by anything external (Corollary, Prop. vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause—that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to its nature.

PROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Proof.—There can only be one substance with an identical attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.) ; its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.) ; and there would be two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.

Note I.—As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance is necessarily infinite.

Note II.—No doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop. vii. : for such persons make no distinction between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence they attribute to substances the beginning which they observe in natural ob-. jects. Those who are ignorant of true causes, make complete confusion—think that trees might talk just as well as men—that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed ; and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So, also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind. But, if people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no doubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this proposition would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism. For, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself—that is, something of which the conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the thing in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas of non- existent modifications ; for, although they may have no actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their essence is so involved in something external to themselves that they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in their existence, because they are conceived through themselves. Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and distinct—that is, a true—idea of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same as saying that a false idea was true—in short, the height of absurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning—that there is but one such substance. I think that this may profitably be done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the demonstration, we must premise:—

1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From this it follows that—

2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it does not imply any fixed number of triangles.

3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause why it should exist.

4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated apart from such definition.

It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less. For example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general; we must also show why there are exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual. Now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition of man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty. Consequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of several individuals must have an external cause. And, as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of substance, existence must necessarily be included in its definition ; and from its definition alone existence must be deducible. But from its definition (as we have shown, Notes ii., iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances; therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.

PROP. IX. The more reality or being a thing has the greater the number of its attributes (Def. iv.).

PROP. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.

Proof.—An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.). and, therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.). Q.E.D.

Note.—It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in fact, conceived as distinct—that is, one without the help of the other—yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other; but each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is, then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.

If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be sought for in vain.

PROP. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses external and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

Proof.—If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.

Another proof.—Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its non-existence—e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from existing, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be external to it. For instance, the reason for the non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it would involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)

But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the order of universal nature in extension. From the latter it must follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it should exist. So much is self-evident. It follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or reason be granted which prevents its existence.

If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the very nature of God, or be external to him —that is, drawn from another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence.

As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect, is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.


(Continues...)

Excerpted from On the Improvement of the Understanding the Ethics Correspondence by Benedict De Spinoza, R. H. M. ELWES. Copyright © 1955 Dover Publications, Inc.. Excerpted by permission of Dover Publications, Inc..
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

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Table of Contents

Contents

Copyright Page,
DOVER BOOKS ON WESTERN PHILOSOPHY,
Title Page,
ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING.,
THE ETHICS. - [ETHICA ORDINE GEOMETRICO DEMONSTRATA.],
PART I. CONCERNING GOD.,
PART II. - OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND.,
PART III. - ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS.,
PART IV. - OF HUMAN BONDAGE, OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS.,
PART V. - OF THE POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING, OR OF HUMAN FREEDOM.,
CORRESPONDENCE.,
LETTER I. (I.) - HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.,
LETTER II. (II.) - SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG.,
LETTER III. (III.) - OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER IV. (IV.) - SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG.,
LETTER V. (V.) - OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER VI. (VI.) - SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG.,
LETTER VII. (VII.) - OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER VIII. (XI.) - OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER IX. (XIII.) - SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG.,
LETTERS X.—XIV.,
LETTER XIII.A. - OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XV. (XXXII.) - SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG.,
LETTER XVI. (XXXIII.) - OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XVII. (LXI.) - OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XVIII. (LXII.) - OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XIX. (LXVIII.) - SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG.,
LETTER XX. (LXXI.) - OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XXI. (LXXIII.) - SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG.,
LETTER XXII. (LXXIV.) - OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XXIII. (LXXV.) - SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG.,
LETTER XXIV. (LXXVII.) - OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XXV. (LXXVIII.) Written 7 Feb., 1676. - SPINOZA TO OLDENBURG.,
LETTER XXV.A. - OLDENBURG TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XXVI. (VIII.) - SIMON DE VRIES TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XXVII. (IX.) - SPINOZA TO SIMON DE VRIES.,
LETTER XXVIII. (X.) - SPINOZA TO SIMON DE VRIES.,
LETTER XXIX. (XII.) - SPINOZA TO L. M. (LEWIS MEYER).,
LETTER XXTX.A. - SPINOZA TO LEWIS MEYER.,
LETTER XXX. (XVII.) - SPINOZA TO PETER BALLING.,
LETTER XXXI. (XVIII.) - WILLIAM DE BLYENBERGH TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XXXII. (XIX.) - SPINOZA TO BLYENBERGH.,
LETTER XXXIII. (XX.) - BLYENBERGH TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XXXIV. (XXI.) - SPINOZA TO BLYENBERGH.,
LETTER XXXV. (XXII.) - BLYENBEBGH TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XXXVI. (XXIII.) - SPINOZA TO BLYENBERGH.,
LETTER XXXVII. (XXIV.) - BLYENBERGH TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER XXXVIII. (XXVII.) - SPINOZA TO BLYENBERGH.,
LETTER XXXIX. - SPINOZA. TO CHRISTIAN HUYGHENS.,
LETTER XL. (XXXV.) - SPINOZA TO CHRISTIAN HUYGHENS.,
LETTER XLI. (XXXVI.) - SPINOZA TO CHRISTIAN HUYGHENS.,
LETTER XLI.A. - SPINOZA TO (May or June, 1665).,
LETTER XLII. (XXXVII.) - SPINOZA TO I. B.,
LETTER XLIII. (XXXVIII.) - SPINOZA TO I. V. M.,
LETTERS XLIV., XLV., XLVI. (XXXIX., XL., XLI.) - SPINOZA TO I. I.,
LETTER XLVII. (XLIV.) - SPINOZA TO I. I.,
LETTER XLVIII.,
LETTER XLIX. - SPINOZA TO ISAAC OROBIO.,
LETTER L. (L.) - SPINOZA TO JARIG JELLIS.,
LETTER LI. (XLV.) - GODFREY LEIBNITZ TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LII. (XLVI.) - SPINOZA TO LEIBNITZ.,
LETTER LIII. (XLVII.) - FABRITIUS TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LIV. (XLVIII.) - SPINOZA TO FABRITIUS.,
LETTER LV. (LI.) - HUGO BOXEL TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LVI. (LII.) - SPINOZA TO HUGO BOXEL.,
LETTER LVII. (LIII.) - HUGO BOXEL TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LVIII. (LIV.) - SPINOZA TO HUGO BOXEL.,
LETTER LIX. (LV.) - HUGO BOXEL TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LX. (LVI.) - SPINOZA TO HUGO BOXEL.,
LETTER LXI. (LVII.) - TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LXII. (LVIII.) - SPINOZA TO (The Hague, October, 1674).,
LETTER LXIII. (LIX.) - * * * * * TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LXIV. (LX.) - SPINOZA TO * * * * *.,
LETTER LXV. (LXIII.) - G. H. SCHALLER TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LXVI. (LXIV.) - SPINOZA TO * * * * *,
LETTER LXVII. (LXV.) - * * * * * TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LXVIII. (LXVI.) - SPINOZA TO * * * * *.,
LETTER LXVIII.A. - G. H. SCHALLER TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LXVIII.B. - SPINOZA TO SCHALLER.,
LETTER LXIX. (LXXX.) - * * * * * TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LXX. (LXXXI.) - SPINOZA TO * * * * *,
LETTER LXXI. (LXXXII.) - * * * * * TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LXXII. (LXXXIII.) - SPINOZA TO * * * *,
LETTER LXXIII. (LXVII.) - ALBERT BURGH TO SPINOZA.,
LETTER LXXIV. (LXXVI.) - SPINOZA TO ALBERT BURGH.,
LETTER LXXV. (LXIX.) - SPINOZA TO LAMBERT VAN VELTHUYSEN (Doctor of,
Medicine at Utrecht.)1,

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