One More Bridge To Cross: Lowering the Cost of Warby H. John Poole, Edward Molina
Without "boots on the ground" that are tactically proficient enough to survive as tiny well-dispersed elements without any help from supporting arms, America should not plan to win any more wars. This book shows how the Pentagon couldwith some "truly light" infantrymen and more self-sufficient commandosproject more overseas power at less cost in/b>
Without "boots on the ground" that are tactically proficient enough to survive as tiny well-dispersed elements without any help from supporting arms, America should not plan to win any more wars. This book shows how the Pentagon couldwith some "truly light" infantrymen and more self-sufficient commandosproject more overseas power at less cost in money and lives. Since Korea, America's foes haven't needed as much preparatory fire or technology, nor have they caused as much collateral damage. This makes them more appealing to local populations. "One More Bridge to Cross" takes a closer look at what happened at Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, and later battles. Then, it shows how to defend against (and acquire) advanced surprise assault technique. Semi-autonomous U.S. squads will not be possible until control over training has been decentralized. Too little tactical experimentation at the company/school level has been the problem. Since the Vietnam War, it has become increasingly clear that America's defense establishment cannot defeat any "bottom-up-operating" (criminal-or-Asian-oriented) foe without first allowing more initiative from its own lowest echelons.
- Posterity Press
- Publication date:
- Edition description:
- 24 illustrations
- Product dimensions:
- 5.90(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.60(d)
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Meet the Author
Through an inverted military career, H. John Poole has discovered a few things that more promotable people miss. After spending his first two years as a combat commander, he did his last seven as an enlisted tactics instructor. That allowed him to see why U.S. troops have always had so much trouble outmaneuvering their immediate adversaries. Their tactical techniques (like football plays) are quite simply outmoded. These U.S. small-unit maneuvers are so unlikely to surprise anyone as to be "premachinegun" in format. This oversight on the part of their commanders and how to compensate for it forms the framework of Poole's work.
Since retirement from the U.S. Marine Corps in 1993, Poole has has traveled extensively in both Communist and Islamist worlds. He has also written 10 other tactics/intelligence supplements and conducted multiday training sessions for 40 U.S. battalions, 9 schools, and 7 special operations units. As most U.S. intelligence personnel know too little about the Eastern thought process and evolution of squad tactics, these supplements provide currently deployed GIs with a rare glimpse into their enemies' intentions. Since 2000, Poole has done research in Russia, Mainland China (twice), North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India (three times), Pakistan (three times), Iran, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Tanzania, and Venezuela. Over the course of his lifetime, he has further traveled throughout Asia, Europe, and most of the Western Hemisphere. He has lived (or been stationed) in Mexico, Panama, Vietnam, and Japan. Between early tours in the Marine Corps (from 1969 to 1971), Poole worked as a criminal investigator for the Illinois Bureau of Investigation (IBI). After attending the State Police Academy, he worked out of the IBI's Chicago office.
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