The Opium Season: A Year on the Afghan Frontier

Overview

Joel Hafvenstein didn't know what he was getting into when he signed up for a year in Afghanistan's rugged Helmand province, the heart of the world's opium trade. He was running an American-funded aid program to help opium poppy farmers make a legal living, and to win hearts and minds. At the height of his team's success, the Taliban attacked, killing his colleagues and destroying their work. This heralded a Taliban resurgence across the country and exposed weaknesses in America's strategy that continue to this ...
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Opium Season: A Year on the Afghan Frontier

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Overview

Joel Hafvenstein didn't know what he was getting into when he signed up for a year in Afghanistan's rugged Helmand province, the heart of the world's opium trade. He was running an American-funded aid program to help opium poppy farmers make a legal living, and to win hearts and minds. At the height of his team's success, the Taliban attacked, killing his colleagues and destroying their work. This heralded a Taliban resurgence across the country and exposed weaknesses in America's strategy that continue to this day.
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Editorial Reviews

William Grimes
The sobering dispatches in Opium Season, a wrenching account of lofty hopes and bitter disappointments, shed a dismal light on American efforts to improve the lot of ordinary Afghans. All over the country development projects are under way aimed at winning over the Afghan people, depriving the Taliban of popular support and propping up Hamid Karzai's government. The obstacles are as steep as the surrounding mountains, as Mr. Hafvenstein discovered and ruefully recounts in this bitter but affectionate book about his three stints in Afghanistan from October 2003 to May 2005.
—The New York Times
Publishers Weekly

In May 2005, four employees of Chemonics International, a Washington, D.C.-based contractor with the U.S. Agency for International Development, were among 11 Afghans killed in two separate attacks on aid workers operating in Afghanistan's Helmand province. First-time author Hafvenstein was then a young administrator for Chemonics, having eagerly joined in 2003 a small team working on U.S.A.I.D.'s Alternative Incomes Project, aiming to create thousands of jobs building a new infrastructure to offset planned eradication of the opium poppy, the mainstay of the rural economy and the raw basis for heroin sold around the world. Beginning with the news of his colleagues' deaths, Hafvenstein retraces his rapid immersion into the deeply fractured and danger-strewn politics and society of post-Taliban Afghanistan. His personal narrative gracefully introduces this complex and troubled land, measuring the impact of warlordism and police corruption on what he comes to see as the ultimately misguided U.S. emphasis on poppy eradication. While that conclusion will hardly surprise those following the escalating violence since 2005, Hafvenstein offers a revealing if narrowly critical insider perspective on the workings of U.S.-sponsored international development schemes in Afghanistan and worldwide. (Nov.)

Copyright 2007 Reed Business Information
Library Journal

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 has resulted in another wretched chapter in the recent history of that volatile country. Six years after the overthrow of its fundamentalist Taliban government, chaos and uncertainty characterize daily life there. Notwithstanding elections that have led to the establishment of a nominal central government in Kabul, the country continues to exhibit all the hallmarks of a failed state. The opium trade has once again become the most important source of revenue in Afghanistan, where a combination of opium growers and the so-called warlords exercise more political and socioeconomic control than do the country's elected officials and its government. This very readable and engaging book recounts the harshness of daily life in Afghanistan, as seen from the vantage point of an American who spent a year in the country's rugged Helmand province for an aid organization seeking to train farmers to cultivate other crops than opium. The author, who has published articles on Afghanistan, describes in a diary format his experience of violent political intrigue and criminal alliances resulting in the murderous drug trafficking, and the impossibility of his mission, in that country. Recommended for public libraries.
—Nader Entessar

Kirkus Reviews
Long-winded, superfluously stuffed account of the author's vain attempts to induce the Afghans to give up their primary cash crop. From November 2004 to May 2005, Hafvenstein worked as a development coordinator for Chemonics International, a contractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), in the military outpost of Lashkargah near the Helmand River, deep in the heart of opium-growing country. His urgent assignment was to wean the growers from poppy while the Afghan government supposedly pushed for its eradication. The USAID team was charged with creating enough temporary paying jobs to cushion the economic damage to opium farmers. However, the scale of the 2004 harvest was hugely lucrative; the Afghans produced a whopping 87 percent of the world's illegal opium. The author and his colleagues faced an arduous, dangerous task: to manage the walis (provincial governors) as well as the tribal groups and the remnants of Taliban rebels, while securing the safety of the agency's personnel. They learned that this area was the site of a previous American reconstruction effort in the 1940s, the damming of the Helmand and Arghandab rivers by American engineering company Morrison-Knudsen, one of the contractors on the Hoover Dam. Hafvenstein's team insinuated itself into the powerful Afghan government agency controlling the rivers' modern irrigation system in order to secure local jobs clearing drainage ditches. They were threatened by warlords still tied to the Taliban and ultimately defeated by the government's halfhearted commitment to eradication. Kidnapping and murders forced out the American agency, overwhelmed by the scale and significance of the project. Not likely towin any new converts to America's cowboys-and-Indians approach to fixing foreign countries' deep-seated problems.
From the Publisher

"A wrenching account of lofty hopes and bitter disappointments."--The New York Times

"One of the best books written about modern Afghanistan."--Asia Times

"Laden with urgent information and stinging political insights."-- Booklist

"His personal narrative gracefully introduces this complex and troubled land."-- Publishers Weekly

"The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 has resulted in another wretched chapter in the recent history of that volatile country. Six years after the overthrow of its fundamentalist Taliban government, chaos and uncertainty characterize daily life there. Notwithstanding elections that have led to the establishment of a nominal central government in Kabul, the country continues to exhibit all the hallmarks of a failed state. The opium trade has once again become the most important source of revenue in Afghanistan, where a combination of opium growers and the so-called warlords exercise more political and socioeconomic control than do the country's elected officials and its government. This very readable and engaging book recounts the harshness of daily life in Afghanistan, as seen from the vantage point of an American who spent a year in the country's rugged Helmand province for an aid organization seeking to train farmers to cultivate other crops than opium. The author, who has published articles on Afghanistan, describes in a diary format his experience of violent political intrigue and criminal alliances resulting in the murderous drug trafficking, and the impossibility of his mission, in that country. Recommended for public libraries."
—Nader Entessar, Univ. of South Alabama, Mobile, Library Journal

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Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9781599211312
  • Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
  • Publication date: 11/1/2007
  • Pages: 352
  • Product dimensions: 6.00 (w) x 9.00 (h) x 1.25 (d)

Meet the Author

Joel Hafvenstein is an international development consultant, an analyst of South and Central Asia, and a writer. He has written on Afghanistan for the New York Times and Commonweal, and has been interviewed on National Public Radio's "The Story."
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Read an Excerpt

OPIUM SEASON

A YEAR ON THE AFGHAN FRONTIER
By JOEL HAFVENSTEIN

The Lyons Press

Copyright © 2007 Joel Hafvenstein
All right reserved.

ISBN: 978-1-59921-131-2


Chapter One

Little America

* * *

Lashkargah, Helmand-November 27, 2004

"You know, they used to call this place Little America."

The night sky was cloudless, but the moon had already set. Ray and I were walking by starlight through the dusty back streets of Lashkargah. Far away, a single lightbulb burned above the closed wooden shutters of a fruits and spices vendor. The earth-walled compounds on either side of the road were silent and dark. We had been in town for two days and had no idea who lived on the other side of those walls. Last night, we had walked back by a slightly different route to throw off anyone tracking us-a gesture at the basic security precautions we had chosen to ignore by traveling on foot, in the dark, through an unfamiliar bit of Afghanistan.

"Americans built this whole city," Ray explained. "Back in the 1950s. It was where the Morrison-Knudsen engineers lived while they were working on the canals. People remember that here. They basically like us."

Ray Baum always varied his route, and he always walked. He didn't like to keep the Afghan drivers around after the end of the work day, so whenever he worked late he would dismiss them and walk home. Even on evenings when we all finished work at six or seven o'clock, the rest of us would pile into our rented Toyota Land Cruisers in front of our Lashkargah office, while Ray handed one of us his laptop bag and struck out on foot. The drivers couldn't believe it; for the first two or three blocks outside the office, they cruised alongside Ray while he waved them away and did his best to ignore them. They didn't speak English, and none of us spoke Pashto, so it was beyond us to explain what possessed this grizzled American to walk home through the lightless alleys of Lashkargah.

"It's not like in Jalalabad. The whole of eastern Afghanistan was under Russian influence back in the '50s and '60s. Up there, the Russians built the roads and bridges and dams, and everyone went to study in Russia. Americans are still unpopular up there even today. But in Helmand, we were the good guys."

I had begun joining Ray on his walks home-not always, but usually on nights when we both stayed late at the office. I didn't like keeping the drivers waiting at night any more than he did, and I thought I understood a few other reasons why he chose to walk. Ray liked to know the places where he worked, to explore the geography and understand the people. Every day, he walked up the street, bought a pomegranate at the fruit stand, and ate it at meticulous length while conversing with the locals in fragments of English, Dari, and Pashto. Yet even though virtually no one was on the streets after dark, Ray made a point of always walking home at night. Another crucial principle was at stake: show no fear. Ray was a hardy man, spending his holidays on hunting expeditions in remote bits of his native Alaska, and he didn't want anyone to mistake him for a mere development bureaucrat. More importantly, Ray knew what he represented in Helmand province-America, development, the new Afghan order-and he didn't believe we could succeed if we were held back by fear of possible disaster.

"I think this is going to be a really good project, Joel. We've just got to get things approved and started quickly. We can adjust them later if we need to. We can't get scared or let things get bogged down."

Ray spoke at a deliberate pace, his eyes intense and searching beneath furrowed brows. He had a thick-tongued voice, a weathered, crumpled face, close-cropped gray hair, and a mustache. He was more a practical than an intellectual man, his conversation circling unadorned around whatever was most on his mind; when he came across an idea or phrase that resonated with him, he would bring it up verbatim and often. Yet Ray was the canniest development swashbuckler I knew. Back in the 1980s he had figured out how to get aid to areas of Nicaragua and Honduras dominated by anti-Communist guerrillas, and when the fighting was over, he helped talk the guerrillas down out of the hills. For that accomplishment, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) awarded Ray its highest honor. He won it again, later, for his deft management of a counter-narcotics project in Bolivia.

I had worked with Ray before in Afghanistan, on my previous short trips to the country. I had seen him lead a team and handle the ever-shifting demands of the USAID mission in Kabul, and I admired his judgment and gruff diplomacy. In mid-2004 he had left Afghanistan, resigning from a long-term position to spend more time with his family. My boss had pleaded with Ray to come back for one month to lead the start-up team on our most challenging project yet.

We were working for Chemonics International, USAID's largest private contractor. A few weeks earlier, USAID had given Chemonics an urgent assignment: to create tens of thousands of jobs in remote southern Afghanistan. Our target area was Helmand province, which was both an oasis of relative calm in the heart of the Taliban resistance and the foremost drug-producing region in the country. The Afghan government had promised to eradicate the opium poppy fields of Helmand this year. USAID had promised to create enough temporary, cash-paying work to cushion the economic damage. Chemonics had promised to make it happen with eighteen million dollars.

Of course, all that money was in Washington, and we weren't sure how we were going to get it to Helmand. There were no banks in Lashkargah, the provincial capital. We had no staff yet, no reliable phone or Internet connections, no radios or project vehicles. All we had was the start-up Go Team, an all-star ensemble of the most relevant experts from Chemonics headquarters. Plus me.

I had been working with Chemonics for a year and a half, helping to "backstop" its existing Afghan agriculture projects. That is, I provided administrative support from the Washington office: getting visas for our consultants, buying plane tickets, handling the USAID paperwork. I had flown out to Afghanistan a couple of times, but those trips didn't really qualify me to help launch a project deep in Taliban country. What they did give me was the Afghanistan bug. I was captivated by the arid, serrated mountains and green valleys, the ruins left by foreign armies from Genghis Khan to Gorbachev, the generosity and resilience of my Afghan friends. I made sure my bosses knew that I would take any Afghan field assignment-even a one-year assignment to a dusty provincial center that made Kabul look like a cosmopolitan paradise.

As it turned out, my most important qualification was the willingness to stay longer than Christmas. We were launching this project on unusually short notice and the all-star team all wanted to be home for the holidays. The only other member of the start-up group who was in for the long haul was our government liaison, Yaqub Roshan, an affable Afghan-American with a vaguely defined job. If Chemonics couldn't replace Ray and the other Go Team members in the next few weeks, by Christmas Day it would just be Yaqub and me.

I was nervous-but mostly about my own ability to do the job. I had no idea I would end up as the de facto second-in-command, or that our project would succeed beyond our wildest dreams, employing thousands of men in some of the farthest corners of Helmand province. The Afghan friends who would make it happen-Habibullah, Khair, Raz, Ehsan, and dozens of others who would join us to struggle against problems both petty and lethal-were still strangers to me. And I didn't really understand that our success might make us a target. That night, as I followed Ray through the alleys of Lashkargah, I believed him when he said we shouldn't be afraid. Like him, I was more preoccupied with the seemingly impossible goal that had brought us to Helmand.

* * *

How do you convince a farmer to give up the perfect crop?

Picture a rugged, desert country in which a seven-year drought has emptied the canals and a twenty-five-year war has wrecked roads, schools, and markets. Orchards and vineyards have been bombed, fields and pastures mined. The millions of farmers and farm workers in this country have few sources of credit, no banks, and a national currency that until very recently was worthless. Many don't actually own land, and in fertile areas the competition for sharecropping work is intense.

Now imagine a drought-resistant cash crop. It grows during the wheat season but fetches a much higher price than wheat-anywhere from five to twenty-five times higher, depending on the year. This crop doesn't bruise or require refrigeration, so the lack of reliable roads and electricity is no obstacle. Once harvested, its gum can be kept for months or years before processing, so villagers stockpile the gum and use it as cash. The traders in this crop are a sophisticated, internationally connected bunch who offer credit; they'll pay farmers in the winter for a certain amount of gum in the spring. Landowners are more likely to accept sharecroppers who agree to cultivate this crop. It offers the most reward for the fewest risks, with one significant exception: The government might plow up your fields if it catches you. The government is weak, though, and plenty of local authorities are involved in the trade themselves.

The country is, of course, Afghanistan, and the crop is opium poppy, the raw material for heroin. Opium has been grown in the Afghan mountains for millennia, but it took two and a half decades of civil war to turn poppy into the country's economic mainstay-and to turn Afghanistan into the heart of the global heroin trade. During the long war that began in 1979, the country's government slowly disintegrated, local warlords began to support themselves by trafficking opium, and brutalized farmers turned to poppy as their best chance of escaping poverty. By 1992, Afghanistan had passed Burma as the world's largest opium exporter. By 2004, the largest sector of the Afghan economy was narcotics (generating well over one-third of its gross domestic product), and Afghanistan produced a staggering 87 percent of the world's illegal opium.

Opium brought me back to Afghanistan in November 2004. On my previous trips, I had worked with Chemonics' projects to restore the once-thriving Afghan agricultural sector. None of those programs had focused specifically on poppy. We hoped that by helping Afghan farmers cultivate and market legal crops, we would eventually give them a ladder out of poverty that didn't involve opium. We called it a strategy, but it was just a simple, plausible justification for leaving poppy out of our plans for the next few years.

The scale of the 2004 opium harvest wrecked that strategy. For the first time in history, farmers in all thirty-four Afghan provinces chose to plant the perfect crop. They carpeted an unprecedented 323,000 acres of land with poppy, which was 126,000 acres more than the previous year, and almost 99,000 acres above 1999's prior record. The harvest of opium gum fell just short of record levels, thanks to bad weather, disease, and poppy-munching parasites. Still, by the end of the season in summer 2004, Afghanistan's addiction to opium had unmistakably reached a new peak.

As the extent of the harvest became clear, the political rumbling from Washington and Kabul grew thunderous. George Bush and Hamid Karzai both had elections to win in the fall. Both knew their rivals would use the high poppy crop against them, though in rather different senses: Bush could expect a rhetorical bruising from the Democrats, while Karzai risked losing provincial control entirely to rich and well-armed drug lords. Neither president had the patience to rely on long-term projects of agricultural development. As the yearly report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime euphemistically declared, Afghan farmers would require "more robust forms of persuasion" to give up opium. A comprehensive poppy eradication campaign was on the way.

Just before the fall 2004 poppy-planting season began, USAID frantically called its Afghanistan contractors with a new assignment: to keep the bottom from dropping out of the rural economy when the poppies were destroyed. In the top opium-cultivating provinces, hundreds of thousands of Afghans depended on opium for their livelihoods. If the American and Afghan governments were going to plow up the poppy fields, we needed to create enough jobs to plug the gap with cash.

Nobody mistook this kind of mass job creation program for a long-term solution. It was an emergency response, a bandage on the eradication campaign. The British government had been struggling for three years to come up with a serious substitute for poppy, and in 2004 USAID joined in, offering hundreds of millions of dollars for "alternative livelihoods" projects. The problem was that no one really knew what a long-term solution would look like. A bevy of agricultural specialists tried to come up with "silver bullet" alternative crops that were almost as lucrative as poppy: saffron, rose oil, black cumin. Others argued that instead of introducing a novel crop, it would be better to revive Afghanistan's traditional export business in dried fruits and almonds. Microfinance experts devised schemes to provide credit with no opium strings attached.

All this would take years to get off the ground, however; in the meantime, cash-for-work had to smooth the way. USAID ordered a few of its big private-sector contractors to head immediately into the Afghan provinces with the most poppy cultivation. Chemonics was told to redirect money from one of its existing projects to create jobs in Helmand, Afghanistan's opium heartland. The farmers of Helmand's central plains benefited from a massive irrigation canal network built with American money and engineering between the 1940s and the 1960s. During Afghanistan's decades of war, the farmers of "Little America" had switched wholesale from cotton to poppy, spurred on by local warlords who built shaky, violent baronies on a foundation of drug money. Now the Americans were back, hoping to transform Helmand again.

To compensate for the loss of poppy income in the province, USAID estimated, over the next year we would need to create two and a half million days of paid work. It wasn't entirely clear what assumptions about the poppy trade had inspired that peculiar number, but that was our only solid target: two and a half million days. Everything else-the amount of money we spent, the total number of people we hired, the nature of the jobs we created-was flexible. The "magic number" had some inescapable consequences, though. Given a six-day work week, we would need to have an average of eight thousand men at work every day for the whole year. With every day that we didn't meet that target, it would increase.

So we needed to quickly identify large-scale public works projects that would involve lots of pick and shovel work. To monitor our thousands of laborers, we needed to hire qualified engineers and project managers, in a province where a twelfth-grade diploma represented exceptionally high education. We needed somehow to get a million dollars in cash down from Kabul every month and safely distribute it all over a province still awash with guns from the long, American-funded jihad against the Soviet Union. No one was sure how the local drug traffickers or nearby insurgents would respond to us. The project was simple in conception, crazy in reality.

But as with the overall project of rebuilding Afghanistan, time was essential. Everyone involved in the Afghan reconstruction talked about windows of opportunity that would soon close. Ours was the window between the time we arrived in the country and the time the eradication tractors started rolling. Like Ray said, if we spent too long preparing, we'd lose our chance to make a difference. So we jumped in.

(Continues...)



Excerpted from OPIUM SEASON by JOEL HAFVENSTEIN Copyright © 2007 by Joel Hafvenstein. Excerpted by permission.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

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Table of Contents

Prelude: The End 1

Part 1 Planting 5

Little America 7

Yaqub 14

City of Dust 26

Mullah Omar's Drought 36

Into the Minefield 46

Salaam to Helmand 58

A Million Dollars a Mile 67

The Place of the Soldiers 80

Jack of All Trades 91

The Babaji Abduction 103

Christmas in Helmand 115

The Warlords' Vendetta 127

Part 2 Flowering 139

Guns and Poppies 141

New California 153

Traveling Difficulties 162

The Way of Love 176

Good Cop, Bad Cop 187

Politics as Usual 198

The Royal Bungalow 210

The Indispensable Warlords 223

Back on Track 234

Gunfire in the Backyard 242

Part 3 Harvest 253

Valley of Death 255

Defining Success 266

Three Days in May 277

In Limbo 290

Helmand at War 304

Badakhshan 316

Sources 327

Index 329

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Recipe

Opium Season is the story of a young American working on the brutal fault line where the war on terror meets the war on drugs. Joel Hafvenstein didn’t know what he was getting into when he signed up for a year in Afghanistan’s rugged Helmand Province, the heart of the country’s opium trade. He was running an American-funded aid program with two goals: to help tens of thousands of opium poppy farmers make a legal living, and to win hearts and minds away from the former Taliban government.

 

The author and his friends were soon caught up in the deadly intrigues of Helmand’s drug trafficking warlords. He found himself dodging Taliban in poppy-filled mountain ravines and arguing with murderous, AK-47 toting bandits in police uniform. He saw both the stark beauty and the terrible cruelty that Afghans live with every day. At the height of his team’s success, the Taliban attacked, killing his colleagues and destroying their work. These ambushes heralded a Taliban resurgence across the country; they also showed the weaknesses in America’s strategy that continue to undermine every American accomplishment in Afghanistan.

 

This is a riveting story of intrigue, adventure, and tragedy at the far edge of the world. In the tradition of The Places In Between and The Kite Runner, Opium Season examines the odyssey of an American chasing a seemingly impossible goal in the midst of chaos and describes this shattered, beautiful country and its deeply divided people.

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