Despite the frequency with which organizations are encouraged to adopt learning practices, organizational learning—especially in public organizations—is not well understood and deserves to be studied in more detail. This book fills that gap with a thorough examination of NASA’s loss of the two shuttles. After offering an account of the processes that constitute organizational learning, Julianne G. Mahler focuses on what NASA did to address problems revealed by Challenger and its uneven efforts to institutionalize its own findings. She also suggests factors overlooked by both accident commissions and proposes broadly applicable hypotheses about learning in public organizations.
Despite the frequency with which organizations are encouraged to adopt learning practices, organizational learning—especially in public organizations—is not well understood and deserves to be studied in more detail. This book fills that gap with a thorough examination of NASA’s loss of the two shuttles. After offering an account of the processes that constitute organizational learning, Julianne G. Mahler focuses on what NASA did to address problems revealed by Challenger and its uneven efforts to institutionalize its own findings. She also suggests factors overlooked by both accident commissions and proposes broadly applicable hypotheses about learning in public organizations.

Organizational Learning at NASA: The Challenger and Columbia Accidents
256
Organizational Learning at NASA: The Challenger and Columbia Accidents
256Paperback(New Edition)
Product Details
ISBN-13: | 9781589012660 |
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Publisher: | Georgetown University Press |
Publication date: | 03/27/2009 |
Series: | Public Management and Change series |
Edition description: | New Edition |
Pages: | 256 |
Product dimensions: | 5.90(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.80(d) |
Age Range: | 18 Years |