Overseen or Overlooked?: Legislators, Armed Forces, and Democratic Accountability

by David P. Auerswald, Philippe Lagassé, Stephen M. Saideman

Overview

"War is too important to be left to the generals," declared French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau over a century ago. But which civilians, exactly, play the most important roles in controlling the armed forces? When civilian control is studied, the focus is typically on those in the upper echelons of the executive branch: presidents, prime ministers, or defense secretaries. Yet, because civilians in the executive may be tempted to hide problems or use the military in controversial ways, researchers must extend Clemenceau's dictum: if war is too important to be left to the generals, civilian control is too important to leave with the executive. This book aims to understand the similarities and differences among the world's democracies regarding the role of legislatures in democratic civil-military relations. Drawing on over a dozen cases from across the globe, the authors examine how most legislatures face capability and motivational impediments to conducting truly robust oversight and propose realistic reforms to strengthen military accountability to elected officials and the public—the heart of the civil-military relationship.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781503643420
Publisher:	Stanford University Press
Publication date:	09/23/2025
Pages:	360
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.00(d)

About the Author

David P. Auerswald is Professor of Security Studies at the U.S. National War College. Philippe Lagassé is Associate Professor and Barton Chair at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. Stephen M. Saideman is Professor and Paterson Chair of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University.

Table of Contents

One. Introduction: Are Legislators Watching the Armed Forces?
Two. Explaining Legislative Oversight Over the Armed Forces
I. ARE WESTMINSTER PARLIAMENTS IGNORANT AND IRRELEVANT?
Three. Westminster in the Atlantic: The United Kingdom and Canada
Four. Westminster in the Pacific: Australia,New Zealand, and Japan
II. CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACIES
Five. Consensual Democracies in the Heart of Europe: Germany and Belgium
Six. Consensual Democracies in the High North: Finland, Norway, and Sweden
III. CONGRESSES ARE OVERRATED
Seven. Not All Congresses: Brazil, Chile, and South Korea
Eight. Older Presidential Systems: France and the United States
Nine. Conclusion: Comparisons, Implications, and Lessons

Editorial Reviews

"Warfare today is mostly waged by coalitions of like-minded states. Too often, however, practitioners lack a clear understanding of the internal political dynamics affecting coalition partners. This book provides a first-of-its-kind exploration of the degree to which legislatures and parliaments oversee their militaries in democracies. Scholars will find a clear explanation of variations in legislative oversight. Practitioners will gain a better understanding of how legislative oversight affects a defense coalition's militaries." —James Stavridis, Admiral US Navy (ret), former Supreme Allied Commander at NATO

"This important, data-driven book taught me so much! The authors make a powerful case that civilian control is too important to leave with the executive, explain why legislative oversight varies among democracies, and recommend ways to strengthen oversight. An invaluable work of scholarship for the field of civil-military relations." —Kori Schake, American Enterprise Institute

"For too long, the civilian side of the civil-military relations equation in democracies has been neglected by scholars. This innovative new book illustrates why it is so important. Lucidly written and empirically expansive, this book exposes the mechanisms that make civilian control work—or not. The authors make an essential contribution to our knowledge of civil-military relations and democratic governance." —Risa Brooks, Marquette University

From the Publisher