Perfect Deterrence

Perfect Deterrence

by Frank C. Zagare, D. Marc Kilgour
     
 

This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using non-cooperative game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and… See more details below

Overview

This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using non-cooperative game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. The book's distinctive approach yields some surprising conclusions, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780521781749
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
09/25/2000
Series:
Cambridge Studies in International Relations Series, #72
Pages:
442
Product dimensions:
5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 1.14(d)
Lexile:
1440L (what's this?)

Meet the Author

Table of Contents

List of figures
List of tables
Preface
1Classical deterrence theory3
1.1Classical deterrence theory: assumptions and implications7
1.2Empirical anomalies24
1.3Logical problems30
2Rationality and deterrence37
2.1On rationality38
2.2Some implications of the assumption of instrumental rationality44
2.3Resolving the paradox I: deterministic threats49
2.4Resolving the paradox II: the threat-that-leaves-something-to-chance54
2.5Resolving the paradox III: the metagame solution58
3Credibility and deterrence65
3.1On credibility66
3.2Resolving the paradox IV: mutually credible threats70
3.3On capability81
3.4Deterrence and uncertainty84
4Uncertainty and mutual deterrence99
4.1Capability, credibility, and mutual deterrence101
4.2Credibility, uncertainty, and mutual deterrence104
4.3Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game111
5Unilateral deterrence133
5.1Game form135
5.2Unilateral deterrence under complete information139
5.3Unilateral deterrence under incomplete information143
5.4Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Unilateral Deterrence Game144
5.5The Unilateral Deterrence Game and power transition theory158
6Modeling extended deterrence169
6.1Preliminaries170
6.2The Asymmetric Escalation Game175
6.3Extended deterrence and the dynamics of escalation183
6.4The Asymmetric Escalation Game under complete information187
6.5Subgame-perfect equilibria192
7Modeling Massive Retaliation197
7.1Modeling all-or-nothing deployments200
7.2Perfect Bayesian equilibria under Massive Retaliation203
8Modeling Flexible Response219
8.1Modeling Flexible Response: assumptions221
8.2Perfect Bayesian equilibria under Flexible Response224
8.3Multiple equilibria243
9Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence255
9.1Theory and evidence257
9.2Assumptions258
9.3Behavioral possibilities261
9.4Deterrence and conflict spirals262
10Perfect Deterrence Theory285
10.1Capability: a necessary condition290
10.2Deterrence and the status quo293
10.3Credibility and deterrence296
10.4Deterrence breakdowns, limited conflicts, and escalation spirals301
10.5Nuclear weapons and deterrence303
App. 1Deterrence models311
App. 2Useful definitions323
App. 3Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game328
App. 4Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game331
App. 5Unilateral Deterrence Game339
App. 6Asymmetric Escalation Game: "Massive Retaliation" version347
App. 7Asymmetric Escalation Game: "Flexible Response"354
App. 8Asymmetric Escalation Game: general version365
References384
Index405

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