Perfect Deterrence

Hardcover (Print)
Buy New
Buy New from BN.com
$132.05
Used and New from Other Sellers
Used and New from Other Sellers
from $109.88
Usually ships in 1-2 business days
(Save 31%)
Other sellers (Hardcover)
  • All (8) from $109.88   
  • New (5) from $109.88   
  • Used (3) from $132.04   

Overview

This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using non-cooperative game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. The book's distinctive approach yields some surprising conclusions, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace.
Read More Show Less

Editorial Reviews

From the Publisher
"...Zagare and Kilgour are to be commended...They present complex results clearly...Notation is clear and consistent, making it easy to directly compare equilibrium conditions for different models. Throughout the book, each set of findings is illustrated with appropriate examples, drawing from a wide array of historical eras." American Political Science Review
Read More Show Less

Product Details

Table of Contents

List of figures
List of tables
Preface
1 Classical deterrence theory 3
1.1 Classical deterrence theory: assumptions and implications 7
1.2 Empirical anomalies 24
1.3 Logical problems 30
2 Rationality and deterrence 37
2.1 On rationality 38
2.2 Some implications of the assumption of instrumental rationality 44
2.3 Resolving the paradox I: deterministic threats 49
2.4 Resolving the paradox II: the threat-that-leaves-something-to-chance 54
2.5 Resolving the paradox III: the metagame solution 58
3 Credibility and deterrence 65
3.1 On credibility 66
3.2 Resolving the paradox IV: mutually credible threats 70
3.3 On capability 81
3.4 Deterrence and uncertainty 84
4 Uncertainty and mutual deterrence 99
4.1 Capability, credibility, and mutual deterrence 101
4.2 Credibility, uncertainty, and mutual deterrence 104
4.3 Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game 111
5 Unilateral deterrence 133
5.1 Game form 135
5.2 Unilateral deterrence under complete information 139
5.3 Unilateral deterrence under incomplete information 143
5.4 Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Unilateral Deterrence Game 144
5.5 The Unilateral Deterrence Game and power transition theory 158
6 Modeling extended deterrence 169
6.1 Preliminaries 170
6.2 The Asymmetric Escalation Game 175
6.3 Extended deterrence and the dynamics of escalation 183
6.4 The Asymmetric Escalation Game under complete information 187
6.5 Subgame-perfect equilibria 192
7 Modeling Massive Retaliation 197
7.1 Modeling all-or-nothing deployments 200
7.2 Perfect Bayesian equilibria under Massive Retaliation 203
8 Modeling Flexible Response 219
8.1 Modeling Flexible Response: assumptions 221
8.2 Perfect Bayesian equilibria under Flexible Response 224
8.3 Multiple equilibria 243
9 Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence 255
9.1 Theory and evidence 257
9.2 Assumptions 258
9.3 Behavioral possibilities 261
9.4 Deterrence and conflict spirals 262
10 Perfect Deterrence Theory 285
10.1 Capability: a necessary condition 290
10.2 Deterrence and the status quo 293
10.3 Credibility and deterrence 296
10.4 Deterrence breakdowns, limited conflicts, and escalation spirals 301
10.5 Nuclear weapons and deterrence 303
App. 1 Deterrence models 311
App. 2 Useful definitions 323
App. 3 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game 328
App. 4 Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game 331
App. 5 Unilateral Deterrence Game 339
App. 6 Asymmetric Escalation Game: "Massive Retaliation" version 347
App. 7 Asymmetric Escalation Game: "Flexible Response" 354
App. 8 Asymmetric Escalation Game: general version 365
References 384
Index 405
Read More Show Less

Customer Reviews

Be the first to write a review
( 0 )
Rating Distribution

5 Star

(0)

4 Star

(0)

3 Star

(0)

2 Star

(0)

1 Star

(0)

Your Rating:

Your Name: Create a Pen Name or

Barnes & Noble.com Review Rules

Our reader reviews allow you to share your comments on titles you liked, or didn't, with others. By submitting an online review, you are representing to Barnes & Noble.com that all information contained in your review is original and accurate in all respects, and that the submission of such content by you and the posting of such content by Barnes & Noble.com does not and will not violate the rights of any third party. Please follow the rules below to help ensure that your review can be posted.

Reviews by Our Customers Under the Age of 13

We highly value and respect everyone's opinion concerning the titles we offer. However, we cannot allow persons under the age of 13 to have accounts at BN.com or to post customer reviews. Please see our Terms of Use for more details.

What to exclude from your review:

Please do not write about reviews, commentary, or information posted on the product page. If you see any errors in the information on the product page, please send us an email.

Reviews should not contain any of the following:

  • - HTML tags, profanity, obscenities, vulgarities, or comments that defame anyone
  • - Time-sensitive information such as tour dates, signings, lectures, etc.
  • - Single-word reviews. Other people will read your review to discover why you liked or didn't like the title. Be descriptive.
  • - Comments focusing on the author or that may ruin the ending for others
  • - Phone numbers, addresses, URLs
  • - Pricing and availability information or alternative ordering information
  • - Advertisements or commercial solicitation

Reminder:

  • - By submitting a review, you grant to Barnes & Noble.com and its sublicensees the royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable right and license to use the review in accordance with the Barnes & Noble.com Terms of Use.
  • - Barnes & Noble.com reserves the right not to post any review -- particularly those that do not follow the terms and conditions of these Rules. Barnes & Noble.com also reserves the right to remove any review at any time without notice.
  • - See Terms of Use for other conditions and disclaimers.
Search for Products You'd Like to Recommend

Recommend other products that relate to your review. Just search for them below and share!

Create a Pen Name

Your Pen Name is your unique identity on BN.com. It will appear on the reviews you write and other website activities. Your Pen Name cannot be edited, changed or deleted once submitted.

 
Your Pen Name can be any combination of alphanumeric characters (plus - and _), and must be at least two characters long.

Continue Anonymously

    If you find inappropriate content, please report it to Barnes & Noble
    Why is this product inappropriate?
    Comments (optional)