×

Uh-oh, it looks like your Internet Explorer is out of date.

For a better shopping experience, please upgrade now.

Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking / Edition 1
     

Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking / Edition 1

by Keith Krehbiel
 

See All Formats & Editions

ISBN-10: 0226452727

ISBN-13: 9780226452722

Pub. Date: 06/28/1998

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Politicians and pundits alike have complained that the divided governments of the last decades have led to legislative gridlock. Not so, argues Keith Krehbiel, who advances the provocative theory that divided government actually has little effect on legislative productivity. Gridlock is in fact the order of the day, occurring even when the same party controls the

Overview

Politicians and pundits alike have complained that the divided governments of the last decades have led to legislative gridlock. Not so, argues Keith Krehbiel, who advances the provocative theory that divided government actually has little effect on legislative productivity. Gridlock is in fact the order of the day, occurring even when the same party controls the legislative and executive branches. Meticulously researched and anchored to real politics, Krehbiel argues that the pivotal vote on a piece of legislation is not the one that gives a bill a simple majority, but the vote that allows its supporters to override a possible presidential veto or to put a halt to a filibuster. This theory of pivots also explains why, when bills are passed, winning coalitions usually are bipartisan and supermajority sized. Offering an incisive account of when gridlock is overcome and showing that political parties are less important in legislative-executive politics than previously thought, Pivotal Politics remakes our understanding of American lawmaking.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780226452722
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
Publication date:
06/28/1998
Edition description:
1
Pages:
258
Sales rank:
842,001
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d)

Table of Contents

Tables
Figures
Preface
I: Theoretical Foundations
1: Basics
2: A Theory
II: Empirical Tests
3: Gridlock
4: Coalition Sizes
5: Filibuster Pivots
6: Veto Pivots
III: Applications
7: Presidential Power?
8: Party Government?
9: Partisanship or Pivots?
IV: Conclusion
10: Beyond Basics
Bibliography
Index

Customer Reviews

Average Review:

Post to your social network

     

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See all customer reviews