Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process

Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process

by Gideon Doron, Itai Sened
     
 

ISBN-10: 0761952500

ISBN-13: 9780761952503

Pub. Date: 05/25/2001

Publisher: SAGE Publications

Political Bargaining introduces a process at the heart of all political and economic exchanges in contemporary society, and the very essence of politics itself, to provide a new framework and fresh insights for modern political science.

Gideon Doron and Itai Sened trace the prevalence of bargaining processes in politics from the abstract level of individual human

Overview

Political Bargaining introduces a process at the heart of all political and economic exchanges in contemporary society, and the very essence of politics itself, to provide a new framework and fresh insights for modern political science.

Gideon Doron and Itai Sened trace the prevalence of bargaining processes in politics from the abstract level of individual human interaction and the 'state of nature' to the more concrete political or institutionalized level.

They introduce students to theory — the basic models of social choice and game theory, rational choice theory and positivist approaches; practice — the practical manifestations of political bargaining in everyday national and international political life; and process — its setting, the interests of the players involved, the conditions and properties that affect their calculations and, consequently, their ability to obtain desired outcomes.

Political Bargaining will serve to provide students with the basic tools for learning about and participating in politics today by richly illustrating how the authoritative allocation of scarce resources is arrived at through a complex bargaining process between competing interests in society. It will be essential reading for student and lecturer alike across political science and the social sciences more widely.

Author//Editor Description:

Gideon Doron is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University.

Itai Sened is Associate Professor at Washington University in St Louis and Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780761952503
Publisher:
SAGE Publications
Publication date:
05/25/2001
Series:
SAGE Politics Texts series
Pages:
192
Product dimensions:
6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x (d)

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tablesvii
List of Commonly Used Symbolsix
Prefacexiii
Introduction1
1The Prevalence of Bargaining1
2Political Scarcity and Boundaries4
3Political Bargaining: A Non-Technical Definition7
4Factors Affecting the Political Bargaining Process7
5Unifying Theme12
6The Structure of the Book15
Chapter 1A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Political Bargaining19
1.1Introduction19
1.2The 'Hard Core' of the Rational Choice Theory20
Basic Assumptions20
Game Theory22
1.3Cooperative Game Theory in Political Bargaining Theory24
1.4Non-Cooperative Game Theory and Political Bargaining Theory25
1.5Rubinstein's Formulation of the Bargaining Problem27
1.6Concluding Remarks: Bargaining in Political Settings32
Chapter 2The Social Problem35
2.1Introduction35
2.2The Arrowian Social Choice Problem36
2.3The Chaos Theorem41
2.4Hobbes' Collective Action Problem45
2.5Coase's Social Cost Problem47
2.6Concluding Remarks: A Bargained Social Contract49
AppendixAn Outline of the Proof to Arrow's Theorem51
Chapter 3A Bargained Social Contract55
3.1Introduction: Spontaneous and Intentional Origins of Social Order55
3.2The Origin of Social Order: The State of Nature56
3.3The Origin of Order: Spontaneous Emergence and the Folk Theorem57
3.4The Origin of Order: Emergency by Design & the Role of Governments63
3.5Participation Games64
3.6Negotiating the Social Contract Through a Bargaining Process68
3.7The Bargained Social Contract71
3.8Concluding Remarks: An Imperfect Bargained Social Contract73
Chapter 4Special Interests and Political Entrepreneurs77
4.1Introduction: The Role of Political Entrepreneurs77
4.2Special Interests and Entrepreneurs78
4.3A Model of a Polity with Special Interests and Entrepreneurs80
4.4The State as a Nexus of Information and Coordination of Special Interests87
4.5Concluding Remarks: The Political Origin of Social Order89
Chapter 5Electoral and Post Electoral Bargaining in Parliamentary Systems93
5.1Introduction93
5.2The Historic Origins of Representative Government94
5.3Barriers of Entry into Elected Bodies97
5.4The Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition99
5.5The Legislative Bargaining Game - The Heart of the Polity101
5.6The Coalition Bargaining Game - The General Heart of the Polity103
5.7The Vote Decision107
5.8Parties' Strategic Positions at the Initial Stage of the Game111
5.9Conclusions: Representation Through Bargaining112
Chapter 6Post Electoral Bargaining in Presidential Systems115
6.1Division of Power: Some Preliminary Thoughts115
6.2A Spatial Model of Checks and Balances116
6.3Organization of U.S. House of Representatives: The Role of Committees120
6.4Coalition Building in the U.S. House of Representatives124
6.5Bargaining Over Unanimous Consent Agreements in the U.S. Senate130
6.6Bargaining Between Legislators and Special Interests133
6.7Conclusions134
Chapter 7Bargaining at the International Arena137
7.1The Nature of Bargaining in the International Arena137
7.2Inter-State Pattern of Equilibria: The Israeli-Egyptian Conflict138
7.3The Democratic Peace Hypothesis143
7.4A Deductive Approach to the Democratic Peace Hypothesis146
7.5A Game-Theoretic Model that Implies the 'Democratic Peace' Hypothesis149
7.6Conclusions153
Conclusion155
References159
Index171
List of Figures and Tables
Figure 0.1The Management - Workers' Union Chicken Game11
Figure 1.1A Two-Person Prisoners' Dilemma Game27
Figure 1.2Edgeworth Box as a Model of the Bargaining Problem28
Figure 2.1An Illustration of the Chaos Theorem44
Figure 2.2The State of Nature as a Two-Person Prisoners' Dilemma45
Figure 3.1The State of Nature as a Two-Person Prisoners' Dilemma Game58
Figure 3.2A Graphic Illustration of the Folk Theorem61
Figure 3.3A Two-Person 'Who Goes First' game66
Figure 5.1Distribution of Ideal Points and Party Positions in the 1996 Election in Israel109
Figure 6.1An Illustration of a Bicameral Core118
Figure 6.2An Illustration of Structure Induced Equilibrium122
Figure 6.3The Structure of the Legislative Process as Modeled by B&F125
Figure 6.3aThe Legislative Process Under the Closed Rule125
Figure 6.3bThe Legislative Process Under the Open Rule126
Figure 7.1A Game of Chicken: Israeli-Egyptian Conflict until 1973141
Figure 7.2The Game of Prisoners' Dilemma: Israel-Egypt 1973-1979142
Table 2.1A Nine-Person Preference Profile Over Four Possible Outcomes40
Table 2.2A Nine-Person Preference Profile Over Five Possible Outcomes40
Table 2.3Total and Marginal Benefits to Farmer and Cattle-Raiser48
Table 2.4Optimal Resource Allocation Under Different Ownership Designs48
Table 2.5Resource Allocations with Governments that Maximize Revenues49
Table 3.1N-Person Participation Game65
Table 3.2Constituents' Pay-offs69
Table 4.1Constituents' Pay-offs82
Table 4.2The Entrepreneur's Pay-offs83
Table 5.1Multinomial Logit Analysis of the 1996 Election in Israel110

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