Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process

Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process

by Gideon Doron, Itai Sened
     
 

Political Bargaining introduces a process at the heart of all political and economic exchanges in contemporary society, and the very essence of politics itself, to provide a new framework and fresh insights for modern political science.

Gideon Doron and Itai Sened trace the prevalence of bargaining processes in politics from the abstract level of individual human

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Overview

Political Bargaining introduces a process at the heart of all political and economic exchanges in contemporary society, and the very essence of politics itself, to provide a new framework and fresh insights for modern political science.

Gideon Doron and Itai Sened trace the prevalence of bargaining processes in politics from the abstract level of individual human interaction and the 'state of nature' to the more concrete political or institutionalized level.

They introduce students to theory — the basic models of social choice and game theory, rational choice theory and positivist approaches; practice — the practical manifestations of political bargaining in everyday national and international political life; and process — its setting, the interests of the players involved, the conditions and properties that affect their calculations and, consequently, their ability to obtain desired outcomes.

Political Bargaining will serve to provide students with the basic tools for learning about and participating in politics today by richly illustrating how the authoritative allocation of scarce resources is arrived at through a complex bargaining process between competing interests in society. It will be essential reading for student and lecturer alike across political science and the social sciences more widely.

Author//Editor Description:

Gideon Doron is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University.

Itai Sened is Associate Professor at Washington University in St Louis and Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University.

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Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780761952503
Publisher:
SAGE Publications
Publication date:
05/25/2001
Series:
SAGE Politics Texts series
Pages:
192
Product dimensions:
6.22(w) x 9.62(h) x 0.68(d)

Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables
List of Commonly Used Symbols
Preface
Introduction1
Ch. 1A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Political Bargaining19
The 'Hard Core' of the Rational Choice Theory20
Cooperative Game Theory in Political Bargaining Theory24
Non-Cooperative Game Theory and Political Bargaining Theory25
Rubinstein's Formulation of the Bargaining Problem27
Concluding Remarks: Bargaining in Political Settings32
Ch. 2The Social Problem35
The Arrowian Social Choice Problem36
The Chaos Theorem41
Hobbes' Collective Action Problem45
Coase's Social Cost Problem47
Concluding Remarks: A Bargained Social Contract49
AppAn Outline of the Proof to Arrow's Theorem51
Ch. 3A Bargained Social Contract55
Introduction: Spontaneous and International Origins of Social Order55
The Origin of Social Order: The State of Nature56
The Origin of Order: Spontaneous Emergence and the Folk Theorem57
The Origin of Order: Emergence by Design & the Role of Governments63
Participation Games64
Negotiating the Social Contract Through a Bargaining Process68
The Bargained Social Contract71
Concluding Remarks: An Imperfect Bargained Social Contract73
Ch. 4Special Interests and Political Entrepreneurs77
Introduction: The Role of Political Entrepreneurs77
Special Interests and Entrepreneurs78
A Model of a Polity with Special Interests and Entrepreneurs80
The State as a Nexus of Information and Coordination of Special Interests87
Concluding Remarks: The Political Origin of Social Order89
Ch. 5Electoral and Post Electoral Bargaining in Parliamentary Systems93
The Historic Origins of Representative Government94
Barriers of Entry into Elected Bodies97
The Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition99
The Legislative Bargaining Game - The Heart of the Polity101
The Coalition Bargaining Game - The General Heart of the Polity103
The Vote Decision107
Parties' Strategic Positions at the Initial Stage of the Game111
Conclusions: Representation Through Bargaining112
Ch. 6Post Electoral Bargaining in Presidential Systems115
Division of Power: Some Preliminary Thoughts115
A Spatial Model of Checks and Balances116
Organization of U.S. House of Representatives: The Role of Committees120
Coalition Building in the U.S. House of Representatives124
Bargaining Over Unanimous Consent Agreements in the U.S. Senate130
Bargaining Between Legislators and Special Interests133
Ch. 7Bargaining at the International Arena137
The Nature of Bargaining in the International Arena137
Inter-State Pattern of Equilibria: The Israeli-Egyptian Conflict138
The Democratic Peace Hypothesis143
A Deductive Approach to the Democratic Peace Hypothesis146
A Game-Theoretic Model that Implies the 'Democratic Peace' Hypothesis149
Conclusion155
References159
Index171

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