The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions

The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions

by Peter Daniel Moser, Peter Moser
     
 

ISBN-10: 1858989663

ISBN-13: 9781858989662

Pub. Date: 01/01/2000

Publisher: Elgar, Edward Publishing, Inc.

Asserting that because majority rule is generally unstable and not binding for future voters, it is insufficient for the required security of a market, Moser (economics, U. of Applied Sciences of Eastern Switzerland, Chur and U. of St. Gallen, Switzerland) argues that democratic political institutions must limit the influence of majorities. He examines the potential

Overview

Asserting that because majority rule is generally unstable and not binding for future voters, it is insufficient for the required security of a market, Moser (economics, U. of Applied Sciences of Eastern Switzerland, Chur and U. of St. Gallen, Switzerland) argues that democratic political institutions must limit the influence of majorities. He examines the potential of constitutional rules, the organizational structure of legislatures, and administrative and judicial procedures to undermine popular democracy in favor of capitalism. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9781858989662
Publisher:
Elgar, Edward Publishing, Inc.
Publication date:
01/01/2000
Series:
Locke Institute Series
Pages:
208
Product dimensions:
6.12(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)

Table of Contents

List of figuresix
List of tablesxi
Acknowledgmentsxiii
1Introduction1
1.1Institutions and stability2
1.2Institutions and policy choice2
1.3Institutions and regulatory behavior3
1.4Relevance for economists4
Part ILegislative Institutions and Public Policy: A Survey of the Literature
Introduction to Part I9
2Collective decisions under simple majority rules10
2.1Methodology10
2.2Pure majority rule: main results12
2.3Pure majority rule: some extensions15
3Institutional constraints and stability22
3.1Voting sequence23
3.2Issue-by-issue voting23
3.3Proposal rights27
3.4Veto rights35
4Legislative institutions and policy choices: selected applications39
4.1Legislative policy making40
4.2Bureaucratic influence52
Part IIInstitutions and Stability: Checks and Balances in the Swiss Political System
Introduction to Part II61
5A model of legislative decisions64
5.1One-dimensional choices64
5.2Two-dimensional choices67
6A model of constitutional decisions73
6.1One-dimensional choices73
6.2Two-dimensional choices75
6.3Reform proposals78
7Uncertainty and interest groups82
7.1A model of the referendum game82
7.2Examples85
Summary of Part II88
Part IIIInstitutions and Policy Choice: The Conditional Influence of the European Parliament
Introduction to Part III91
8Strategic interactions in legislative procedures in the European Union95
8.1Description of legislative procedures95
8.2The model99
8.3Conditions for successful amendments by the EP105
9Case study on car emission standards112
9.1Car emission policy in the EU112
9.2Evaluation of the hypotheses116
Summary of Part III123
Part IVInstitutions and Regulatory Behavior: Checks and Balances as a Prerequisite for Independent Central Banks
Introduction to Part IV127
10Legislative choice of the monetary institution128
10.1The discussion in the literature128
10.2The model130
10.3Institutional choice135
10.4Appendix: Proposition 1 and proof of proposition 2137
11Legislative structure and central bank independence143
11.1Legislative structure and central bank independence in OECD countries143
11.2Discussion of related empirical studies151
11.3Appendix: Checks and balances in OECD countries153
Summary of Part IV158
Epilogue: Markets, checks and balances, and commitments159
References163
Index187

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