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Recent analysis by political economists of monetary institution determinants in different countries has been limited by the fact that exchange rate regimes and central bank institutions are studied in isolation from each other,
without examining how one institution affects the costs and benefits of the other.
By contrast, the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange rate regime and level of central bank independence together; the articles (originally published in a special issue of International Organization) constitute a second generation of research on the determinants of monetary institutions. The contributors consider both economic and political factors to explain a country's choice of monetary institutions, and examine the effect of political processes in democracies, including interest group pressure, on the balance between economic and distributional policy.
The MIT Press
|The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions||1|
|Partisan and Electoral Motivations and the Choice of Monetary Institutions Under Fully Mobile Capital||33|
|Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments||59|
|Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions||83|
|Political Parties and Monetary Commitments||111|
|Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration||139|
|Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes||169|
|Competing Commitments: Technocracy and Democracy in the Design of Monetary Institutions||197|