The political economy of property rights discrimination.

More About This Textbook


A seemingly unassailable consensus in political economy states that secure and private property rights are the institutional guarantor of economic growth. In this dissertation, I dispute this conventional account and propose a new understanding of property rights institutions, their effect on economic activity, and their political origins. I assume that economic agents demand---and politicians can provide---property rights discrimination, protecting certain groups rights while willfully ignoring or deliberately others'. Property rights discrimination shapes economic inequality and threatens per capita economic growth. In turn, it is the result of a bargaining process between citizens and politicians. The design of political institutions and citizens' different obstacles to collective action underlie the shape of that bargain. Empirically, I use firm-level surveys from the World Bank to provide statistical evidence of property rights discrimination's existence, consequences, and origins. Careful examination of firm managers' responses supports the proposition that individuals' confidence in the security of their property rights varies both within and across countries. I find tentative evidence that firm managers with less confidence in their private property rights invest less, operate at lower capacity, and hide a larger percentage of their revenues from the State, all else equal. I also find that national-level informality responds to property rights discrimination. Finally, I find evidence that autocratic regimes more likely discriminate in favor of politically influential firms than democratic or mixed regimes. A number of factors suggest the utility of marrying small-n case analysis with this statistical research. Therefore, I shift focus and method, discussing the reform of rules governing land rights in Colombia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Colombia's insertion into the world economy raised demand for land fertile for growing coffee. I show how large landowners and peasants competed over land rights through a lengthy and sometimes violent political process. Peasants' inability to create enduring forms of collective action, estate owners' economic power and Colombia's rigidly bipartisan system facilitated the creation of land rights institutions that heavily favored large landowners.
Read More Show Less

Product Details

  • BN ID: 2940032162155
  • Publisher: ProQuest LLC
  • Sold by: Barnes & Noble
  • Format: eTextbook
  • Pages: 240

Customer Reviews

Be the first to write a review
( 0 )
Rating Distribution

5 Star


4 Star


3 Star


2 Star


1 Star


Your Rating:

Your Name: Create a Pen Name or

Barnes & Review Rules

Our reader reviews allow you to share your comments on titles you liked, or didn't, with others. By submitting an online review, you are representing to Barnes & that all information contained in your review is original and accurate in all respects, and that the submission of such content by you and the posting of such content by Barnes & does not and will not violate the rights of any third party. Please follow the rules below to help ensure that your review can be posted.

Reviews by Our Customers Under the Age of 13

We highly value and respect everyone's opinion concerning the titles we offer. However, we cannot allow persons under the age of 13 to have accounts at or to post customer reviews. Please see our Terms of Use for more details.

What to exclude from your review:

Please do not write about reviews, commentary, or information posted on the product page. If you see any errors in the information on the product page, please send us an email.

Reviews should not contain any of the following:

  • - HTML tags, profanity, obscenities, vulgarities, or comments that defame anyone
  • - Time-sensitive information such as tour dates, signings, lectures, etc.
  • - Single-word reviews. Other people will read your review to discover why you liked or didn't like the title. Be descriptive.
  • - Comments focusing on the author or that may ruin the ending for others
  • - Phone numbers, addresses, URLs
  • - Pricing and availability information or alternative ordering information
  • - Advertisements or commercial solicitation


  • - By submitting a review, you grant to Barnes & and its sublicensees the royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable right and license to use the review in accordance with the Barnes & Terms of Use.
  • - Barnes & reserves the right not to post any review -- particularly those that do not follow the terms and conditions of these Rules. Barnes & also reserves the right to remove any review at any time without notice.
  • - See Terms of Use for other conditions and disclaimers.
Search for Products You'd Like to Recommend

Recommend other products that relate to your review. Just search for them below and share!

Create a Pen Name

Your Pen Name is your unique identity on It will appear on the reviews you write and other website activities. Your Pen Name cannot be edited, changed or deleted once submitted.

Your Pen Name can be any combination of alphanumeric characters (plus - and _), and must be at least two characters long.

Continue Anonymously

    If you find inappropriate content, please report it to Barnes & Noble
    Why is this product inappropriate?
    Comments (optional)