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Barbara Geddes brings rational choice theory to her study of Brazil between 1930 and 1964 and shows how state agencies are made more effective when they are protected from partisan pressures and operate through merit-based recruitment and promotion strategies. Looking at administrative reform movements in other Latin American democracies, she traces the incentives offered politicians to either help or hinder the process.
In its balanced insight, wealth of detail, and analytical rigor, Politician's Dilemma provides a powerful key to understanding the conflicts inherent in Latin American politics, and to unlocking possibilities for real political change.
|Figures and Tables|
|2||Reform as a Collective Good: Political Entrepreneurs and Democratic Politics||24|
|3||Insulation and the Struggle for Reform in Brazil, 1930-1964||43|
|4||Legislators and the Supply of Public Goods: A Brazilian Example and a Model||83|
|5||A Test of the Game Theoretic Model: When Legislators Initiate Reforms||99|
|6||The Political Uses of Bureaucracy: Presidential Survival versus Administrative Competence||131|
|7||The Effects of Institutions||182|
|Appendix A: Assessment of Achievement for the Various Targets in the Target Plan||197|
|Appendix B: Creation of Appointment and Survival Strategy Indices||210|
|Appendix C: Variable Construction||217|