Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don't

Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don't

by Jonathan Dancy, Alan H. Goldman
     
 

ISBN-10: 0521034078

ISBN-13: 9780521034074

Pub. Date: 02/28/2007

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Rules proliferate; some are kept with a bureaucratic stringency bordering on the absurd, while others are manipulated and ignored in ways that injure our sense of justice. Under what conditions should we make exceptions to rules, and when should they be followed despite particular circumstances? The two dominant models in the current literature on rules are the

Overview

Rules proliferate; some are kept with a bureaucratic stringency bordering on the absurd, while others are manipulated and ignored in ways that injure our sense of justice. Under what conditions should we make exceptions to rules, and when should they be followed despite particular circumstances? The two dominant models in the current literature on rules are the particularist account and that which sees the application of rules as normative. Taking a position that falls between these two extremes, Alan Goldman is the first to provide a systematic framework to clarify when we need to follow rules in our moral, legal, and prudential decisions, and when we ought not to do so.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780521034074
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
02/28/2007
Series:
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy Series
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
224
Product dimensions:
5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.51(d)

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments; Introduction; Part I. Moral Rules: 1. Outline of the task; 2. Types of rules: dispensable and indispensable; 3. Ordinary moral consciousness; 4. Rules as second-best strategies; 5. The justification of rules: strong and weak; 6. Interpretation of weak rules; Part II. Prudential Rules: 7. Moral and prudential rules compared; 8. Second-order prudential rules: optimizing; 9. A prudential rule to be moral; Part III. Legal Rules: 10. Classification; 11. The descriptive question: Hart, Dworkin and others; 12. The descriptive question: sources of law; 13. The normative question; Part IV. Moral Reasoning without Rules: 14. The inadequacy of particularism; 15. Coherence; 16. The reasoning process reviewed; 17. Objections; Notes; References; Index.

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