Presidential Control over Administration: A New Historical Analysis of Public Finance Policymaking, 1929-2018
The US Constitution recognizes the president as the sole legal head of the executive branch. Despite this constitutional authority, the president’s actual control over administration varies significantly in practice from one president to the next. Presidential Control over Administration provides a new approach for studying the presidency and policymaking that centers on this critical and often overlooked historical variable.

To explain the different configurations of presidential control over administration that recur throughout history—collapse, innovation, stabilization, and constraint—O’Brien develops a new theory that incorporates historical variation in a combination of key restrictions such as time, knowledge, and the structure of government as well as key incentives such as providing acceptable performance and implementing preferred policies. O’Brien then tests the argument by tracing the policymaking process in the domain of public finance across nearly a century of history, beginning with President Herbert Hoover during the Great Depression and ending with the first two years of the Trump presidency. Although the book focuses on historical variation in presidential control, especially during the New Deal era and the Reagan era, the theory and empirical analysis are highly relevant for recent incumbents. In particular, O’Brien shows that during the Great Recession and beyond the initial efforts of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump to change the established course during a period of unified party control of the government were largely undercut by each president’s limited control over administration.

Presidential Control over Administration is a groundbreaking contribution to our understanding of the presidency and policymaking.
1140780436
Presidential Control over Administration: A New Historical Analysis of Public Finance Policymaking, 1929-2018
The US Constitution recognizes the president as the sole legal head of the executive branch. Despite this constitutional authority, the president’s actual control over administration varies significantly in practice from one president to the next. Presidential Control over Administration provides a new approach for studying the presidency and policymaking that centers on this critical and often overlooked historical variable.

To explain the different configurations of presidential control over administration that recur throughout history—collapse, innovation, stabilization, and constraint—O’Brien develops a new theory that incorporates historical variation in a combination of key restrictions such as time, knowledge, and the structure of government as well as key incentives such as providing acceptable performance and implementing preferred policies. O’Brien then tests the argument by tracing the policymaking process in the domain of public finance across nearly a century of history, beginning with President Herbert Hoover during the Great Depression and ending with the first two years of the Trump presidency. Although the book focuses on historical variation in presidential control, especially during the New Deal era and the Reagan era, the theory and empirical analysis are highly relevant for recent incumbents. In particular, O’Brien shows that during the Great Recession and beyond the initial efforts of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump to change the established course during a period of unified party control of the government were largely undercut by each president’s limited control over administration.

Presidential Control over Administration is a groundbreaking contribution to our understanding of the presidency and policymaking.
59.99 In Stock
Presidential Control over Administration: A New Historical Analysis of Public Finance Policymaking, 1929-2018

Presidential Control over Administration: A New Historical Analysis of Public Finance Policymaking, 1929-2018

by Patrick Obrien
Presidential Control over Administration: A New Historical Analysis of Public Finance Policymaking, 1929-2018

Presidential Control over Administration: A New Historical Analysis of Public Finance Policymaking, 1929-2018

by Patrick Obrien

eBook

$59.99 

Available on Compatible NOOK devices, the free NOOK App and in My Digital Library.
WANT A NOOK?  Explore Now

Related collections and offers


Overview

The US Constitution recognizes the president as the sole legal head of the executive branch. Despite this constitutional authority, the president’s actual control over administration varies significantly in practice from one president to the next. Presidential Control over Administration provides a new approach for studying the presidency and policymaking that centers on this critical and often overlooked historical variable.

To explain the different configurations of presidential control over administration that recur throughout history—collapse, innovation, stabilization, and constraint—O’Brien develops a new theory that incorporates historical variation in a combination of key restrictions such as time, knowledge, and the structure of government as well as key incentives such as providing acceptable performance and implementing preferred policies. O’Brien then tests the argument by tracing the policymaking process in the domain of public finance across nearly a century of history, beginning with President Herbert Hoover during the Great Depression and ending with the first two years of the Trump presidency. Although the book focuses on historical variation in presidential control, especially during the New Deal era and the Reagan era, the theory and empirical analysis are highly relevant for recent incumbents. In particular, O’Brien shows that during the Great Recession and beyond the initial efforts of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump to change the established course during a period of unified party control of the government were largely undercut by each president’s limited control over administration.

Presidential Control over Administration is a groundbreaking contribution to our understanding of the presidency and policymaking.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780700632978
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Publication date: 04/27/2022
Series: Studies in Government and Public Policy
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 344
File size: 2 MB

About the Author

Patrick R. O'Brien is research and policy fellow at Connecticut Voices for Children, a public policy think tank in New Haven. He is also a visiting assistant professor of public policy at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut.

Table of Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments

I. A New Historical Approach for Studying the Presidency and Policymaking

1. Introduction

2. A Theory of Historical Variation in Presidential Control

II. A Quantitative Overview of Historical Variation in Public-Finance Policymaking

3. Public-Finance Problems, Prioritization, Administration, and Policy

III. Historical Variation in Presidential Control during the New Deal Era

4. Collapse: The Failing New Era Apparatus Limits Hoover’s Control

5. Innovation: Roosevelt Strengthens His Control in Restructuring the Policy Domain

6. Stabilization: Truman Relinquishes His Control in Securing the Policy Domain

7. Constraint: The New Deal-Era Apparatus Limits Eisenhower’s Control

IV. Historical Variation in Presidential Control during the Reagan Era

8. Collapse: The Failing New Deal-Era Apparatus Limits Carter’s Control

9. Innovation: Reagan Strengthens His Control in Restructuring the Policy Domain

10. Stabilization: Bush Relinquishes His Control in Securing the Policy Domain

11. Constraint: The Reagan-Era Apparatus Limits Clinton’s Control

V. Historical Variation in Presidential Control during the Great Recession and Beyond

12. The Reagan-Era Apparatus Limits Obama’s Control in Managing the Great Recession

13. A Preliminary Examination of Trump’s Control

14. Conclusion

Appendix: A Statistical Analysis of Public-Finance Administration

Notes

Index

From the B&N Reads Blog

Customer Reviews