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Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997
     

Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997

by David Lewis
 

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ISBN-10: 0804745900

ISBN-13: 9780804745901

Pub. Date: 09/02/2004

Publisher: Stanford University Press

Building on the theoretical tools developed under the rubric of the "New Economics of Organization" developed by such scholars as Morris Fiorina and Terry Moe, Lewis (politics, Princeton U.) presents a theory of government agency design process that sees the constitutional separation of powers and partisan politics as the main drivers of agency design. He tests his

Overview

Building on the theoretical tools developed under the rubric of the "New Economics of Organization" developed by such scholars as Morris Fiorina and Terry Moe, Lewis (politics, Princeton U.) presents a theory of government agency design process that sees the constitutional separation of powers and partisan politics as the main drivers of agency design. He tests his theory with case studies of the National Biological Service and the National Nuclear Security Agency, focusing on how Congress and the President struggle over levels of political insulation built into agencies. Annotation ©2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780804745901
Publisher:
Stanford University Press
Publication date:
09/02/2004
Edition description:
1
Pages:
240
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.50(d)

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