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The New York TimesPreventing Surprise Attacks" provides a... useful and contrarian view of the commision report.
— Eric Lichtblau
The commission to investigate the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States issued its final report in July of 2004, in which it recommended a dramatic overhaul of the nation's intelligence system. Congress responded by hastily enacting the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which adopts many of the 9/11 commission's specific recommendations, though with a number of alterations. Richard A. Posner, in the first full-length study of the post-9/11 movement for intelligence reform, argues that the 9/11 commission's analysis, on which Congress relied, was superficial and its organizational proposals unsound. The commission, followed by Congress, exaggerated the benefits of centralizing control over intelligence; neglected the relevant scholarship dealing with surprise attacks, organization theory, the principles of intelligence, and the experience of foreign nations, some of which have a longer history of fighting terrorism than the United States; and as a result ignored the psychological, economic, historical, sociological, and comparative dimensions of the issue of intelligence reform. Posner explains, however, that a ray of hope remains: the reorganization provisions of the new Act are so vague, as a result of intense politicking, that the actual shape of the reorganized system will depend critically on decisions made by the President in implementing the Act. In a searing critique, Posner exposes the pitfalls created by the new legislation, identifies the issues overlooked by the 9/11 commission and Congress, and suggests directions for real reform. This book is published in cooperation with the Hoover Institution
Part 1 Preface Part 2 Introduction Part 3 Part I: From the 9/11 Commission's Report to the Intelligence Reform Act Chapter 4 1. The Commission's Organizational Recommendations Chapter 5 2. The Congressional Response Part 6 Part II: Toward the Optimal Organization of the U.S. Intelligence System Chapter 7 3. The History and Anatomy of Successful Surprise Attacks Chapter 8 4. The Principles of Intelligence Chapter 9 5. The Principles of Organization Chapter 10 6. Lessons from the Organization of Intelligence in Other Countries Part 11 Conclusion: What Is to Be Done?