Principal Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives (International Library of Critical Writings in Economics)by Jean-Jacques Laffont
Pub. Date: 09/01/2003
Publisher: Elgar, Edward Publishing, Inc.
Laffont (economics, University of Southern California) presents articles mainly from the 1970s-80s, plus a few classic articles and articles from the 1990s, on foundations of the economic theory of incentives, the theory of moral hazard, adverse selection, and advanced topics. Some specific topics include uncertainty and welfare economics, an analysis of the principal-agent problem, the trade-off between risk spreading and appropriate incentives, and the theory of moral hazard and unobservable behavior. Other subjects are monopoly and product quality, regulation and information in a continuing relationship, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, and aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Annotation ©2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
- Elgar, Edward Publishing, Inc.
- Publication date:
- International Library of Critical Writings in Economics
- Product dimensions:
- 6.88(w) x 9.50(h) x (d)
and post it to your social network
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
See all customer reviews >