Principal Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives (International Library of Critical Writings in Economics)

Principal Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives (International Library of Critical Writings in Economics)

by Jean-Jacques Laffont
     
 

ISBN-10: 1843762404

ISBN-13: 9781843762409

Pub. Date: 09/01/2003

Publisher: Elgar, Edward Publishing, Inc.

Laffont (economics, University of Southern California) presents articles mainly from the 1970s-80s, plus a few classic articles and articles from the 1990s, on foundations of the economic theory of incentives, the theory of moral hazard, adverse selection, and advanced topics. Some specific topics include uncertainty and welfare economics, an analysis of the principal…  See more details below

Overview

Laffont (economics, University of Southern California) presents articles mainly from the 1970s-80s, plus a few classic articles and articles from the 1990s, on foundations of the economic theory of incentives, the theory of moral hazard, adverse selection, and advanced topics. Some specific topics include uncertainty and welfare economics, an analysis of the principal-agent problem, the trade-off between risk spreading and appropriate incentives, and the theory of moral hazard and unobservable behavior. Other subjects are monopoly and product quality, regulation and information in a continuing relationship, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, and aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Annotation ©2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9781843762409
Publisher:
Elgar, Edward Publishing, Inc.
Publication date:
09/01/2003
Series:
International Library of Critical Writings in Economics
Pages:
720
Product dimensions:
6.88(w) x 9.50(h) x (d)

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments
Introduction
1Of the Discouragement of Agriculture in the Ancient State of Europe after the Fall of the Roman Empire3
2The Economy of Incentives11
3Uncertainity and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care33
4The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment66
5Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff between Risk Spending and Appropriate Incentives73
6Insurance, Information, and Individual Action90
7The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem98
8The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I107
9Moral Hazard and Observability126
10An Analysis of the Principal-agent Problem144
11Justifying the First-order Approach to Principal-agent Problems183
12Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design197
13Repeated Moral Hazard226
14An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation237
15Monopoly and Product Quality271
16Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market288
17Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs312
18Regulating, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing332
19A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-agent Problems with an Application to the Control of a Self-managed Firm356
20Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship397
21Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem433
22Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms450
23Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems478
24Optimal Contracts with Public ex post Information498
25Nash Equilibrum and Welfare Optimality511
26Subgame Perfect Implementation527
27Incentive Theory with Data Compression557
28Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design572
29Contracts and Productive Information Gathering582
30Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives602
31The Principal-agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values628
32Multi-dimensional Screening: A User's Guide659
Name Index681

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