Principal Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives (International Library of Critical Writings in Economics)

Hardcover (Print)


Laffont (economics, University of Southern California) presents articles mainly from the 1970s-80s, plus a few classic articles and articles from the 1990s, on foundations of the economic theory of incentives, the theory of moral hazard, adverse selection, and advanced topics. Some specific topics include uncertainty and welfare economics, an analysis of the principal-agent problem, the trade-off between risk spreading and appropriate incentives, and the theory of moral hazard and unobservable behavior. Other subjects are monopoly and product quality, regulation and information in a continuing relationship, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, and aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Annotation ©2004 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
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Table of Contents

1 Of the Discouragement of Agriculture in the Ancient State of Europe after the Fall of the Roman Empire 3
2 The Economy of Incentives 11
3 Uncertainity and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care 33
4 The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment 66
5 Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff between Risk Spending and Appropriate Incentives 73
6 Insurance, Information, and Individual Action 90
7 The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem 98
8 The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I 107
9 Moral Hazard and Observability 126
10 An Analysis of the Principal-agent Problem 144
11 Justifying the First-order Approach to Principal-agent Problems 183
12 Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design 197
13 Repeated Moral Hazard 226
14 An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation 237
15 Monopoly and Product Quality 271
16 Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market 288
17 Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs 312
18 Regulating, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing 332
19 A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-agent Problems with an Application to the Control of a Self-managed Firm 356
20 Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship 397
21 Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem 433
22 Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms 450
23 Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems 478
24 Optimal Contracts with Public ex post Information 498
25 Nash Equilibrum and Welfare Optimality 511
26 Subgame Perfect Implementation 527
27 Incentive Theory with Data Compression 557
28 Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design 572
29 Contracts and Productive Information Gathering 582
30 Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives 602
31 The Principal-agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values 628
32 Multi-dimensional Screening: A User's Guide 659
Name Index 681
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