Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Moral Judgment and Decision Making [NOOK Book]

Overview

This volume presents a variety of perspectives from within and outside moral psychology. Recently there has been an explosion of research in moral psychology, but it is one of the subfields most in need of bridge-building, both within and across areas. Interests in moral phenomena have spawned several separate lines of research that appear to address similar concerns from a variety of perspectives. The contributions to this volume examine key theoretical and empirical issues these perspectives share that connect ...

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Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Moral Judgment and Decision Making

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Overview

This volume presents a variety of perspectives from within and outside moral psychology. Recently there has been an explosion of research in moral psychology, but it is one of the subfields most in need of bridge-building, both within and across areas. Interests in moral phenomena have spawned several separate lines of research that appear to address similar concerns from a variety of perspectives. The contributions to this volume examine key theoretical and empirical issues these perspectives share that connect these issues with the broader base of theory and research in social and cognitive psychology.

The first two chapters discuss the role of mental representation in moral judgment and reasoning. Sloman, Fernbach, and Ewing argue that causal models are the canonical representational medium underlying moral reasoning, and Mikhail offers an account that makes use of linguistic structures and implicates legal concepts. Bilz and Nadler follow with a discussion of the ways in which laws, which are typically construed in terms of affecting behavior, exert an influence on moral attitudes, cognition, and emotions.

Baron and Ritov follow with a discussion of how people's moral cognition is often driven by law-like rules that forbid actions and suggest that value-driven judgment is relatively less concerned by the consequences of those actions than some normative standards would prescribe. Iliev et al. argue that moral cognition makes use of both rules and consequences, and review a number of laboratory studies that suggest that values influence what captures our attention, and that attention is a powerful determinant of judgment and preference. Ginges follows with a discussion of how these value-related processes influence cognition and behavior outside the laboratory, in high-stakes, real-world conflicts.

Two subsequent chapters discuss further building blocks of moral cognition. Lapsley and Narvaez discuss the development of moral characters in children, and Reyna and Casillas offer a memory-based account of moral reasoning, backed up by developmental evidence. Their theoretical framework is also very relevant to the phenomena discussed in the Sloman et al., Baron and Ritov, and Iliev et al. chapters.

The final three chapters are centrally focused on the interplay of hot and cold cognition. They examine the relationship between recent empirical findings in moral psychology and accounts that rely on concepts and distinctions borrowed from normative ethics and decision theory. Connolly and Hardman focus on bridge-building between contemporary discussions in the judgment and decision making and moral judgment literatures, offering several useful methodological and theoretical critiques. Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum argue that some forms of moral judgment that appear objective and absolute on the surface are, at bottom, more about motivated reasoning in service of some desired conclusion. Finally, Bauman and Skitka argue that moral relevance is in the eye of the perceiver and emphasize an empirical approach to identifying whether people perceive a given judgment as moral or non-moral. They describe a number of behavioral implications of people's reported perception that a judgment or choice is a moral one, and in doing so, they suggest that the way in which researchers carve out the moral domain a priori might be dubious.

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Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9780080922775
  • Publisher: Elsevier Science
  • Publication date: 2/9/2009
  • Sold by: Barnes & Noble
  • Format: eBook
  • Pages: 384
  • File size: 2 MB

Meet the Author

Douglas L. Medin is the series editor of The Psychology of Learning and Motivation.

Brian Ross received his Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1982.
He is a professor in the UIUC Department of Psychology and a full-time faculty member in the Beckman Institute Cognitive
Science Group. His fields of professional interest are cognitive psychology, human memory and learning, problem solving,
acquisition of cognitive skills, remindings in learning and problem solving, and concepts and categories.
Honors and awards: Arnold O. Beckman Research Award
(1991, 1982); Beckman Fellow, UIUC Center for Advanced
Study (1985-86); Sigma Xi.

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Table of Contents

Our goals would be to put together a volume of 10-12 chapters for a total of 400-450 pages. A list of potential authors (tentative) and probable topics is given below:
1. Lance Rips (Psychology Department, Northwestern University) and Reid Hastie (U. Chicago Business School). Lance Rips is a leading expert in the area of reasoning and Reid Hastie contributes broad expertise in social cognition and in decision making. Topic: Moral versus nonmoral reasoning.
2. Linda J. Skitka (University of Illinois at Chicago) and Christopher W. Bauman, Northwestern Kellogg School of Management ): These authors would explore theoretical foundations and recent empirical evidence that supports the notion that there appears to be special links between attitudes and behavior when attitudes have a connection to people's moral convictions. Skitka and Bauman are both leaders in making the case for why attitudes held with strong moral conviction may be a special case of otherwise strong but non-moral attitudes (i.e., attitudes that are extreme, certain, central).
3. Peter Ditto (University of California, Irvine): This author will apply his extensive knowledge and background on motivated reasoning to tackle how motivation may play a special role when people are thinking through morally charged issues.
4. Janice Nadler (Northwestern University): Dr. Nadler has extensive experience studying the conflict between justice and truth, specifically, how people deal with conflicts between legally just and fair laws or decisions, and people's own sense of what the ?correct? answer should be. She has also done intriguing work on the issue of whether laws can affect moral judgment [Law]
5. Valerie Reyna (Cornell University). Dr. Reyna's current research program is focused on risky decision making in adolescents and on criteria for rationality in decision making. Dr. Reyna's contribution would be to focus on adolescents? ability to make moral decisions, and whether and how moral decision making may be different from other kinds of decision making. [Cognitive Development]
6. Darcia Narvaez (University of Notre Dame) and Daniel Lapsley (University of Notre Dame). Narvaez and Lapsley's expertise includes various topics in moral development and psychology, such as children's understanding of moral stories and text, with a special focus on moral identity and the degree to which moral constructs are easily accessed in memory. Following Higgins, King, and Marvin's (1982) chronicity research paradigm, these authors have been exploring the effects of chronically accessed moral constructs for prototypic moral character using a number of different social cognitive paradigms, including spontaneous trait inferences and lexical decision making tasks [Moral Development]
7. Philip Tetlock (University of California, Berkeley). This author will describe theory and research related to the construct of ?sacred values,? that is, values held with transcendent importance and that people are especially reluctant to see as fungible or possible of trading off for other values. This chapter will address the cognitive and motivational underpinnings of sacred and moral values, and the inherent difficulties'if not impossibility-- of distinguishing between cognition and motivation in this domain.
8. Steven Sloman (Brown University) and Michael Waldmann (Freiberg University). Sloman and Waldmann are cognitive scientists interested in causal reasoning and categorization, among other things. Waldmann has recently been doing work on moral judgment and the authors would write about the relationship between causal reasoning and moral judgment.
9. Shaun Nichols and Terry Connolly (University of Arizona). Nichols is a philosopher by training but does experiments and Connolly is does behavioral decision making research that touches on and includes moral values. We would ask them to write about the interaction of values and emotions in moral versus non-moral judgment and decision making.
10. Jon Baron (Penn) and Ilana Ritov (Hebrew University). Baron and Ritov have done extensive research on how sacred or protected values affect decision making and are leaders in this area of research. They probably would write about the relationship between deontology and consequentialism in decision making.
11. Jeremy Ginges (New School) and Scott Atran (CNRS). These two cognitive scientists bring research tools from mainstream decision making and judgment research to addressing real world moral judgments of Palestinian refugees and Israeli settlers displaced from Gaza. They would write on the interaction of sacred values, religious ideology, and culture in moral judgment.
12. Bill Goldstein (U Chicago) and Elke Weber (Columbia). Goldstein has a great historical appreciation of the field of decision making and Weber has recently become interested in culture and decision making. They earlier collaborated on an influential PLM chapter on kinds of decisions and we would ask them to address the same issue once again, this time from the perspective of culture and moral cognition.
13. Daniels Bartels (U Chicago Business School), Douglas Medin (and several of our other lab members) and Satoru Suzuki (Northwestern University). We would write on the general topic of attentional processes associated moral decision making and the paradox of how uncompromising values can be associated with great flexibility in judgments. Suzuki is an expert in the area of attention and would bring mainstream attention research to bear on this topic.
14. Jesse Prinz (University of North Carolina and John Mikhail (Georgetown University). Prinz is a philosopher by training and is well-known for his proposal giving emotion a dominant role in moral judgment. John Mikhail, at the Georgetown Law Center, has a different take on the literature and we would ask them to jointly write on whether the evidence suggests that an account of moral concepts is essential for models of moral cognition.
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