Public Choice III / Edition 3

Public Choice III / Edition 3

by Dennis C. Mueller
     
 

ISBN-10: 0521894751

ISBN-13: 9780521894753

Pub. Date: 02/28/2003

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the

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Overview

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined. The book is suitable for upper level courses in economics dealing with politics, and political science courses emphasizing rational actor models.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780521894753
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
02/28/2003
Edition description:
Third Edition
Pages:
788
Product dimensions:
5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 1.65(d)

Table of Contents

1. Introduction; Part I. Origins of the State: 2. The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency; 3. The reason for collective choice - redistribution; Part II. Public Choice in a Direct Democracy: 4. The choice of voting rule; 5. Majority rule - positive properties; 6. Majority rule - normative properties; 7. Simple alternatives to majority rule; 8. Complicated alternatives to majority rule; 9. Exit, voice and disloyalty; Part III. Public Choice in a Representative Democracy: 10. Federalism; 11. Two-party competition - deterministic voting; 12. Two-party competition - probabilistic voting; 13. Multiparty systems; 14. The paradox of voting; 15. Rent seeking; 16. Bureaucracy; 17. Legislatures and bureaucracies; 18. Dictatorship; Part IV. Applications and Testing: 19. Political competition and macroeconomic performance; 20. Interest groups, campaign contributions and lobbying; 21. The size of government; 22. Government size and economic performance; Part V. Normative public choice: 23. Social welfare functions; 24. The impossibility of a social ordering; 25. A just social contract; 26. The constitution as a utilitarian contract; 27. Liberal rights and social choices; Part VI. What Have We Learned?: 28. Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?; 29. Allocation, redistribution, and public choice.

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