Through widespread and relentless surprise attacks and ambushes, Confederate guerrillas drove Union soldiers and their leaders to desperation. Confederate cavalrymen engaged in hit-and-run tactics; autonomous partisan rangers preyed on Federal railroads, telegraph lines, and supply wagons; and civilian bushwhackers waylaid Union pickets. Together, all of these actions persuaded the Union to wage an increasingly punitive war.
Clay Mountcastle presents a new look at the complex nature of guerrilla warfare in the Civil War and the Union Army's calculated response to it. He examines guerrilla attacks and Federal responses in a number of operational theaters to show how the problem grew throughout the South and ultimately convinced the Union to adopt retaliatory measures that challenged the sensibilities of even the most hardened soldiers.
In revealing the impact that Confederate guerrilla activity had on the Union's prosecution of the war, Mountcastle reveals how the character of the war was shaped every bit as much by the troops on the ground as by their Union leaders. He draws on primary sources that vividly convey their reaction to the guerrilla problem and their justification for punitive action—with guerrillas described by one angry soldier as "thieves and murderers by occupation, rebels by pretense, soldiers only in name, and cowards by nature." Showing how much of the impetus for retaliation originated from the bottom up, starting in the western theater in 1861, he describes how it became the most influential factor in convincing Union generals, especially Grant and Sherman, that the war needed to be extended to include civilians and their property. The result was alevel of destructiveness that has been downplayed by other scholars—despite the evidence of executions and incidents of entire towns being burned to the ground.
By 1864, punitive action had evolved into such a powerful and decisive force that it produced what has been called "a warfare of frightfulness." And although guerrilla activity deviled the Union until the end, the Union's response ultimately proved a significant factor in persuading leaders like General Lee to call a halt to such actions and, ultimately, to surrender. Mountcastle's book offers the most revealing look yet at this incompletely understood dimension of the Civil War and also raises provocative questions about the relationship between guerrilla and conventional warfare in any conflict.
This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.
Confederate guerrillas are the subject of many books on the Civil War. Mosby, Quantrill, the sack of Lawrence, Bloody Bill Anderson or Missouri is the subject of many books. These books look at the guerrilla war from a Confederate perspective, with a slight nod to the Union's response. I do not recall a book that looks at the guerrilla war from the Union side, nor one that cover the punitive actions without sensationalism or rancor. Clay Mountcastle gives us a unique view in this small, well-written book by doing just that.
Lincoln and much of the North under estimated the depth of commitment to secession existing throughout the South. This lead to a policy of restraint, expecting kindness would case the majority of Southerners to return to the Union. In truth, Southerners were very committed to the cause showing a refusal to be conquered and occupied. This refusal manifested itself in burning bridges, tearing down telegraph wires, pulling up rails, sniping or attacking isolated groups of soldiers. Armies excel at fighting battles against other armies. They do not excel at guarding miles of railroad tracks or telegraph lines. Chasing after locals, trying to determine which civilian had fired on a riverboat or burned a bride is not a good mission for soldiers. Hours of marching, enduring dust and heat with little or nothing to show for it wears away restraint and builds contempt for those locals.
Starting in Missouri, moving down the Mississippi River, marching in Georgia and ending in the Shenandoah Valley we follow the North's response to the guerrilla problem in the field, at headquarters, in Washington and in the press. This is a history of the development and implementation of a policy of reprisals against civilian property. Systematically, the author shows how reprisals became a bottom-up and a top down policy. Men in the field tired of attacks and fruitless marches started attacking farms or towns. In turn, department commanders faced with an invisible foe in a "defeated" area were unable to maintain order in the face of small-scale attacks. In turn, Washington faced with a break down in the field harden the policy and accepted reprisals as policy.
This is an excellent history of punitive war and is much more than a list of towns burned or farms devastated. It is a history of a policy change that changed the face of war forever. The author has written a well-supported thesis, with full footnotes and a bibliography. Well thought out and presented, this book is history of the Union effort to break the South's will to fight by reprisals. The author says this took place "in the space and time between battles". This is true but foe many men in the Union army this was the Civil War they fought.
This book is a valuable addition to my Civil War library, presenting a view of the war that moves past "Battles and Leaders" into the reality of "the space and time between battles". This is a story that will resonate with veterans of our modern wars. Guerrilla warfare is becoming the norm and how this was "handled" in our history is important.
Anonymous
Posted July 18, 2010
No text was provided for this review.
Overview
Through widespread and relentless surprise attacks and ambushes, Confederate guerrillas drove Union soldiers and their leaders to desperation. Confederate cavalrymen engaged in hit-and-run tactics; autonomous partisan rangers preyed on Federal railroads, telegraph lines, and supply wagons; and civilian bushwhackers waylaid Union pickets. Together, all of these actions persuaded the Union to wage an increasingly punitive war.
Clay Mountcastle presents a new look at the complex ...