Questions Concerning Aristotle's On Animals

by Albert the Great, Irven M. Resnick, Kenneth F. Kitchell Jr.

Overview

After the Latin translation of Aristotelian works outside the logica vetus began in earnest in twelfth-century Spain, it remained to Scholastic philosophers to assimilate the new materials. Although many individuals commented on the logica nova and on some of Aristotle's books on natural philosophy, Albert the Great is one of only a very few Scholastics to comment on the entire collection of Aristotle's biological works.

This text, the Questions concerning Aristotle's On Animals [Quaestiones super de animalibus], recovered only at the beginning of the twentieth century and never before translated in its entirety, represents Conrad of Austria's report on a series of disputed questions that Albert the Great addressed in Cologne ca. 1258. The Questions, in nineteen books, mixes two distinct genres: the scholastic quaestio, with arguments pro et contra, a determination, and answers to the objections; and the straightforward question-and-response found, for example, in The Prose Salernitan Questions.

Here, even more clearly perhaps than in his slightly later and much larger paraphrastic commentary On Animals [De animalibus], Albert adduces his own views—often criticizing other medieval physicians and natural philosophers—on comparative anatomy, human physiology, sexuality, procreation, and embryology. This translation, based on the critical edition that appeared in the Cologne edition of Albert's work, helps to explain the title "patron saint of scientists" bestowed upon Albert by Pope Pius XII.

This work should find its audience among medievalists and historians of science and culture. More so than the massive On Animals, it should prove useful in the classroom as an encyclopedia or handbook of medieval life.

ABOUT THE TRANSLATORS:

Irven M. Resnick is professor of philosophy and religion, and Chair of Excellence in Judaic Studies at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. Kenneth F. Kitchell Jr. is professor of classics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780813215198
Publisher:	The Catholic University of America Press
Publication date:	04/01/2008
Series:	Fathers of the Church Mediaeval Continuation Series , #9
Pages:	584
Product dimensions:	5.70(w) x 8.50(h) x 1.40(d)

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QUESTIONS CONCERNING ARISTOTLE'S ON ANIMALS

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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS

Copyright © 2008 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8132-1519-8

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Chapter One

Here begin the questions on the books On Animals.

BOOK ONE

Question 1: Whether this book has animals for its subject.

FIRST ONE ASKS whether this book has animals for its subject.

1. It seems not, because every science has to do with things that are universal and incorruptible, but every animal is individual and corruptible, and therefore, etc.

2. Moreover, if it were about animals, then it would concern either some or all animals. But it is not more about some than others, and it would therefore be about them all. But this is impossible, since then it would seem to be infinite and the infinite cannot be known by humans.

3. Besides, an animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore any treatment of animals can be threefold: either in terms of the soul, in terms of the body, or in terms of the soul as it is related to the body. But the soul is treated in the book On the Soul. Moreover, the body is sufficiently treated in the book, the Physics, and in other subordinate sciences like medicine. But the soul as related to the body is adequately treated in our small books on natural matters [Parva naturalia]. If this book, then, were about animals it would be fruitless and superfluous, because the whole subject of what is in the animal is treated elsewhere, as has been proven. Therefore, etc.

But the opposite is made clear by how the Philosopher decided his subject matter1 and the title of the book.

To this one must say that this book can be said to be about animals because it primarily concerns the animated, movable body as applied to individual species of animals. This is so because such a study [scientia] is related to science [scientia] in the same way a specific subject is related to a [broader] subject. But this study is part of natural science and its subject will therefore be part of the broader subject. But the broader subject is that of the movable body. Therefore, the subject of this study is a specific, movable body.

Thus one must understand that "everything is intelligible to the extent that it is separable from matter." But since sciences are a characteristic [habitus] of the intellect, they have to be distinguished with respect to their objects, and this is why, to the extent that something is separated from its matter in diverse ways, it is naturally destined to pertain to a different science. For this reason, because some things are separated from matter with respect to their being [esse] and definition [ratio], like metaphysical objects, and some are separated with respect to their definition but not their being, like mathematical objects, and some, like natural objects, are separated from matter neither with respect to their being nor their definition, and are not separated in general but only in particular, then these sciences are essentially different-metaphysics, which concerns the first sort of being, and mathematics, which is about the second, and physics, which is about the third.

And likewise, within the same science the parts are distinguished with respect to a greater or lesser degree of separation from matter. And since that which is more universal is further abstracted from matter, it therefore belongs to a different part of science to make a determination about the subject in general and in particular. This is why the book on Physics, in which a determination is made about movable body in general, and the book On Heaven [and Earth], in which a determination is made about movable body restricted in terms of place [contracto ad ubi], concern one part of natural science, and consideration of a movable body defined by being animated, consequently, belongs to another part. And because consideration of the soul or of the ensouled is threefold: one way, considered absolutely, and another way as it is formed in the body or parts of the body, and this can still be considered in general, and a third way can be about that soul when applying it and its natures [rationes] to individual species of plants and animals, and because the first is treated in the book On the Soul, and the second in the short books that follow it, this is why it is necessary to treat the third in another part of natural science, and this is treated in the books On Plants and On Animals, which are in our hands.

Thus, properly speaking, the subject of this book is body, animated with a sensitive soul, as applied to individual species of animals. This is why it has to occupy the last place in the order of the books of natural [science].

1. On to the arguments. To the first, one must reply that animals can be treated in two ways, either with respect to the being [esse] they have apart from the soul or with respect to the being they have in the soul, that is, in the intellect. If they are considered in the first way, then each one is individual and corporeal, and then there can be no science of animals. But if in the second way, then there can be a science of animals since there is nothing in the intellect but what is universal and separable from matter.

2. To the second, one must reply that this is a science of all animals, although not as they are considered in and of themselves, because this way they have no fixed number but are rather infinite as far as we are concerned and do not fall under our understanding, but rather as they are reduced to determinate species and are united and come together in a common nature.

3. To the third, one must reply that although there could be a threefold treatment of an animal and each one could be treated in a different fashion in its own book, nevertheless the treatment that is considered here is not treated elsewhere. For here the soul is treated in relation not to each and every body, but only to the body that is bound to a species of animal. The soul is considered absolutely, however, in the book On the Soul, and body is treated without reference to the soul in the Physics, and in the other books of natural science the soul is considered nevertheless as it is formed for a body in general. And therefore this book is not unnecessary.

Question 2: Whether a variety of organic parts is necessary to the animal.

"Certain parts of bodies, etc." One asks whether an animal needs a variety of organic parts.

1. It seems not, because the more perfect the form, the more operations it can perform and with fewer intermediaries. For the sun, owing to its perfection, can act by means of its own light in more operations than some inferior thing. But the form of man is more perfect than the form of an element or a stone; therefore, it can act in more operations and with fewer intermediaries and, as a consequence, requires less diversity in its matter.

2. Likewise, if an animal needed a variety of parts, then this would be the case either for the sake of its essence or for the sake of its operation. But it is not for the sake of its essence, because it is simpler than the essence of other mixed bodies and freer from matter. Nor is it for the sake of its operations, because a plant has more parts but nevertheless has fewer operations.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher asks in On Heaven and Earth, why some spheres have one star and some have several, and some have several motions and some have fewer. And he says that the sphere that is more perfect has fewer motions, and this is why the starry heaven, which is the cause of being and permanence, moves with a single motion or by fewer motions than some other, inferior sphere. Therefore, since these inferior things imitate the superior as far as they are able, then, to the extent that something is more perfect, to that extent it will have fewer motions. And as a consequence the human, since he is the most perfect animal, will have less need for diverse parts since the diverse parts exist only on account of diverse motions.

On the contrary. As the Philosopher says in the third book of On the Soul, "Nature does nothing in vain, nor is it lacking things necessary to it." But nature provides each animal diverse organic parts. Therefore, these are necessary to it.

One must say that an animal needs a variety of organs. The reason for this is that the more perfect the form, the more operations it can perform. But matter is, to a certain extent, an impediment to operations; for a form bound to matter is perforce constrained or limited by it. Thus a form separated from matter, like intelligence, can be almost infinite with respect to a material form. Therefore, a form bound to a uniform matter has a uniform activity. Thus, each part of fire is fire and each part warms like the whole fire. Since, then, the soul is a more perfect form than the form of an element or a stone, it is the source of several operations. But it cannot perform many operations when it is united to matter, unless its matter is diversified, because it can only perform a uniform operation through a uniform matter. And this is why, if the whole animal body were just like the eye, it would not hear nor would it smell, and if its power were proportionate it would see by means of the whole body. And this is why it is necessary that the body, which is the animal's matter, be diversified into parts, so that diverse operations may be performed by means of the diverse parts, because if the body were undiversified [unigeneum] in its parts then the animal could perform only undiversified actions.

Nevertheless one must understand through the arguments that there is a difference between these inferior things and the superior ones. For among superior ones it is the case that the more perfect something is, the better it attains its end with fewer motions. Thus the supreme sphere attains its end by a single motion, and the inferior one by several. And similarly, when the first cause understands itself it understands all things, whereas inferior substances understand in a less comely manner. But it is different among these inferior things, because the more perfect something is the better it attains its end through several motions. And the reason for this is that these inferior things are joined to matter, and the form is the principle of acting or moving and operating. Therefore, just as the more distant something is from matter the more it shares in the perfection of the form, so too the more distant it is from matter the more it has of [form's] operation. And this is why, when it comes to material things, the human, since he is the most perfect animal, attains his end through several operations. Thus, the order is reversed between material and immaterial things. And the whole reason is that in material things perfection is attained in accordance with the remoteness from matter, but in immaterial ones it is attained in accordance with their nearness [approximatio] to the simplest principle.

1. On to the arguments. To the first argument one must reply that the more perfect the form the more it extends its operation to several things. Nevertheless it is not necessary that it have several operations. Rather, that it have several operations stems from the perfection of a material thing. Now, an immaterial thing or the first cause can affect more in a single act than a material thing can with several. Thus the proper or characteristic act of the sun is to give light, but through this act it extends itself to a multitude of others.

Thus, one must reply to the form of the argument that a plurality of operations can be observed in two ways, either from the standpoint of the agent's power or from the standpoint of the things affected. In the first way, an animal has several operations; in the second way, the sun does. And this is why an animal requires several parts, with which it operates as if with instruments, just as the sun does, because just as the hand and the foot and the eye are the animal's instruments, so too these inferior things are the sun's instruments, because a human can generate a human only through a human and a cow can generate a cow only through a cow.

2. To the second argument one must say that the animal essence is the root cause of diversity in the parts and its operation is just like a final cause. Now because the animal soul is more perfect with respect to its powers than is the form of inanimate things, and each power requires a different organ, for this reason from the beginning [originaliter] a diversity of organs is required owing to the essence of the soul itself, just as diversity in the matter is required owing to a diversity of form, and in the end [finaliter] diversity is required owing to the diverse operations which are performed only through diverse organs.

3. To the third argument one must say, just as we said, that the motion of inferior and superior things is different. Nevertheless, if the argument is made about a star, just as already has been done concerning its motion, then one will conclude the opposite, that it is the case among the spheres that a superior sphere has a greater number of stars than does a lower one. Therefore it will be the case among inferior things that a more perfect body will have a greater plurality of operations and powers, and a plurality of powers demands a plurality of organs. This is why it follows that an animal has more need of diverse parts than does something inanimate. And this is true.

Question 3: Whether an organic member that has been cut off can be restored.

One asks whether an organic member that has been cut off can be restored.

1. It seems so, because organs exist in animals just as branches do in plants. But a branch that has been cut off can be regenerated. Therefore, for the same reason, organic members can be regenerated in animals.

2. Likewise, organic members are composed of homogenous parts, but homogenous parts can be regenerated, as is clear in flesh; therefore, etc.

3. Again, nourishment is converted into the substance of the one nourished; therefore any member that is lost can be restored by nourishment.

The opposite is clear to the senses, since a hand that is cut off or an eye that is plucked out is not regenerated.

One must say that organic (that is, official) members in animals cannot be restored, because the more noble a thing is the more care nature bestows on its production. Thus it disposes a more noble matter upon something capable of being produced more nobly. So the animal's semen is nobler and more subtle than the plant's seed [semen], and this is why nature ordained a determinate place for the animal's semen, namely, the testicles, but not for the plant's seed. Now, however, the organic members are generated from the spermatic semen by means of the power delegated to such parts for the purpose of being a formative power. Therefore, if such a member is cut off, there is no matter remaining in the body from which such a member can be produced nor is there such a productive power in the body, since the productive power of the hand is in the hand and that of the foot is in the foot, and once the hand has been generated this productive power of the hand disappears. Thus such members cannot then be regenerated owing both to a defect in the matter and a defect in the agent.

1. On to the arguments. To the first, one must reply that branches that have been cut off can be regenerated because among animated things a plant is nearer to matter and to inanimate things. Thus it is particularly undiversified both in the whole and the part. So no matter is required to produce a branch beyond that which is the principle of nourishment. Thus, in plants the principle of nourishment and of the generation of branches is one and the same. But this is not the case for organic members in animals.

2. To the second, one must reply that some parts, for example, some nerves, bones, and some others like these, cannot be restored, just as the organic parts cannot. For those that partake more of form and less of matter, like those produced mostly from the spermatic semen, cannot be restored. But those that have a more material condition or are nearer to matter, yet do not arise only from the spermatic moisture but rather from the nutrimental moisture, can be restored. Examples include flesh, hair, and nails. And yet there is some flesh, like the flesh on the face, that cannot be restored, and this is because flesh such as this is produced from the spermatic moisture.

(Continues...)

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Table of Contents

Contents

Acknowledgments....................xxi
Guides to Editorial Convention and Abbreviations....................xxiii
Bibliography....................xxvii
Introduction....................1
BOOK ONE....................13
BOOK TWO....................78
BOOK THREE....................112
BOOK FOUR....................150
BOOK FIVE....................185
BOOK SIx....................203
BOOK SEVEN....................225
BOOK EIGHT....................268
BOOK NINE....................302
BOOK TEN....................328
BOOK ELEVEN....................337
BOOK TWELVE....................353
BOOK THIRTEEN....................389
BOOK FOURTEEN....................418
BOOK FIFTEEN....................439
BOOK SIXTEEN....................473
BOOK SEVENTEEN....................513
BOOK EIGHTEEN....................530
BOOK NINETEEN....................545
Index....................565