Race distinctions in American law by Gilbert Thomas Stephenson | NOOK Book (eBook) | Barnes & Noble
Race distinctions in American law

Race distinctions in American law

by Gilbert Thomas Stephenson
     
 

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This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back

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This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
2940023054193
Publisher:
New York D. Appleton
Format:
NOOK Book
File size:
643 KB

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CHAPTER III DEFAMATION TO CALL A WHITE PERSON A NEGRO There are certain words which are so universally considered injurious to a person in his social or business relations if spoken of him that the courts have held that the speaker of such words is liable to an action for slander, and damages are recoverable even though the one of whom the words were spoken does not prove that he suffered any special damage from the words having been spoken of him. The speaking of such words is said to be actionable per se. In short, all the world knows that it is injurious to a man to speak such words of him, and the court does not require proof of facts which all the world knows. Such words are (1) those imputing an infamous crime; (2) those disparaging to a person in his trade, business, office, or profession; and (3) those imputing a loathsome disease. Thus, to say that a man is a murderer is to impute to him an infamous crime, and if he brings a suit for slander, it is not necessary for him to prove that he has been damaged by the statement. The result is the same if one says that a person will not pay his debts, because that injures him in his profession or business; or that a man has the leprosy, because that is imputing to him a loathsome disease. From early times, it has been held to be slander, actionable per se, to say of a white man that he is a Negro or akin to a Negro. The courts have placed this under the second class—that is, words disparaging to a person in his trade, business, or profession. The first case in point arose in South Carolina1 in 1791, when the courts held that, if the words were true, the party (the white person) would be deprived of all civil rights, andmoreover, would be liable to be tried in all cases, under the " Negro Act," without the privilege of a tri...

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