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The Rational Design of International Institutions / Edition 1
     

The Rational Design of International Institutions / Edition 1

by Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, Duncan Snidal
 

ISBN-10: 0521533589

ISBN-13: 9780521533584

Pub. Date: 12/08/2003

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

International institutions vary widely in terms of key institutional features such as membership, scope, and flexibility. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal argue that this is so because international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different

Overview

International institutions vary widely in terms of key institutional features such as membership, scope, and flexibility. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal argue that this is so because international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. Using a Rational Design approach, they explore five important features of institutions—membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility—and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. The contributors to the volume then evaluate a set of conjectures in specific issue areas. (This book is Volume 55, part 4 of International Organization.)

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780521533584
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
12/08/2003
Series:
International Organization Series
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
342
Sales rank:
1,075,638
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.80(d)

Table of Contents

1. The rational design of international institutions Barbara Koremenos et al.; 2. Trust building, trust breaking: the dilemma of NATO enlargement Andrew Kydd; 3. The optimal design of international trade institutions: uncertainty and escape B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner; 4. Most-favored-nation clauses and cluster negotiations Robert Pahre; 5. Situation structure and institutional design: reciprocity, coercion, and exchange Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach; 6. Private justice in a global economy: from litigation to arbitration Walter Mattli; 7. Multilateralizing trade and payments in postwar Europe Thomas H. Oatley; 8. The institutional features of the Prisoners of War Treaties James D. Morrow; 9. Institutions for flying: how states built a market in international aviation service John E. Richards; 10. Driving with the rearview mirror: on the rational science of institutional design Alexander Wendt; 11. Rational design: looking back to move forward Barbara Koremenos et al.

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