Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War

by Alvin Z. Rubinstein

Overview

The Soviet-Egyptian relationship after the June War of 1967 was a new one for both countries, and its consequences were of global importance. Drawing on all available Soviet and Arab materials, Alvin Rubinstein develops the concept of influence as an analytical tool and explores in comprehensive fashion the diplomatic, military, political, and economic aspects of the influence relationship between the two nations in recent years.

The author's approach is chronological, analytical, and oriented toward the issues. He finds that the relationship has been fundamentally asymmetrical in aims and accomplishments. Egypt's remarkable comeback after the June War would not have been possible without Soviet aid, but Moscow benefited primarily in the context of the Soviet-American strategic rivalry in the Middle East, and only peripherally in terms of influence over Egypt.

Considering broader Soviet-Third World relationships, the author shows that there is no demonstrable correlation between intensified interactions and influence, that an extensive presence is no assurance of influence, and that Soviet influence can seldom be exercised at will in the absence of an ability to project Soviet military power directly.

Originally published in 1977.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691616780
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	03/08/2015
Series:	Princeton Legacy Library , #1625
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	410
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)

Read an Excerpt

Red Star on the Nile

The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War

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By Alvin Z. Rubinstein

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 1977 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-10048-7

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CHAPTER 1

TRANSFIGURATION

THE Middle East war of June 1967 was a watershed in Soviet-Egyptian relations. In the ensuing months, Moscow assumed commitments far greater than any it had previously undertaken in quest of imperial objectives in the Third World: the arms deal of September 1955 and the building of the Aswan High Dam in the 1960s were by comparison low-risk, uncomplicated initiatives whose dramatic impact overshadowed their actual strategic significance. After the June War, the Soviet Union became Egypt's benefactor, munificent but calculating, supportive but ambitious and sometimes overbearing. This ever-changing relationship acquired global importance, affecting as it did issues of war and peace and the superpower détente.

In the following pages the historical background is presented with the purpose of delineating the relationships and outlooks that serve as the starting point for our study of the Soviet-Egyp- tian influence relationship.

DEFEAT

Shortly after the outbreak of fighting in the early hours of June 5, 1967, the Kremlin activated the "hot line" to Washington for the first time. Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin "expressed Soviet concern over the fighting," called on the United States to make Israel desist from its attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and stated Moscow's intention to seek a cease-fire through the United Nations. Later in the day, the Soviet government denounced the Israeli "aggression" in a statement that criticized the encouragement given by the "covert and overt actions of certain imperialist circles." It affirmed the "resolute support" of the USSR for the Arab governments and peoples, demanded that Israel "stop immediately and unconditionally its military actions ... and pull back its troops beyond the truce line," and ended on the ominous note: "The Soviet Government reserves the right to take all steps that may be necessitated by the situation." In the United Nations, the Soviet delegation proposed a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, condemnation of Israel, and a full Israeli withdrawal. Egypt (and the other Arab states), however, opposed any ceasefire because in Cairo Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir was still being told by his Military Operations Command that an Egyptian counterattack was imminent and that the campaign was far from lost.

On the morning of June 6, Cairo and Damascus broke off diplomatic relations with the United States and Great Britain, accusing them of collusion with Israel, of "taking part in the Israeli military aggression insofar as the air operations are concerned." In Moscow, Egyptian Ambassador Muhammad Murad Ghaleb met with Premier Kosygin and urged prompt Soviet support. Kosygin again exchanged views with President Lyndon B. Johnson via the hot line and was informed — indeed, he probably already knew on the basis of his own intelligence reports — that Cairo's allegations were false: American aircraft were not involved, nor had they been at any time. A meeting of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was held on the morning of June 6 to discuss the situation. It is evident that the Politburo realized the inaccurate and reckless nature of the Arab charges of American participation in the Israeli attack for the Soviet press ignored them. Moscow had no desire to be dragged into a war with the United States just to pull Arab chestnuts out of the fire. The same evening the Soviet delegation at the United Nations dropped its previous demand for the condemnation of Israel and announced its readiness to accept a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, without the precondition of a withdrawal to the June 4 lines. This resolution, which the Americans had proposed from the very beginning, was unanimously adopted by all fifteen members of the Security Council. But of the Arab states, only Jordan accepted on the following day, Egypt insisting on a full Israeli withdrawal. Israel agreed to a cease-fire, but only on the condition that it was accepted by all the Arab states.

The June 6 issue of Pravda carried, in addition to the text of the Soviet government's declaration of June 5 condemning Israel, an article by Igor' Beliaev, a well-known analyst of Middle East affairs, in which he went beyond a mere reaffirmation of Soviet support for the Arab nations and emphasized that "Nobody can doubt this for a single minute." The target of his remark was not clear, though it was probably intended for Washington and not Cairo, since the situation early on June 6 may still have appeared fluid in Moscow, given the claims of intense fighting and counterattacks emanating from Arab sources; and Moscow was putting Washington on notice that it would not stand idly by and accept an American intervention to help defeat Egypt and Syria.

Twenty-four hours later Moscow no longer had any doubts about the truth: Egypt, Syria, and Jordan had been decisively defeated, and by Israel alone. Surprised by the dismal showing of Arab forces and unable to prevent the unfolding disaster on the battlefield, the Soviet Union mustered diplomatic support for the Arabs. The Soviet government "warned" the Israeli government that if it did not "comply immediately" with the demand for a cease-fire expressed in the Security Council's resolution, "the Soviet Union will reconsider its attitude towards Israel and decide whether to continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel." In the United Nations, Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko pressed for immediate implementation of the cease-fire resolution, but his efforts foundered on Egypt's continued insistence that this also entail a full Israeli withdrawal, an interpretation of the Security Council's resolution with which not even the USSR could agree. On the afternoon of June 8 Cairo submitted to the inevitable: Egypt's catastrophic defeat in Sinai was finally realized by Nasir. When it was no longer possible to ignore the evidence of collapse, Foreign Minister Mahmud Riyad hurriedly telephoned Ambassador Muhammad al-Quni at the United Nations "just a few seconds before he was due to address the Council. The instructions this time were completely different from those given a few hours before." Riyad said, "the picture has changed. Go back to the meeting and announce acceptance of the ceasefire." Once Egypt had agreed to the cease-fire, the Soviet delegate pushed for new resolutions condemning Israel as an aggressor and demanding its full withdrawal.

Syria agreed to the cease-fire on June 9, but the fighting continued, each side accusing the other of violations. It was clear that Israel was making an all-out effort to capture the Golan Heights before the cease-fire took hold. On June 10 Moscow again activated the hot line. Kosygin impressed upon President Johnson the urgency of forcing Israel to stop further military operations, or else the Soviet Union would take "necessary actions, including military." Johnson responded to the implicit threat in Kosygin's message by ordering the U.S. Sixth Fleet closer to the Syrian coast, but he also pressured Israel to abide by the cease-fire, which it did on June 10, having achieved its objective — the capture of the Golan Heights.

For the moment there was nothing the Soviet government could do for the Arabs, other than mount a major diplomatic campaign in the United Nations. Beyond that, Moscow was faced with the question, how far should it go to help Egypt and Syria. The answer came quickly.

DECISION IN MOSCOW

On June g Moscow mobilized the East European Communist countries on behalf of the Arab states. The leaders of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia attended a conference in Moscow and issued a Declaration condemning Israel and pledging to "do everything necessary to help the peoples of Arab countries to give a firm rebuff to the aggressor, to protect their lawful rights, and to eliminate the hotbed of war in the Middle East and to restore peace in that area." The Declaration was the first of the Soviet steps taken to entrench Moscow's position in the area and to stiffen Cairo's resolve not to settle with Israel. On June 10 the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with Israel. The East European countries followed suit, with the exception of Romania, which had also not signed the Declaration. Pravda repeated the USSR's intention of providing "all necessary material assistance" to the Arabs, and on June 12 the Soviet government sent a squadron of TU-16 bombers to show the flag and bolster Egyptian morale.

A massive Soviet airlift of military equipment began on or about June 12, the day Algeria's leader, Premier Houari Boumedienne, unceremoniously arrived in Moscow to assess Soviet intentions. His visit was an irritant as much to Moscow as to Cairo, which resented his unsolicited advice on how to fight a guerrilla war and his high-handed offer of Algerian troops. The arrival of "significant quantities of Soviet military assistance" in Egypt was reported on June 15 by Tanyug (the Yugoslav News Agency), quoting the Cairo correspondent of Oslobodjenje, a Sarajevo newspaper, to the effect that "for the past three days large Soviet army transports have been arriving in the UAR with MiG's as the first urgent assistance to the Egyptian Army," about one hundred MiGs having already been delivered. For the next few weeks Antonov-12s landed at about the rate of one every fifteen minutes. This air bridge, which facilitated the rapid rebuilding of the Egyptian army and air defense system, was made possible by Tito's immediate accession to Nasir's request that the Soviet transports be allowed to refuel in Yugoslavia. No mention of the airlift or of the magnitude of Arab losses and Soviet replacements appeared in the Soviet press. The resupply effort continued at an intensive pace throughout most of the summer.

While reprovisioning the Arab armies, the USSR simultaneously moved on the diplomatic front. Since all the Soviet resolutions in the Security Council had been overwhelmingly rejected, it looked to the General Assembly for vindication of its position and that of the Arab states. On June 13 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko formally requested the U.N. secretary-general to convoke an emergency special session of the General Assembly, in accordance with Article i1 of the Charter. Gromyko's letter asking that the General Assembly consider the situation and "adopt a decision designed to bring about the liquidation of the consequences of aggression and the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the armistice lines" was unusual in that it implied the Security Council was failing in its assigned Charter responsibilities regarding the Middle East, even though there were a number of resolutions still awaiting its consideration. The United States did not agree with the Soviet view that a stalemate existed in the Security Council, but "was not disposed to be too strict" and insist that all the resolutions before the Council be considered first, as would have been proper procedure.

As a result, the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly convened briefly on June i7 and started its substantive deliberations on June 19 with a major statement by the Soviet premier. Kosygin blamed Israel for "unleashing" the war, condemned it as the aggressor, demanded its withdrawal from all occupied territory, and insisted on restitution for the damage inflicted on the Arab countries. While extolling the United Nations and calling upon it to "use all its influence and all its prestige in order to put an end to aggression," he also said the USSR "will undertake all measures within its power both in the United Nations and outside this organization in order to achieve the elimination of aggression, and promote the establishment of a lasting peace in the region." Besides general criticisms of Israel, Kosygin made three specific points, whose intent was to dispel the shadow from Soviet policy and ingratiate Moscow with the Arab nations. First, clearly sensitive to Arab criticism over the lack of timely Soviet support, Kosygin tried to vindicate Soviet behavior by claiming that several weeks prior to the outbreak of fighting "the Soviet government, and I believe others, too, began receiving information to the effect that the Israeli government had chosen the end of May for a swift strike at Syria in order to crush it and then carry the fighting over into the territory of the United Arab Republic" (emphasis added). He thus implicated the Egyptian government and apportioned to it some responsibility for what had happened. Yet it was the Soviet Union alone that had passed on to Cairo and Damascus the faulty intelligence information that an attack was impending. Indeed, Moscow had apparently given Nasir assurances, which he had erroneously interpreted as a promise of full support in the event of war. Second, Kosygin likened Israeli actions to those of the Gauleiters of Hitler's Germany, thus initiating a virulent propaganda campaign whose blatant anti-Semitism had not been witnessed internationally since the latter years of the Stalin era. By linking Zionism and Hitlerism, he tried to tarnish Israel's achievement and case and to curry favor with the Arabs. Third, Kosygin maintained that the policy of the Soviet Union and the other anti-imperialist forces in the world had succeeded in frustrating Israel's attempt to topple the progressive regimes in Egypt and Syria.

On June 20, less than twenty-four hours after Kosygin's U.N. speech, Radio Cairo announced that Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgornyi would arrive the following day with a high-ranking military mission headed by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Matvei V. Zakharov. On June 21, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee passed a resolution fully approving "the political policy and the practical activity of the Politburo of the Central Committee," and giving formal party sanction to Kosygin's efforts and to the Politburo's decision to resupply the Egyptian and Syrian armies; and, most important, it reaffirmed the objective of taking whatever measures were necessary to restore and strengthen the Soviet position in the Arab world.

Podgornyi's visit (June 21–24) served several purposes: symbolically, it demonstrated Soviet solidarity with Egypt; it bolstered Nasir's position and weakened the case for a negotiated settlement that some within the Egyptian leadership advocated; it served as an antidote for the anti-Soviet fever cropping out in various Arab countries; it provided Podgornyi with an opportunity to assess Nasir's determination to resist and his readiness to carry out internal reforms of the army, party, and economy, which Moscow deemed essential; and it impressed upon Nasir the need for political struggle. According to the Yugoslav party newspaper, Bor'ba, "well-informed circles" [presumably Soviet diplomats] indicated that Podgornyi strongly urged Nasir to seek a political solution; "There is no other way of liquidating the territorial gains of the aggressor except negotiations and even some crucial concessions with respect to navigation and the recognition of the fact of the existence of the Israeli state in the Middle East." But there was no Soviet statement or any hint by Soviet officials to support this sanguine Yugoslav assessment of Soviet policy. The Podgornyi-Nasir communique of June 24 did not provide anything explicit to go on. Commenting that the meeting had been held "in a spirit of fraternal mutual understanding and traditional friendship," it said:

In the course of the discussions, questions were considered, relating to the situation in the Middle East in connection with the aggression of Israel against the UAR and other Arab governments, and to the measures which need to be undertaken for the liquidation of the consequences of this aggression.

The visit, however, was crucial for Nasir. Moscow's assurance of massive aid put Egypt in a position to refuse the kind of compromise settlement that Israel might have been prepared to accept. Moscow thus gave Nasir the option he most desired, namely, the chance to continue the struggle against Israel by political means, meanwhile playing for time, rebuilding his army, showing outward flexibility but preparing himself internally for a prolonged conflict. For the moment, Nasir willingly went along with Moscow's preference of ruling out military means. Completely dependent on the Soviet Union for military assistance and protection — he had even asked Podgornyi to take charge of Egypt's air defense under Soviet commanders but was turned down — and acutely aware of Egypt's vulnerability and need to rebuild its armed forces from the ground up, Nasir jockeyed for time. He welcomed the USSR's attempt to effect a voluntary pullback of Israeli forces and the statement made by CPSU leader Leonid I. Brezhnev on July 5 in a speech in the Kremlin at the annual reception for graduates of the Soviet military academies. There Brezhnev announced that "at this new political stage of struggle against the aggression and for the removal of its aftermath," the Soviet Union was giving "every assistance" and attached great importance to visits such as Podgornyi's, and it sought to strengthen relations and coordinate "joint actions in the political struggle in defense of the rights of the interests of the UAR, Syria and other Arab countries" (emphasis added). An experienced diplomatic intriguer, Nasir was not without a capacity, even in weakness, to use the Soviet commitment to his advantage.

(Continues...)

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Excerpted from Red Star on the Nile by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Copyright © 1977 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents

• Frontmatter, pg. i
• Contents, pg. vii
• Preface, pg. xi
• Prologue, pg. 1
• Chapter One. Transfiguration, pg. 9
• Chapter Two. The Illusory Consensus, pg. 44
• Chapter Three. To the War of Attrition, pg. 66
• Chapter Four. Myrmidons from Moscow, pg. 90
• Chapter Five. Sadat's Uneasy Alliance with the Soviet Union, pg. 129
• Chapter Six. The End of Illusion, pg. 168
• Chapter Seven. Toward Confrontation, pg. 212
• Chapter Eight. Strategic Imperatives and the October War, pg. 248
• Chapter Nine. The Diplomacy of Discord, pg. 288
• Chapter Ten. Currents of Influence, pg. 330
• Appendices, pg. 347
• Selected Bibliography, pg. 367
• Index, pg. 375