Reference and Essence


In this new edition of an important work in the philosophy of language, Nathan U Salmon, one of the leading proponents of what has come to be called the new or causal theory of reference, presents his latest thinking on this promising area of study.

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In this new edition of an important work in the philosophy of language, Nathan U Salmon, one of the leading proponents of what has come to be called the new or causal theory of reference, presents his latest thinking on this promising area of study.

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Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9781591022152
  • Publisher: Prometheus Books
  • Publication date: 6/28/2004
  • Series: Studies in Analytic Philosophy Series
  • Edition description: 2ND
  • Edition number: 2
  • Pages: 1
  • Product dimensions: 5.40 (w) x 8.28 (h) x 1.01 (d)

Meet the Author

Nathan Salmon is professor of philosophy at the University of California at Santa Barbara. He is also the author of Frege’s Puzzle, numerous articles in analytic metaphysics and the philosophy of language, and the coeditor of Propositions and Attitudes.

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Table of Contents

Preface to the First Edition xiii
Preface to the Expanded Edition xvii
Introduction 3
I The Theory of Direct Reference
1 The Theory of Singular Direct Reference
1 A Formulation of the Theory 9
1.1 The Orthodox Notion of Sense
1.2 Descriptional Singular Terms
1.3 Relationally Descriptional Singular Terms
1.4 Orthodox Theories and the Theory of Direct Reference
2 The Arguments 23
2.1 The Modal Arguments
2.2 The Epistemological Arguments
2.3 The Semantical Arguments
2.4 Contextual Factors in Reference
3 Rigid Designators 32
3.1 Two Kinds of Rigid Designators: Persistence and Obstinacy
3.2 Proper Names, Nondescriptionality, and Obstinacy
3.3 A Criterion for Obstinacy
2 The Theory Extended to General Terms
4 A Reformulation of the Theory 42
4.1 Descriptional General Terms
4.2 Common Nouns as Proper Names
4.3 A Point of Disanalogy
4.4 Designation
4.5 Relationally Descriptional Designators
4.6 Orthodox Theories and the Theory of Direct Reference
4.7 The Traditional Theory of Cognition and Understanding
5 The Arguments Reconsidered 59
5.1 The General Form of the Arguments
5.2 An Obvious Objection
5.3 A Reply: Putnam's Twin Earth Argument
6 Rigid Designators Reconsidered 69
6.1 General Term Designation and Rigid Designation
6.2 A Criterion for General Term Designation
3 Reference and the Necessary A Posteriori
7 Some Consequences of the Theory 76
7.1 Traditional Assimilations
7.2 Necessary A Posteriori Identities
7.3 The General Phenomenon
8 Other Alleged Necessary A Posteriori Truths 80
8.1 The Examples
8.2 Trivial Essentialism
8.3 Nontrivial Essentialism Concerning Natural Kinds
8.4 Nontrivial Essentialism Concerning Individuals
9 A Crucial Question 87
4 Putnam's Theory of Natural Kind Terms
10 Putnam's Theses 93
11 Initial Exegetical Remarks 99
11.1 The 'is' of Instantiation
11.2 A Gross Misinterpretation
11.3 A Subtle Misinterpretation
11.4 A Difficulty in Interpretation
12 First Formulations 106
12.1 An Initial Formalization
12.2 Time-Slices and Possible World-Slices of Continuant Individuals
12.3 An Initial Attempt to Eliminate Possible World-Slices
13 Cross-World Relations 116
13.1 Cross-World Construal of Binary Relations
13.2 Intra-World Attributes, Extra-World Attributes, and Cross-World Relations
13.3 A Mechanism for Generating Cross-World Relations
13.4 Nondenoting Singular Terms
14 Reformulations 136
14.1 A New Attempt at Formalization
14.2 Thesis (T3)
14.3 Reductionism and Analysis
14.4 Translation into Modal Operator Discourse
15 Further Exegetical Remarks 148
15.1 Theses (T5) and (T6)
15.2 Thesis (T4)
15.3 Thesis (T7)
15.4 Thesis (T6) Again
II The Program to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference
5 The K and I Mechanisms
16 Putnam on (T9) 161
17 Donnellan's Elucidations of (T9) 163
18 The OK-Mechanism 166
18.1 A Valid Modal Argument
18.2 The General Case
19 The General K-Mechanism and the I-Mechanism 169
19.1 The General K-Mechanism
19.2 The I-Mechanism
20 The Program 174
6 Hidden Essentialism in the K and I Mechanisms
21 The First Two Premises 176
22 The Third Premise 176
22.1 Putnam and Donnellan on the Third Premise
22.2 Formalization
22.3 The K-Mechanisms
22.4 The I-Mechanism
23 The Failure of the Program 183
23.1 The Original Argument
23.2 The K and I Mechanisms
7 Arguments for the Essentiality of Origin
24 Kripke and the Putnam Program 193
25 Kripke's "Proof" of the Essentiality of Origin 196
25.1 Kripke's Formulation of Argument
25.2 Some Initial Considerations
25.3 The Compossibility Premise
25.4 The Unfinished Argument
25.5 A Principle of Cross-World Identification
25.6 An Alternative Argument
26 Compossibility Principles and Cross-World Identification Principles 214
Conclusion 217
Appendix I Principles of Cross-World Identification
27 Cross-World Identification Principles and the Ship of Theseus 219
27.1 An Argument for Contingent Identity
27.2 A Fallacy
27.3 A Better Theory
28 The Four Worlds Paradox 229
28.1 The Argument
28.2 One Solution
28.3 A Better Solution
28.4 Vagueness and the Paradox
Appendix II The Essentialist Principles in the K and I Mechanisms
29 Donnellan vs. Kripke 253
30 A Problem in the Epistemology of Modality 253
31 The Nonmodal Consequences 255
32 Connecting Statements 260
32.1 The Need for Connecting Statements
32.2 The Theoretical Status of the Connecting Statements
33 Conclusion 264
Appendix III Fregean Theory and the Four Worlds Paradox
34 Fregean Theory 265
35 The Four Worlds Paradox 268
Appendix IV Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints
36 Modal Paradox 273
37 A Modal Fallacy 282
38 Counterpart Theory 286
39 Modal Paradox and Sorites 298
40 Some Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory 302
41 More Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory 312
42 The Solution Refined 321
43 Vagueness and Modal Paradox 326
44 Twin Worlds 331
45 Necessity and Apriority 335
46 The Determinacy of Identity 338
Appendix V Cross-World Identification and Stipulation
47 Haecceitism, Reductionism, and the Problem of Cross-World Identification 345
48 A Residual Problem of Cross-World Identification 356
49 A Third Problem of Cross-World Identification 362
Appendix VI Letter to Teresa Robertson
50 If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It 369
51 If It Is, Do 371
Appendix VII Naming, Necessity, and Beyond
52 Substitution 377
53 Are General Terms Rigid? 382
54 The Necessity of Water Being H[subscript 2]O 393
Select Bibliography 399
Index of Labeled Expressions of Parts I and II 419
Index of Subjects of Parts I and II 425
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