Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes: A Defense of Internal Realism / Edition 1

Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes: A Defense of Internal Realism / Edition 1

by G. Forrai
     
 

This systematic development of the internal realist approach, first developed by Hilary Putnam, tries to steer a middle course between metaphysical realism and relativism. It argues against metaphysical realism that it is open to global skepticism and cannot cope with conceptual pluralism. Against realism it is claimed that there are mind-independent constraints on

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Overview

This systematic development of the internal realist approach, first developed by Hilary Putnam, tries to steer a middle course between metaphysical realism and relativism. It argues against metaphysical realism that it is open to global skepticism and cannot cope with conceptual pluralism. Against realism it is claimed that there are mind-independent constraints on the validity of our claims to knowledge. The book provides a moderately verificationist account of semantics and a novel explanation of the idea of conceptual schemes. It is also argued that the approach developed can accommodate our commonsense realist intuitions and is also compatible with physicalism and naturalism.
Readership: Philosophers at graduate student and advanced level. Advanced undergraduate courses could be based on certain parts of the book.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780792368854
Publisher:
Springer Netherlands
Publication date:
05/31/2001
Series:
Synthese Library Series, #296
Edition description:
2001
Pages:
163
Product dimensions:
9.21(w) x 6.14(h) x 0.50(d)

Meet the Author

Table of Contents

1. Introduction. 2. Metaphysical Realism and Internal Realism. 3. Reference. 4. Truth. 5. Conceptual Pluralism. Notes. References. Index.

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