2009-07-28 Hardcover First Edition New 0385518269 Ships Within 24 Hours. Tracking Number available for all USA orders. Excellent Customer Service. Upto 15 Days 100% Money Back ...Gurantee. Try Our Fast! ! ! ! Shipping With Tracking Number.Read moreShow Less
Hardcover New 0385518269 SERVING OUR CUSTOMERS WITH BEST PRICES. FROM A COMPANY YOU TRUST, HUGE SELECTION. RELIABLE CUSTOMER SERVICE! ! HASSLE FREE RETURN POLICY, SATISFACTION ...GURANTEED****Read moreShow Less
Can you have the same Europe with different people in it? The answer, says Christopher Caldwell, is no.
Europe has undergone a demographic revolution it never expected. A half century of mass immigration has failed to produce anything resembling an American-style melting pot. By overestimating its need for immigrant labor and underestimating the culture-shaping potential of religion, Europe has trapped itself in a problem to which it has no obvious solution.
Christopher Caldwell has been reporting on the politics and culture of Islam in Europe for more than a decade. His deeply researched and insightful new book reveals a paradox. Since World War II, mass immigration has been made possible by Europe’s enforcement of secularism, tolerance, and equality. But when immigrants arrive, they are not required to adopt those values. And they are disinclined to, since they already have values of their own. Muslims dominate or nearly dominate important European cities, including Amsterdam and Rotterdam, Strasbourg and Marseille, the Paris suburbs and East London. Islam has challenged the European way of life at every turn, becoming, in effect, an “adversary culture.”
The result? In Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, Caldwell reveals the anger of natives and newcomers alike. He describes guest worker programs that far outlasted their economic justifications, and asylum policies that have served illegal immigrants better than refugees. He exposes the strange ways in which welfare states interact with Third World customs, the anti-Americanism that brings European natives and Muslim newcomers together, and the arguments over women and sex that drive them apart. He considers the appeal of sharia, “resistance,” and jihad to a second generation that is more alienated from Europe than the first, and addresses a crisis of faith among native Europeans that leaves them with a weak hand as they confront the claims of newcomers.
As increasingly assertive immigrant populations shape the continent, Caldwell writes, the foundations of European culture and civilization are being challenged and replaced. Reflections on the Revolution in Europe is destined to become the classic work on how Muslim immigration permanently reshaped the West.
“In this book, Christopher Caldwell presents a daring, thoroughly researched and provocative view of the Islamic revolution underway in Europe. It’s a chilling account of how complacency, moral relativism and socialist dogma froze the European imagination while the agents of radical Islam proceeded, sure-footed, to claim Europe neighborhood by neighborhood. There have been many wake-up calls to alert Europeans to the challenges of immigration and the threat of Islam, but if anything should thaw the minds of the European leadership, it is this book.” —Ayaan Hirsi Ali
“Among the many brilliant things Christopher Caldwell has done in Reflections is write a how-not-to book about immigration. Once again Europe has shown us the way—to go wrong. Thanks to Caldwell’s careful reporting and keen analysis we know exactly what we shouldn’t do when new people move to our country.” —P.J. O’Rourke
“In Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, Christopher Caldwell combines an authentically Burkean historical breadth of vision with a reporter’s keen eye for detail. No one can seriously doubt after reading this book that large-scale immigration, particularly of Muslims, is in the process of transforming Europe profoundly. From the strife-torn banlieues of Paris to the multiplying minarets of Middle England, as Caldwell shows, we are a very long way indeed from the merry multicultural melting-pot of bien-pensant fantasy.” —Niall Ferguson, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History, Harvard University, and author of The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and theDescent of the West
Christopher Caldwell…makes arguments that have been made elsewhere…But Caldwell makes these arguments unusually well, in a book notable for its range, synthesis of the literature, analytical rigor and elegant tone…The strength of this book is not in its original reporting, of which there is little, or the solutions it offers, because there are none. What it offers instead is unusual lucidity and comprehensiveness; a reader unfamiliar with the debate would be, upon finishing it, well-informed. One familiar with the debate will be even more depressed.
—The Washington Post
Mr. Caldwell's book is the most rigorous and plainspoken examination of Muslim immigration in Europe to date, a sobering book that walks right up to, if never quite crossing, the line between being alarming and being alarmist…well researched, fervently argued and morally serious. It may serve as a dense, footnoted wake-up call to many of Europe's liberal democracies.
—The New York Times
Caldwell frames the issue of Muslim immigration to Europe as a question of "whether you can have the same Europe with different people." The author, a columnist for the Financial Times and a senior editor at the Weekly Standard, answers this question unequivocally in the negative. He offers a brief demographic analysis of the potential impact of Muslim immigration-estimating that between 20% and 32% of the populations of most European countries will be foreign-born by the middle of the century-and traces the origins of this mass immigration to a postwar labor crisis. He considers the social, political and cultural implications of this sea change, from the banlieue riots and the ban on the veil in French public schools to terrorism across Europe and the question of Turkey's accession to the E.U. Caldwell sees immigration as a particular problem for Europe because he believes Muslim immigrants retain a Muslim identity, which he defines monolithically and unsympathetically, rather than assimilating to their new homelands. This thorough, big-thinking book, which tackles its controversial subject with a conviction that is alternately powerful and narrow-minded, will likely challenge some readers while alienating others. (July)
Respected conservative journalist Caldwell (senior editor, Weekly Standard) writes with deep skepticism about Europe's future relations with the Islamic world. He most clearly expresses his attitude when arguing that immigration has had unintended consequences, "importing not just factors of production but factors of social change." More specifically, Caldwell is concerned about what he sees as Islam's tendency to "trump" other social identities and ultimately form a single identity contrary to the values of democratic rule; at its peril, Europe neglects religion as the "anchor" of this identity. The values and culture of secular Europe are dependent on "ethical survivals of Christianity," says Caldwell, but the same is not true of Islam, despite the number of European converts. Caldwell also rejects American-style assimilation as a model for European immigrant "integration." VERDICT Regardless of one's attitude toward immigration, Caldwell interprets an important European policy debate and illuminates why anti-immigrant sentiment cannot be dismissed as simple bigotry. Recommended for informed readers.—Zachary T. Irwin, School of Humanities & Social Science, Penn State, Erie, Behrend Coll.
—Zachary T. Irwin
A specter is haunting Europe, writes Weekly Standard senior editor and Financial Times columnist Caldwell-a theocracy about to overwhelm a tolerant, relativistic society. The revolution referenced in the title is sometimes so quiet as to be unnoticed-if one is not living in Germany, England, Spain or France. Those countries are being transformed by increasing numbers of Muslims radicalized to despise the very democracies into which they have immigrated-or, increasingly, have been born. "Scale matters," writes Caldwell. If the United States had proportionate numbers to France, "it would have close to 40 million Muslims, concentrated in a handful of major cities and poised to take political control of them." The author's tone is not alarmist, but it is urgent, and the question of political control lies at the heart of his argument. What happens to Europe if its institutions are dismantled by those who believe in an authority other than the will of the people? Caldwell gives specific weight to the view that Islam in its current iterations is hostile to assimilation and instead bent on overwhelming other ways of thought. "When an insecure, malleable, relativistic culture meets a culture that is anchored, confident, and strengthened by common doctrines," he concludes, "generally the former . . . changes to suit the latter." The author examines Western responses to the demographic and ideological shift, none of them completely adequate-though Nicholas Sarkozy's idea that Muslims doff the veil when entering secular society just as he removes his shoes on entering a mosque is a start. Caldwell's analysis is calm and forceful, and it provides excellent background for a much-needed discussion.
The Barnes & Noble Review
In recent years, conservative writers have published a number of books and even more articles warning about the demographic decline of Europe and the seemingly dangerous march of Islam on the Continent. These analyses, often delivered with smug Schadenfreude, hold that godless, decadent Europeans have given up having children, leaving a fifth column of faithful, fertile Muslims to swamp their societies. In his bestselling America Alone: The End of the World as We Know It, Mark Steyn predicted "the demise of European races too self-absorbed to breed." The National Review mockingly advertised a "Farewell to Europe Tour," including a visit to the "Islamic Republic of the Netherlands:" "For this special two-day event, females traveling with our party will be allowed to disembark the plane without a veil!"
These analyses seem primarily interested in scoring points in the American culture wars by arguing that secularism and feminism leave societies soft and vulnerable to more patriarchal peoples. For those who don't share their values, they're easy to dismiss. That's not true of Christopher Caldwell's Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West. Thoughtful, erudite, and provocative, it's a conservative book that liberals should take seriously, no matter how uncomfortable the issues it raises are.
Much of Caldwell's volume is dedicated to unfolding a persuasive argument that mass immigration, and particularly mass Muslim immigration, presents some existential challenges to Europe. Moreover, he points out that European political taboos make it difficult to address these challenges without being accused of racism or fascism. Yet these issues need grappling with. Europe is not nearly as good at the United States in assimilating its immigrants, and many live in ghettos alienated from and even hostile to European culture. At times, the resulting tensions have led to spectacular outbreaks of violence: the 2004 murder of the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam, the 2005 terrorist attacks in England, the banlieue riots that shook France later that year, the violent global response to the publication of cartoons depicting Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which was stoked by Danish imams. These incidents raise urgent questions for people who value both multiculturalism and secular liberalism. How much tolerance is owed a radical political ideology that comes wrapped in religion? And how can the state challenge intolerance without undermining the freedom of expression that liberals value?
Caldwell's exploration of these conundrums is penetrating. One of the key differences between his book and others of its ilk is that he mostly avoids the easy contempt for Europe that's so common on the American Right. Reflections on the Revolution in Europe is not meant to demonstrate the superiority of the United States to perfidious France. Caldwell, a senior editor at The Weekly Standard and a contributing writer for The New York Times Magazine, eschews the anti-cosmopolitan cultural populism that currently dominates the Republican Party. His is an urbane, philosophical, Tory-style conservatism. Many of the things he wants to save are worth saving.
For example, when Caldwell discusses the tensions between multiculturalism and the welfare state, it is not to score points against welfare. Mass immigration, he argues, is a problem in part because it undermines European social democracy. He cites research showing that people are less willing to support welfare in more heterogeneous societies, where they trust their neighbors less. "Two-thirds of French imams are on welfare," writes Caldwell. "Most French and British citizens do not think of welfare checks as a do-it-yourself state subsidy for religion, nor would they support them through taxes if they did. If welfare recipients do not share the broader society's values, then the broader society will turn against welfare." He doesn't seem particularly gleeful about this prospect.
That said, his outsize animus toward immigration on the whole can lead him to make dishonestly hyperbolic statements -- for example, suggesting there's no fundamental difference between colonialism and labor migration, as if an empire were sending its subjects to conquer Europe. Meanwhile, his envy of Islam's religious vitality, and sympathy with some of its critiques of the West, runs just beneath the book's surface. Parts of Caldwell's declinist view only makes sense in light of his low opinion of modern Europe's sexual liberation and "spiritual tawdriness," as he puts it.
Still, he makes a convincing if disturbing case when he argues that immigration is exacting "a steep price in freedom. The multiculturalism that has been Europe's main way of managing mass immigration requires the sacrifice of liberties that natives had come to think of as rights." This is in some ways an overly broad generalization, but it deserves more than a knee-jerk response. It is certainly unsettling, for example, to learn that the British Department for Work and Pensions is now giving benefits and recognition to the additional spouses in polygamous marriages. And there is no question that the fear of offending Muslim pieties has impeded freedom of speech in many European countries.
"The management of the Deutsche Oper considered it not worth the risk to stage a performance of Idomeneo that included a scene in which the decapitated heads of Jesus, Muhammad, and the Buddha appeared," Caldwell writes. "Presumably it was not Jesus's head that made them lose their nerve." In one of the book's sharpest observations, he points out that the tiptoeing "respect" with which Islam is treated militates against the Islamic Enlightenment so many Europeans long for. "A main weapon in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment's attacks on Christianity was ridicule," he points out. "But while hoping that Muslims will learn the lessons of Voltaire, Europeans have gone to great lengths to insulate Islam from Voltaire's methods."
Incisive as this observation is, there's a bit of bad faith here, because Caldwell is himself no anticlericalist. His conservatism, usually so wry and low-key, becomes a bit strident when he's discussing the decline of Christianity among native Europeans. He dismisses the idea that "brand-new gender and sexual arrangements" like gay marriage constitute "core European principles." Yet it's on just such principles that the Continent's most robust opponents of conservative Islam, such as the slain Dutch political leader Pim Fortuyn, have staked their case. Caldwell sometimes mistakes his own dislike of certain European convictions for the absence of any conviction at all. Still, while he's no liberal, his book is a compelling warning about a religious challenge to liberalism. It should be as fascinating to those who adore modern Europe as to those who abhor it. --Michelle Goldberg
The author of the books The Means of Reproduction: Sex, Power, and the Future of the World and Kingdom Coming: The Rise of Christian Nationalism, Michelle Goldberg's work appears in Salon.com, Rolling Stone, The New York Observer, New York, In These Times, The New Republic online, The Guardian (U.K.), The Utne Reader, Newsday, and other publications and newspapers nationwide. She was a columnist for the San Francisco Bay Guardian and for Shift magazine and has taught at New York University's Graduate School of Journalism. She is a fellow at the Committee for the Scientific Examination of Religion.
[author photo]CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL is a columnist for the Financial Times, a contributing writer for the New York Times Magazine, and a senior editor at the Weekly Standard. He lives in Washington, D.C.
The rights and wrongs of Enoch Powell—How much immigration is there?—Muslim immigration—Europe's population problem—Civilization and decadence— Diversity is overrated—Can you have the same Europe with different people?
Western Europe became a multiethnic society in a fit of absence of mind. Mass immigration began—with little public debate, it would later be stressed—in the decade after the Second World War. Industries and government in Britain, France, Germany, the Low Countries, and Scandinavia set up programs to recruit manpower to their booming postwar economies. They invited immigrants. Some of the newcomers took positions, particularly in heavy industry, that now look enviably secure and well-paid. But others worked in the hardest, most thankless, and most dangerous occupations that European industry had to offer. Many had been loyal colonial subjects, and had even borne arms for European powers.
Europe became a destination for immigration as a result of consensus among its political and commercial elites. Those elites, to the extent they thought about the long-term consequences at all, made certain assumptions: Immigrants would be few in number. Since they were coming to fill short-term gaps in the labor force, most would stay in Europe only temporarily. Some might stay longer. No one assumed they would ever be eligible for welfare. That they would retain the habits and cultures of southern villages, clans, marketplaces, and mosques was a thought too bizarre to entertain.
Almost all of the assumptions with which mass immigration began proved false. As soon as they did, Europe's welcome to the world's poor was withdrawn—at first ambiguously, through the oratory of a few firebrand politicians in the 1960s, then explicitly through hard-line legislation against immigration in the 1970s. Decade in, decade out, the sentiment of Western European publics, as measured by opinion polls, has been resolutely opposed to mass immigration. But that is the beginning, not the end of our story. The revocation of Europe's invitation to immigrants, no matter how explicit it became, did little to stem their arrival. As the years passed, immigration to Europe accelerated. At no point were Europeans invited to assess its long-term costs and benefits.
The rights and wrongs of Enoch Powell
On April 20, 1968, two weeks after the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and the race riots that it sparked in Washington and other U.S. cities, the British Tory parliamentarian Enoch Powell made a speech at the Midland Hotel in Birmingham that has haunted the European political imagination ever since. Powell was talking about the arrival, modest up to that point, of "coloured" former colonial subjects, primarily from the Indian subcontinent but also from the Caribbean. At the time, this migration had changed the face of only a very limited number of urban neighborhoods. Powell implied that the long-term consequence would be ghettoes like the ones in America that were burning as he spoke. "We must be mad," he said, "literally mad, as a nation, to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre." Citing the poet Virgil, Powell warned, "I seem to see 'the River Tiber foaming with much blood.'"
Half a year later, in the course of an even more ominous speech to the Rotary Club of London, he warned that, should immigration proceed at the current pace,
"the urban part of whole towns and cities in Yorkshire, the Midlands and the Home Counties would be preponderantly or exclusively Afro-Asian in population. There would be several Washingtons in England. From those whole areas the indigenous population, the people of England, who fondly imagine that this is their country and these are their home-towns, would have been dislodged—I have deliberately chosen the most neutral word I could find. And here for the first time this morning I offer a subjective judgement . . . The people of England will not endure it."
All British discussion of immigration since then has been, essentially, an argument over whether Enoch Powell was right. It has been a sterile argument because those who engage in it tend to mix up two senses of the word right—the moral sense and the factual sense. To say the Emancipation Proclamation is right means something different than to say the Pythagorean theorem is right. Powell's remarks revealed a class-based split over which of these two kinds of rightness is the real business of politics. This split is a feature of all discussions of modern immigration in all countries.
Political elites focused on whether Powell was right morally. Even if most of the fears Powell appealed to were legitimate ones, and even if plenty of evidence can be mustered (such as his passion for India and for Indian languages) to show that Powell was not himself a racist, his speech can be defended against charges of bigotry only by splitting hairs. News coverage ran against him. Tory leader Ted Heath, Powell's archrival within the party, forced Powell to resign his position as shadow defense minister. Morally, Powell was not right.
Popular opinion, though, focused on whether he was right factually. And in this sense, right he was, beyond any shadow of a doubt. Although at the time Powell's demographic projections were much snickered at, they have turned out not just roughly accurate but as close to perfectly accurate as it is possible for any such projections to be: In his Rotary Club speech, Powell shocked his audience by stating that the nonwhite population of Britain, barely over a million at the time, would rise to 4.5 million by 2002. (According to the national census, the actual "ethnic minority" population of Britain in 2001 was 4,635,296.) At a speech during the 1970 election campaign, he told voters in Wolverhampton that between a fifth and a quarter of their city, of Birmingham, and of Inner London would consist of Commonwealth immigrants and their descendants. (According to the 2001 census, Wolverhampton is 22.2 percent, Birmingham 29.6 percent, and Inner London 34.4 percent nonwhite.)
Ordinary Britons loved Powell's Birmingham speech. He received literally vanloads of mail—100,000 letters in the ten days that followed, of which only 800 expressed disagreement. Yet if Powell was right that immigration would increase far beyond what an Englishman of 1968 would have considered tolerable, he was wrong to predict that Englishmen of the next generation would not tolerate it. Although blood has indeed flowed at times—a spate of racist murders of South Asians in the East End of London in the 1970s, a dozen major riots over the decades, and numerous terrorist plots, including the 7/7 transport bombings carried out by Islamist Englishmen of Pakistani descent in 2005—it has not made the rivers foam. What did Powell miss?
One thing he missed was shame. The dominant moral mood of postwar Europe was one of repentance for two historic misdeeds, colonialism and Nazism. It is true that Britain, uniquely among Western European countries, had no cause to feel penitence for having perpetrated, encouraged, or watched passively the outrages of fascism two and three decades before. Britain had, however, recently dissolved, or been chased from, the largest empire in the history of the world, which left most of its citizens feeling embarrassed and diffident. Powell was an exception. A lover of the old Empire, swept up in the romance of it, he had no ear for this dirge of repentance, and no sense that his contemporaries were hearing a different music.
When addressing Africans, Asians, and other would-be immigrants, postwar Europeans felt a sense of moral illegitimacy that deepened as the decades passed. The dominant mood was summed up in The March, a fictional movie that BBC 1 aired for "One World Week" in 1990. In it, a charismatic political leader called El-Mahdi leads a quarter of a million people out of a Sudanese refugee camp on a 3,000-mile march to Europe under the slogan "We are poor because you are rich"—a message the movie made little effort to contradict.
Even those who felt that such shame was misplaced were forced to admit its power. In The Camp of the Saints, the dark 1973 novel of the Frenchman Jean Raspail, a collection of philanthropists and activists incite a million underfed Indians to board a flotilla of rusty ships for Europe, with dire consequences, including the trampling to death of the well-wishers who rush to welcome the disembarking hordes. Raspail's vision captures more of the complexity of the modern world than does The March. Political clashes are provoked not just by simple inequalities but by accidents, the vanity of intellectual elites, and the snowball effect of the mass media. What the BBC's filmmakers saw as conscience, Raspail saw as a mix of cowardice and unintended consequences.
For Powell, as for Raspail, mass migration into Europe was not a matter of individual migrants "looking for a better life," as the familiar phrase goes. It was a matter of organized masses demanding a better life, a desire with radically different political consequences. "It is much nearer to the truth," Powell said, "to think in terms of detachments from communities in the West Indies or India or Pakistan encamped in certain areas of England." Detachments, encampments—these are military metaphors. Powell is wrong to use them. But even if immigrants are not acting collectively, individual decisions to migrate can, in an age of globalization, produce massive collective effects. As the German poet and essayist Hans Magnus Enzensberger wrote in 1992:
"The free movement of capital brings the free movement of labor in its wake. With the globalization of the world economy, which has been fully achieved only in the very recent past, migratory movements will take on a new quality, too. Government-organized colonial wars, campaigns of conquest, and expulsions will most likely be replaced by molecular mass migrations."
If one abandons the idea that Western Europeans are rapacious and exploitative by nature, and that Africans, Asians, and other would-be immigrants are inevitably their victims, then the fundamental difference between colonization and labor migration ceases to be obvious.
How much immigration is there?
Europe is now, for the first time in its modern history, a continent of migrants. Of the 375 million people in Western Europe, 40 million are living outside their countries of birth. In almost all Western European countries, the population of immigrants and their children approaches or surpasses 10 percent. Even the historically poor and backward countries of peripheral Catholic Europe, such as Ireland (14.1 percent immigrant) and Spain (11.1 percent), have become crossroads. Between 2000 and 2005, Ireland's foreign-born population was increasing at an average annual rate of 8.4 percent and Spain's at (what follows is not a typographical error) 21.6 percent a year.
But we must make a sharp distinction. Much of this movement—that part that involves Europeans moving to other European countries—is not really immigration at all. It is a program of increased labor and residential mobility explicitly agreed to, through treaties, by the more than two dozen states that are part of the European Union. The EU's members have pledged themselves to an "ever closer union." The so-called "Schengen agreements," ratified in the decade after 1985, permit free movement of residents across most of Europe's internal borders, with no checks or passport controls.
It is not such a big deal that a third (37 percent) of Luxembourg's residents were born abroad. Virtually all of them were born in the EU: Portugal, France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy are the most important sending countries. Luxembourg is a charter member of the European Union and one of the most loyal. And a Pole who moves to Ireland—as about 63,000 have done since the turn of the century, to the point where 2 percent of the island's population is Polish born—isn't just moving out of one country and into another. He is moving around within a federation.
The EU is not unanimously loved in Europe, and movement between EU countries is not popular—78 percent of Irish people, for instance, want to reimpose restrictions on Eastern European immigration. Such mobility erodes national cultures that have shaped and comforted people for centuries and it does so no matter who is doing the moving. For instance, the Swedish sociologist Åke Daun has often written about how Swedes "like being like each other." Most peoples do, and they have a harder time being so when their countries fill up with people from elsewhere. Preferences for cultural sameness are often about seemingly small matters—say, the pea soup that Swedes traditionally eat on Thursday or a national taciturnity so extreme that, in Sweden, according to Daun, "signaling in traffic is often considered an undesirable expression of aggression." If you are among those Swedes who feel a warm glow when eating pea soup on Thursday or a slight unease when signaling on turns, then immigration can make your life a little bit crummier, because it disrupts those patterns. And this is so even if the immigrants are perfectly upstanding citizens from a neighboring country.
But immigration from neighboring countries does not provoke the most worrisome immigration questions, such as "How well will they fit in?" "Is assimilation what they want?" and, most of all, "Where are their true loyalties?"—culminating in a troubled "Where is this all heading?" Describing intra-European movements as "immigration" can be a useful debating trick for those who wish to short-circuit discussion of the problems of non-European immigration. ("Why are Moroccan slums in Amsterdam a problem, but not German retirement communities in Ibiza?") In this sense, using the word immigration to describe intra-European movements makes only slightly more sense than describing a New Yorker as an "immigrant" to California. Movement between European countries does count as immigration for statistical purposes. But it is not what this book is about.
This book concerns a second type of immigration: immigration from non-European countries and cultures. To be more precise, it is about certain problems created by the desire of non-Europeans to settle in Europe for good: the problems of multiethnic and multicultural societies. There have always been Western European countries that contain multiple European peoples with distinct linguistic and cultural identities—Belgium, Britain, Finland, France, Spain, and Switzerland in particular. Intercontinental immigration on the present scale, however, is unheard of. And it is unpopular. In no country in Europe does the bulk of the population aspire to live in a bazaar of world cultures. Yet all European countries are coming to the wrenching realization that they have somehow, without anyone's actively choosing it, turned into such bazaars.
In theory, any profoundly different culture could prove difficult to assimilate into European life. In practice, it is Islam that is posing the most acute problems. For 1,400 years, the Islamic and the Christian worlds have opposed one another, violently at times. We are living through one of those times. And yet, if immigration is somehow structurally or economically necessary to Europe—a proposition that will be examined more closely in the next chapter—it is from the overcrowded Muslim countries of Europe's southern and southeastern perimeter that it is likely to come. Of course, such immigration already has come and is continuing to come.
what he has to say is scary and so very sad. Wake up folks.
Was this review helpful? YesNoThank you for your feedback.Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.
Posted October 4, 2009
A Critical Work Of OurTime
I have a short list of books which I consider the most important, which I have read, during the past 25 years.
They include Thomas Friedman's "The Lexus and the Olive Tree", Friedman's "The World is Flat", Paul Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers", and Ravi Batra's " The Great Depression of 1990" Ignore the title of Batra's book. It's substance is extraordinary.
I have now added Caldwell's "Reflections on the Revolution in Europe".
The prophetic nature of this book, substantiated by an incredible level of homework and detail, make this work a must read for the 21st century. It is not a typical, dry work, simply referencing other works on the same subject. His insights open one's mind to this demographically significant evolution and revolution dominating the European landscape.
Was this review helpful? YesNoThank you for your feedback.Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.
I found this book to be fascinating. The facts and figures that Caldwell gives the reader are truly at times alarming and very much food for thought. I would recommend this book to anyone who is interested how immigration influences society at large.
Was this review helpful? YesNoThank you for your feedback.Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.
Posted August 4, 2009
The Inconvenient Truth about Islamic Immigration to Europe
A superb book! Caldwell has the courage, backed by facts and analysis, to tell the truth about the effect of Islamic immigration on Europe. Caldwell's case, in summary: Muslims coming to tolerant, prosperous, law-abiding Europe to escape their intolerant, poor, violent societies bring the intolerance, poverty and violence that they sought to escape with them. The demographics are against Europe. The old societies of Europe have birthrates below replacement level for their populations. Europe will be majority Muslim by the end of the century, if the current trends continue. What Caldwell doesn't say but which will be in every American reader's mind is, "Can it happen here?"
Was this review helpful? YesNoThank you for your feedback.Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.