Representation and Reality / Edition 1

Representation and Reality / Edition 1

by Hilary Putnam
     
 

Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his own theory of functionalism in this book. Putnam argues that in fact the computational analogy cannot answer the important questions about the nature of such mental states as belief, reasoning, rationality,

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Overview

Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his own theory of functionalism in this book. Putnam argues that in fact the computational analogy cannot answer the important questions about the nature of such mental states as belief, reasoning, rationality, and knowledge that lie at the heart of the philosophy of mind.

The MIT Press

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780262660747
Publisher:
MIT Press
Publication date:
08/28/1991
Series:
Representation and Mind series
Edition description:
Reprint
Pages:
154
Product dimensions:
6.00(w) x 8.80(h) x 0.40(d)
Age Range:
18 Years

Table of Contents

Preface
Introduction
Chapter 1 Meaning and Mentalism
Fodor and Chomsky
Three Reasons Why Mentalism Can't Be Right
1. Meaning Is Holistic
2. Meaning Is in Part a Normative Notion
3. Our Concepts Depend on Our Physical and Social Environment in a Way That Evolution (Which Was Com...
Connections between 1, 2, and 3
Chapter 2 Meaning, Other People, and the World
The Division of Linguistic Labor
Elms, Beeches, and Searle
The Contribution of the Environment
An Indexical Component
Other Natural Kinds
Reference and Theory Change
Meaning and "Mental Representation"
Chapter 3 Fodor and Block on "Narrow Content"
Narrow Content as a "Function of Observable Properties"
"Narrow Content" and "Conceptual Role"
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 4 Are There Such Things as Reference and Truth?
Why "Folk Psychology" and Not "Folk Logic"?
Disquotation, Anyone?
The "Semantical Conception" of Truth
Disquotation as Disappearance
Chapter 5 Why Functionalism Didn't Work
Sociofunctionalism
What "In Principle" Means Here
The Single-Computational-State Version of Functionalism
Equivalence
Surveying Rationality
Chapter 6 Other Forms of Functionalism
David Lewis and I
Lewis's Theory Further Examined
Conclusion
Chapter 7 A Sketch of an Alternative Picture
Objectivity and Conceptual Relativity
Internal Realism as an Alternative Picture
My Present Diagnosis of the "Functionalism" Issue
Appendix
Notes
Author Index

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