Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries / Edition 1

Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries / Edition 1

by Michael Tomz
     
 

View All Available Formats & Editions

ISBN-10: 0691134693

ISBN-13: 9780691134697

Pub. Date: 08/13/2007

Publisher: Princeton University Press

How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors,

Overview

How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment.

Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible.

Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt. His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780691134697
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
Publication date:
08/13/2007
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
328
Sales rank:
925,183
Product dimensions:
6.10(w) x 9.10(h) x 0.80(d)

Table of Contents

List of Tables ix
List of Figures xi
Preface xiii

PART ONE: THEORY 1
Chapter 1: The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt 3
Chapter 2: A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation 14

PART TWO: EVIDENCE 37
Chapter 3: Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers 39
Chapter 4: Reputation in Expert Opinion 70
Chapter 5: Reputations during Good Times and Bad 86
Chapter 6: Enforcement by Gunboats 114
Chapter 7: Enforcement through Trade Sanctions 158
Chapter 8: Enforcement through Collective Retaliation 196

PART THREE: IMPLICATIONS 221
Chapter 9: Reputation and Cooperation under Anarchy 223
Bibliography 243
Index 275

Customer Reviews

Average Review:

Write a Review

and post it to your social network

     

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See all customer reviews >