Table of Contents
Contents Preface Introduction 1. The Big Issue 2. Rescuing Equality and Justice 3. Some Methodological Disagreements 4. Justice and Fairness 5. The Two Standpoints 6. The Greatness of John Rawls 7. An Outline of the Book Part One: Rescuing Equality from .o.o. Chapter 1 The Incentives Argument I: The Incentive Argument, The Interpersonal Test, and Community 1. Incentives, the Difference Principle, and Equality 2. Nigel Lawson's Tax Cut 3. On Uttering Arguments in Variable Interpersonal Settings 4. The Kidnapper's Argument 5. Community, and the Interpersonal Test 6. Does the Incentive Argument Pass the Interpersonal Test? II: Testing the Incentive Argument 7. What Makes the Minor Premiss of the Incentive Argument True? 8. Why the Incentive Argument Fails the Interpersonal Test 9. The Incentive Argument and Bad Faith 10. Should the Poor Reject the Incentive Argument? 11. First Persons and Third Persons III: Incentives and the Difference Principle 12. Strict and Lax Readings of the Difference Principle 13. Why Just People Must Practise the Strict Difference Principle 14. The Difference Principle and "Daily Life" 15. Dignity, Fraternity, and The Difference Principle 16. The Difference Principle and "Mutual Indifference" 17. The Difference Principle and the Unjust Society Chapter 2 The Pareto Argument for Inequality 1. Introduction 2. The Argument Expounded 3. The Argument Challenged 4. The Argument Rejected 5. Labour Burden in the Metric of Equality 6. Inconsistent Metrics 7. Raising the Baseline 8. Impartiality and Mutual Advantage 9. Inequality: A Necessary Evil? 10. Conclusion Chapter 3 The Basic Structure Objection 1. "The Personal is Political" 2. Incentives and the Difference Principle: A Review of the Argument 3. The "Basic Structure" Objection 4. The "Basic Structure" Objection: A Preliminary Reply 5. The "Basic Structure" Objection: A More Fundamental Reply 6. Who is to Blame? 7. Coercive and Non-Coercive Social Structures Appendix I: More on Coercion and the Basic Structure Appendix II: The Basic Structure is a Structure Chapter 4 The Difference Principle 1. Introduction 2. Reconsidering the Difference Principle 3. The Moral Arbitrariness Case for the Difference Principle Contradicts its Content 4. A Recent Argument for the Difference Principle 5. A Contractarian Argument for the Difference Principle 6. What is the Moral Arbitrariness of Talent Differences Supposed to Show? 7. Chamberlain and Pareto 8. "Can't" or "Won't" 9. Human Nature and Constructivism Chapter 5 The Freedom Objection 1. Introduction 2. Equality, Pareto, and Freedom of Choice of Occupation 3. Equality, Pareto, and Rawlsian Liberty 4. Equality, Pareto, and Freedom in Work 5. The Unequal-Income Inference 6. Blood, Kidneys, and Sex Chapter 6 The Facts 1. A Statement of my Thesis 2. Facts, and Some Meta-Ethical Questions 3. What Most Philosophers Think about Facts and Principles 4. My Thesis: Ultimate Principles are Fact-Insensitive; and the Clarity of Mind Requirement 5. An Illustration of the Thesis 6. More Illustration of the Thesis 7. The Argument for the Thesis 7 (i). A Defence of the First Premiss of the Argument 7 (ii). A Defence of the Second Premiss of the Argument 7(iii). A Defence of the Third Premiss of the Argument 8. Still Further Illustration and Defence of the Thesis 9. The Clarity of Mind Requirement 10. The Merely Logical Priority of Fact-Insensitive Principles 11. The Conditional Character of the Thesis 12. On "Is" and "Ought" 13. On "Ought" and "Can" 14. Possible Misunderstandings of the Thesis 15. The Thesis is not a Causal Thesis 16. The Thesis is not a Psychological Thesis 17. The Thesis is Neutral with Respect to Central Meta-Ethical Disputes 18. Some Bad Rawlsian Arguments that Reject My Thesis 19. Utilitarianism, and the Difference Between Fundamental Principles and Rules of Regulation 20. The Interest of My Thesis Appendix: God Part Two: Rescuing Justice from .o.o. Chapter 7 Constructivism 1. Introduction, and Preliminary Overview 2. Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism. 3. Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism: Matters Arising 4. Is Justice the First Virtue of Social Institutions? 5. Two Illustrations: Social Insurance, Property Taxation 6. Justice and the Pareto Principle 7. Justice, and Constraints, Notably Publicity, on Choice of Optimal Rules at Regulation 8. Justice and Stability 9. The "Circumstances of Justice" 10. Conclusion Appendix: Is the Original Position Justification of Principles Contractarian? Chapter 8 The Publicity Argument 1. Andrew Williams on Publicity and the Egalitarian Ethos 2. An Anatomy of Williams's Argument 3. Racism, Justice, and Assurance 4. Does Assurance Williams-type Determinacy? 5. Does Justice Require Precision? 6. Egalitarian Ethi at Home, in the Market, and in the State 7. Publicity as a Desideratum of Justice 8. Justice and Occupational Choice 9. Conclusion General Appendix: Replies to critics 1. Public and Private Action 2. The Site of Justice is not Where it Gets Caused 3. Prior Principles, Self-Respect, and Equality 4. Incentives and Prerogatives 5. Pogge's Mastergoals and Supergoals 6. Pogge's Failure to Address the Standard Case 7. The Currency of Distributive Justice and Incentive Inequality 8. Earlier Discussions of Rawls on Incentives Bibliography
