Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991: A History

Overview

From the author of A People’s Tragedy, an original reading of the Russian Revolution, examining it not as a single event but as a hundred-year cycle of violence in pursuit of utopian dreams

In this elegant and incisive account, Orlando Figes offers an illuminating new perspective on the Russian Revolution. While other historians have focused their examinations on the cataclysmic years immediately before and after 1917, Figes shows how the revolution, while it changed in form and...

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Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991: A History

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Overview

From the author of A People’s Tragedy, an original reading of the Russian Revolution, examining it not as a single event but as a hundred-year cycle of violence in pursuit of utopian dreams

In this elegant and incisive account, Orlando Figes offers an illuminating new perspective on the Russian Revolution. While other historians have focused their examinations on the cataclysmic years immediately before and after 1917, Figes shows how the revolution, while it changed in form and character, nevertheless retained the same idealistic goals throughout, from its origins in the famine crisis of 1891 until its end with the collapse of the communist Soviet regime in 1991.

Figes traces three generational phases: Lenin and the Bolsheviks, who set the pattern of destruction and renewal until their demise in the terror of the 1930s; the Stalinist generation, promoted from the lower classes, who created the lasting structures of the Soviet regime and consolidated its legitimacy through victory in war; and the generation of 1956, shaped by the revelations of Stalin’s crimes and committed to “making the Revolution work” to remedy economic decline and mass disaffection. Until the very end of the Soviet system, its leaders believed they were carrying out the revolution Lenin had begun.

With the authority and distinctive style that have marked his magisterial histories, Figes delivers an accessible and paradigm-shifting reconsideration of one of the defining events of the twentieth century.

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Editorial Reviews

Publishers Weekly
02/03/2014
Figes (A People’s Tragedy) covers familiar terrain in his new account of Russia and its revolution with a sharp and confident analysis. He presents a centurylong revolution stretching from 1891 to 1991, and divides it into three phases: the rise of the Bolsheviks, Stalin’s rule, and the repercussions of Khruschev’s denouncement of Stalin. Figes works to dispel the mythology that still surrounds Lenin, Stalin, and the Revolution, plenty of which still survives in the West even after the Cold War. He reminds us that Lenin “was a stranger to Russia,” having spent most of the preceding 17 years outside the country, and that the Bolshevik storming of the Winter Palace was more like a house arrest, a coup d’état that few observers, including some Bolsheviks, thought could last. Analyzing Stalin’s leadership, Figes notes that even though intelligence reports suggested the Germans were massing for an attack in 1941, Stalin ignored the signs and, due to fears inspired by his Great Terror, his military commanders refused to contradict him. Figes strips away the propaganda and nostalgia to emphasize the Revolution’s destructive powers, a perspective that is all the more relevant as Vladimir Putin seeks to capitalize on many Russians’ hunger for the so-called glory days of the Soviet Union. (Apr.)
Library Journal
02/15/2014
While most historians traditionally focus on the events of 1917, Figes (history, Birkbeck, Univ. of London; A People's Tragedy) offers a new perspective, examining the Russian Revolution within the context of an entire century, from the Russian famine of 1891 through the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union. Figes presents a "single revolutionary cycle" that encompasses not only the tsarist past but the entire existence of the Soviet state. Identifying three distinct generational phases—the Old Bolsheviks, the Stalinist generation, and the post-1956 generation—he goes on to argue that Soviet leaders always believed they were carrying out Lenin's original utopian objectives. Throughout, the author tries to clear up popular misconceptions about Soviet history, such as the surprisingly small scale of the October 1917 Revolution. Although at times the object of controversy himself (e.g., he has written positive self-reviews and pseudonymous negative reviews of rivals' books on Amazon), Figes is considered a serious scholar of Russian history. His book combines a career of Russian and Soviet study with the added retrospective that the 20-plus years since the Soviet demise can bring. VERDICT Approachable and compelling, this will serve as a good overview for generalists interested in its subjects and offers pathways toward further reading for serious students. [See Prepub Alert, 11/1/13.]—Leslie Lewis, Duquesne Univ. Lib., Pittsburgh
Kirkus Reviews
★ 2014-03-04
The dean of contemporary Russian studies—and a gifted popularizer—ventures a refreshing thesis that joins the fondest dreams of the Bolsheviks to the full-circle collapse of the Soviet Empire. Figes (History/Birkbeck Coll., Univ. of London; Just Send Me Word: A True Story of Love and Survival in the Gulag, 2012, etc.) delivers the welcome insight that "red Russia" really began in a time of widespread famine in 1891, when Russians of various classes and regions realized that the czarist regime was of no help—so helpless, in fact, that it called on the people themselves for solutions, which "opened the door to a powerful new wave of public activity and debate which the government could not control and which quickly turned from the philanthropic to the political." With the bloodletting of the Russo-Japanese War, thanks to an inept general command, the die was cast, proving Trotsky's observation that a human crisis needed a match of human agency to bring about revolution. Figes carefully reminds readers that the revolution happened in stages: first in 1905, then again in 1917—twice, the first when the czar was overthrown, the second when the Bolsheviks wrestled power away from a coalition that would likely have proved more humane, and certainly more democratic, had it remained in government. The result was the grim regime of Stalin, which was not inevitable but instead hinged on the accident of Lenin's weakness in illness and Trotsky's talent for making enemies. Figes ably explains the subsequent Nazi-Soviet pact, which Stalin parsed as "Leninist," and the slow thawing that came about after the dictator's death in 1953. The author then joins the developments of the final four decades of Soviet power to the earlier era, writing that Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms were proposed much earlier—decades, in some cases—than they were enacted. As ever, highly readable and of tremendous interest to students not just of Russian history, but also of modern geopolitics—and not least due to the fact that Soviet heir Vladimir Putin remains in power.
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Product Details

  • ISBN-13: 9780805091311
  • Publisher: Holt, Henry & Company, Inc.
  • Publication date: 4/8/2014
  • Pages: 336
  • Sales rank: 92,713
  • Product dimensions: 6.20 (w) x 9.40 (h) x 1.30 (d)

Meet the Author

Orlando Figes is the author of eight books on Russia that have been translated into twenty-seven languages; they include The Whisperers, A People’s Tragedy, Natasha’s Dance, and Just Send Me Word. A professor of history at Birkbeck, University of London and a frequent contributor to The New York Review of Books, Figes is the recipient of the Wolfon History Prize, the W. H. Smith Literary Award, the NCR Book Award, and the Los Angeles Times Book Prize, among others.

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Read an Excerpt

Introduction

My aim is to provide a brief account of the Russian Revolution in the longue durée, to chart one hundred years of history as a single revolutionary cycle. In this telling the Revolution starts in the nineteenth century (and more specifically in 1891, when the public’s reaction to the famine crisis set it for the first time on a collision course with the autocracy) and ends with the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991.

It might seem odd to plot the Revolution in one hundred years of history. Most short books on the subject focus on the years immediately before and after 1917. But to understand the Revolution’s origins, its violent character and tragic course from freedom to dictatorship, one must look more closely at the tsarist past; and to perceive its lasting outcomes, one must see it in the broader context of Soviet history. Many of the themes of the first chapters on the tsarist period—the absence of a political counter-balance to the power of the state; the isolation of the educated classes from the common people; the rural backwardness and poverty that drove so many peasants to seek a better life in the industrial towns; the coercive basis of authority in Russia; and the extremism of the socialist intelligentsia—will reappear in the later chapters on 1917 and the Soviet regime.

When did the Russian Revolution end? Historians have chosen various dates, depending on the stories which they wish to tell, and these of course can all be justified. Some have ended their accounts in 1921 with the ending of the Civil War, when armed opposition to the Bolsheviks was finally defeated, and the consolidation of the Soviet dictatorship. Others have concluded with the death of Lenin in 1924, as I did in A People’s Tragedy, a work on which I draw in these pages, on the grounds that by this time the basic institutions, if not the practices, of the Stalinist regime were in place. One or two have ended in 1927, with the defeat of Trotsky and the Left Opposition; or in 1929, with the onset of a new revolutionary upheaval, the forced industrialization and collectivization of the first Five Year Plan, implying that the Stalinist economy was the significant outcome of 1917.

One of the most influential historians of the Soviet period, Sheila Fitzpatrick, concluded her short history of the Revolution in the mid-1930s, a period of ‘retreat’ from its utopian objectives when the structural economic changes of Stalin’s Revolution were consolidated as a permanent system. By her own later admission, this was to suggest that the Great Terror of 1937–8 was a ‘monstrous postscript’ to the Revolution, an aberration explained by the regime’s fear of war, when in fact it was a part of it—the biggest in a series of waves of terror whose origins can only be explained by the insecurities of the Soviet regime going back to 1917. To omit the Great Terror from a history of the Russian Revolution, Fitzpatrick acknowledged, would be the equivalent of writing an account of the French Revolution of 1789 without the Reign of Terror (1793–4) for which it was chiefly known.1

The Great Terror was not the final wave of violence by the Soviet state. The population of the Gulag labour camps, which Solzhenitsyn placed at the very core of the Bolshevik experiment, reached its peak, not in 1938, but in 1952. So it does not make much sense to end a history of the Revolution with the halting of the Great Terror. But then it doesn’t make much sense either to break it off in 1939 or 1941. The Second World War did not interrupt the Revolution. It intensified and broadened it. Bolshevism came into its own during the war—with its military discipline and cult of sacrifice, its willingness to expend human life to meet its goals, and its capacity to militarize the masses through its planned economy, it was made to fight. The Revolution was reforged and toughened by the war. Through the Red Army and its NKVD units, the Soviet empire tightened its control of its borderlands in West Ukraine and the Baltic, purging towns and villages and sending to the Gulag, in their hundreds of thousands, nationalist insurgents, repatriated Soviet servicemen and ‘collaborators’ with the Germans. By force of arms, the Bolsheviks exported the Russian Revolution into Eastern Europe—first in 1939–40 and again in 1945.

The Cold War, in this sense, has to be seen as a continuation of the international civil war started by the Bolsheviks in 1917. The global ambitions of the Revolution’s leaders remained essentially unchanged, from their first attempts to extend Soviet power into Europe through the invasion of Poland in 1920 to their final foreign adventure in Afghanistan after 1979. Lenin’s power seizure had been based on the idea that the Revolution could not survive on its own in a backward peasant country such as Russia, that it needed the support of revolutions in the more advanced industrial states or in countries that could give it the resources it needed to industrialize: a life-or-death conflict between socialism and the capitalist powers was unavoidable as long as capitalism existed. Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov, if not Gorbachev, were all Leninists in this belief.

Until the end of their regime, the Soviet leaders all believed they were continuing the Revolution Lenin had begun. Their means of rule altered over time, of course, particularly after Stalin’s death, when they gave up on the use of mass terror, but they always saw themselves as Lenin’s heirs, working to achieve the same utopian goals envisaged by the founders of the Soviet state: a Communist society of material abundance for the proletariat and a new collective type of human being. That is why I think a good case can be made for the Revolution being treated as a single cycle of one hundred years, ending with the collapse of the Soviet system in 1991.

Within this longer cycle I aim to explain the Revolution’s rise and fall in three generational phases. The first corresponds to the lifetime of the Old Bolsheviks, mostly born in the 1870s or 1880s and, if not already dead, eliminated in the Great Terror. Their utopian ideals and austere party culture of military unity and discipline had been shaped by years of struggle in the conspiratorial underground. But they obtained their revolutionary power from the cataclysm of the First World War—which seemed at once to undermine the value of a human life and to open up the possibility of altering the nature of humanity out of the destruction it had caused—and reached the height of their destructive fury in the Civil War, from which the Bolsheviks emerged victorious and strengthened in their conviction that any fortress could be stormed. From these killing fields they set about the building of a new society. But they could not overcome the problem of the peasantry—the smallholding family farmers who made up three quarters of the country’s population and dominated its economy—with their individualistic attitudes, patriarchal customs and attachment to the old Russian world of the village and the church. To so many of the Party’s new supporters—peasant sons and daughters who had fled the ‘backward’ village for a better life—the Revolution could not banish peasant Russia fast enough.

Here were the roots of Stalin’s ‘revolution from above’, the second phase of the cycle charted here, beginning with the Five Year Plan of 1928–32. Stalinism’s vision of modernity gave fresh energy to the utopian hopes of the Bolsheviks. It mobilized a whole new generation of enthusiasts—young ambitious workers, officials and technicians born around the turn of the century and schooled in Soviet values—who forced through Stalin’s policies of crash collectivization and industrialization and who, through the purges of the 1930s, took the places of the old élites. Collectivization was the real revolution of Soviet history—the complete overturning of a peasant way of life that had developed over many centuries—and a catastrophe from which the country never recovered. It was a social holocaust—a war against the peasants—uprooting millions of hardworking families from their homes and dispersing them across the Soviet Union. This nomadic population became the labour force of the Soviet industrial revolution, filling the great cities, the building-sites and labour camps of the Gulag.

The industrial infrastructure built by Stalin in the 1930s remained in place until the end of the Soviet system. His Five Year Plans became the model for Communist development throughout the world. They were said to be the cause of the Soviet military victory in 1945—the justifying rationale for everything accomplished by the October Revolution according to Soviet propaganda. But these achievements came at an enormous human cost—far bigger than we had imagined before the archives opened after 1991—so big that they challenge us to think about the moral nature of the Stalinist regime in ways reserved previously for historians of Nazism.

Khrushchev’s speech denouncing Stalin’s crimes marks the start of the Revolution’s third and final phase. The Soviet system never recovered from the crisis of belief caused by Khrushchev’s revelations at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. For the next thirty years the leadership was split about how far they could build on Stalin’s legacies, or even recognize his influence, except as a war leader. The country was divided between Stalin’s victims and those who revered his memory or took pride in Soviet achievements under Stalin’s leadership. But the speech was the defining moment for a younger generation that identified itself by the years of Khrushchev’s ‘thaw’ (the shestidesiatniki or ‘people of the sixties’), among them a 1955 law graduate from Moscow University called Mikhail Gorbachev, whose ideas of socialist renewal were first sown by Khrushchev’s programme of de-Stalinization.

The challenge facing all the later Soviet leaders was to sustain popular belief in the Revolution as it became a remote historical event. The problem was particularly acute for the generation born since 1945: they were too young even to relate to the ‘Great Patriotic War’, the other main legitimizing Soviet myth after the ‘Great October Socialist Revolution’. Better educated and more sophisticated than the Stalin-era generation, the post-war Soviet baby boomers were less engaged in the Revolution’s history or ideas than in Western music, films and clothes. Did this make the demise of the Soviet system unavoidable? Is any revolution destined to run out of energy, to die from old age, if it lives as long as the Soviet Union did? The Chinese endgame (liberalizing the economy within the one-party state) could briefly have been an alternative for the Soviet leadership under Andropov and Gorbachev, although it is doubtful whether economic modernization could have saved the system in the longer term (the Soviet population had forgotten how to work). But in the end it was Gorbachev’s commitment to political reform—a belief rooted in his Leninist ideals—that brought the system down.

In 2017 the world’s media will reflect on the Revolution during its centenary. It is a good time to look back at 1917. A generation after the collapse of the Soviet regime, we can see it more clearly, not as part of Cold War politics or Sovietology, but as history, a series of events with a beginning, a middle, and an end.

Retrospective distance enables us to see the Revolution from a fresh perspective and to ask again the big questions: why Russia? why Lenin? why Stalin? why did it fail? and what did it all mean? Questions as worth engaging with at the start of the next hundred years as they were during the last.

Seen from today’s perspective the Revolution appears very differently from the way it looked in 1991. Communism now seems, more than ever, like something from a stage of history that has been passed. Capitalism may have its crises, but outside North Korea no one sees the Soviet model of the planned economy as a viable alternative, not even China or Cuba any more. Russia has become very much weaker as a power in the world. Its loss of empire and foreign influence has been so dramatic that it makes one wonder how it held the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for so long. Russia is no longer an aggressive state. It does not start foreign wars. Economically it is a pale shadow of the powerhouse it was on the eve of the First World War. Seventy years of Communism ruined it. Yet the authoritarian state tradition has revived in Russia in a manner unexpected twenty years ago. This resurgence, based on Putin’s reclamation of the Soviet past, demands that we look again at Bolshevism—its antecedents and its legacies—in the long arc of history.

Copyright © 2014 by Orlando Figes

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Table of Contents

Introduction          1 


1. The Start          7


2. The ‘Dress Rehearsal’          24


3. Last Hopes          39


4. War and Revolution          54


5. The February Revolution          68


6. Lenin’s Revolution          89


7. Civil War and the Making of the Soviet System          108


8. Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin          125


9. The Revolution’s Golden Age?          135


10. The Great Break          149


11. Stalin’s Crisis          163


12. Communism in Retreat?          176


13. The Great Terror          190


14. Revolution for Export          204


15. War and Revolution          217


16. Revolution and Cold War          230


17. The Beginning of the End          244


18. Mature Socialism          260


19. The Last Bolshevik          273


20. Judgement          288

Notes          297


A Short Guide to Further Reading          306


Acknowledgments          309


Index          311

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