Rings in Auctions: An Experimental Approach / Edition 1

Rings in Auctions: An Experimental Approach / Edition 1

by Angelo Artale
     
 

ISBN-10: 3540619305

ISBN-13: 9783540619307

Pub. Date: 03/11/1997

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

This book deals with experimental studies in economics. It investigates experimentally collusions in first-price auctions with private values. Since the main aim of the study is to see which mechanisms are used when the subjects may collude, the participants are allowed to communicate as long as they want, before they made their bids, but after they have known

Overview

This book deals with experimental studies in economics. It investigates experimentally collusions in first-price auctions with private values. Since the main aim of the study is to see which mechanisms are used when the subjects may collude, the participants are allowed to communicate as long as they want, before they made their bids, but after they have known their private valuations. Moreover, the winner is allowed to make side payments to losing bidders. The subjects have to invent the mechanism they want to use by themselves. The theoretical possibilities are not explained to them. Four mechanisms have been observed. For each of them, we provide a game theoretical analysis and we compare the data with the theoretical prediction.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9783540619307
Publisher:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publication date:
03/11/1997
Series:
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems Series, #447
Edition description:
1997
Pages:
174
Product dimensions:
6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.02(d)

Table of Contents

1 Introduction.- 2 The Experiment.- 2.1 Introduction and Related Literature.- 2.2 Experimental Design.- 2.3 Theory of Collusion in First-price Auctions.- 2.4 Experimental Results.- 2.4.1 Do Experimental Subjects Cooperate?.- 2.4.2 Observed Mechanisms.- 2.4.3 Winners’ Bids and Payoff Shares.- 2.4.4 Two-Player Coalition versus One Individual Bidder.- 2.4.5 Summing Up.- 2.5 Theoretical Predictions versus Data.- 2.5.1 The Announcement Mechanism.- 2.5.2 Announcement Mechanism: The Behavior of Players Who Cheat.- 2.5.3 Announcement Mechanism: Optimality.- 2.5.4 Bid-bargain Mechanism.- 2.5.5 Bid-Bargain Mechanism: Optimality.- 2.5.6 Lattice Mechanism.- 2.5.7 Lattice Mechanism: Optimality.- 2.5.8 First-Price Auction Mechanism.- 2.5.9 Summing Up.- 2.6 Other Mechanisms.- 2.7 Strategic Behavior and the End Effect.- 3 A Descriptive Model.- 3.1 Conditional Probabilities.- 3.2 The Model.- 4 Mechanisms of Collusion.- 4.1 The Distribution Function.- 4.2 Announcement Mechanism.- 4.3 Bid-bargain Mechanism.- 4.3.1 (Non-)Optimality.- 4.4 Lattice Mechanism.- 4.4.1 Optimality.- 4.4.2 The Best Lattice With Four Intervals.- 4.5 First-Price Auction Mechanism.- 4.6 Summing Up.- 5 Two Extensions.- 5.1 Lattice With Continuous Bids.- 5.2 Two-player Coalition.- 6 Conclusion.- A Instructions and Forms.- B Experimental Data.- C Experimental Data.- D Non-cooperative Bidding.- E Player 2’s Equilibrium Strategy.- List of Figures.- List of Tables.

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