Schelling's transcendental idealism by John Watson | NOOK Book (eBook) | Barnes & Noble
Schelling's transcendental idealism

Schelling's transcendental idealism

by John Watson
     
 
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1892 Excerpt: ...us. Thus we have explained at once how there can be in sensation (1) the consciousness of a limit and (2) the consciousness of a limit. Any other explanation

Overview

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1892 Excerpt: ...us. Thus we have explained at once how there can be in sensation (1) the consciousness of a limit and (2) the consciousness of a limit. Any other explanation must deny either the one or the other. Dogmatic idealism explains the consciousness, but not the limit; for, in assuming that sensation is a purely subjective state, it fails to explain the reality of the limit, and makes it a mere product of arbitrary imagination. Dogmatic materialism may account for the limit, if it is allowed to make the perfectly gratuitous supposition of an unknowable thing-in-itself, but it fails to explain how there should be any con-sciousness of a limit. The solution we have offered accounts both for consciousness and for the consciousness of a limit. The most stubborn dogmatist must, therefore, grant that his assumption of a subject without an object, or an object without a subject, is rendered superfluous. Sensation is the first and simplest phase of consciousness. The second phase is that of perception. In the former there is an implicit opposition of subject and object; in the latter the opposition becomes explicit. In perception I have a consciousness, not simply of a limit, but of something which is a limit to me. I not only feel, but know that I feel. Perception is the act by which the V subject apprehends an object, conceived ns standing in opposition to it and limited by it. This object is viewed as completely independent of its own perceptive activity, and as existing apart from that activity. At the same time the object is not something which is regarded as the mere effect of an object, but as an actual object of perception; while standing in opposition to the subject it yet is in relation to it. Now, therefore, for the first time there arises for consciousness a re...

Product Details

ISBN-13:
2940022697513
Publisher:
Chicago, S. C. Griggs and company
Format:
NOOK Book
File size:
353 KB

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