Singleness: Self-Individuation and Its Rejection in the Scholastic Debate on Principles of Individuation

by Michal Glowala

Overview

The book is a systematic study of the issue of self-individuation in the scholastic debate on principles of individuation (principia individuationis).

The point of departure is a general formulation of the problem of individuation acceptable for all the participants of the scholastic debate: a principle of individuation of x is what makes x individual (in various possible senses of ‘making something individual’). The book argues against a prima facie plausible view that everything that is individual is individual by itself and not by anything distinct from it (Strong Self-Individuation Thesis). The keynote topic of the book is a detailed analysis of the two competing ways of rejecting the Strong Self-Individuation Thesis: the Scotistic and the Thomistic one. The book defends the latter one, discussing a number of issues concerning substantial and accidental forms, essences, properties, instantiation, the Thomistic notion of materia signata, Frege’s Begriff-Gegenstand distinction, and Geach’s form-function analogy developed in his writings on Aquinas.

In the context of both the scholastic and contemporary metaphysics, the book offers a framework for dealing with issues of individuality and defends a Thomistic theory of individuation.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9783110611700
Publisher:	De Gruyter
Publication date:	06/11/2018
Series:	Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis , #70
Pages:	173
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 9.06(h) x 0.02(d)
Age Range:	18 Years

About the Author

Michał Głowala, Wrocław University, Poland.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction 1

1.1 The Problem of Principles of individuation 2

1.2 Singleness. A Brief Survey of Notions Concerning Individuality 8

1.3 The Importance of the Scholastic Problem of Individuation 13

1.4 A Brief Historical Survey of the Scholastic Debate on Individuation 14

1.5 The Method of the Study 16

2 Entitas. Nominalism and Self-Individuation 23

2.1 Main Nominalistic Theses 23

2.2 Standard Arguments for the Strong Self-Individuation Thesis 26

2.3 Ens et Unum Convertuntur 27

2.4 The Immediacy of Individuality 28

2.4.1 The Immediacy of Attributes in General 28

2.4.2 The Immediacy of Distinction 30

2.4.3 The Immediacy of Individuality 33

2.5 The Individuality Thesis and Simple Entities in Nominalism 34

2.6 General Features of the Nominalistic Standpoint 37

3 Haecceitas. The Scotistic Rejection of the Strong Self-Individuation Thesis 39

3.1 Main Theses of the Scotistic Standpoint 39

3.2 Standard Arguments for the Scotistic Theses 40

3.3 A Weak Sense of Individuality 42

3.4 Avicenna on Instantiate Natures 46

3.4.1 Some Details of Instance Ascription 49

3.4.2 Natures and Instances, Parts and Wholes 52

3.4.3 The Scotistic Interpretation of Avicenna 56

3.5 Can Things be Differentiated by What They Have in Common? 58

3.6 The Scotistic Way of Rejecting Self-Individuation 60

3.7 What Individuality is Not? 62

3.8 Scotism and Nominalism 65

4 Forms and Self-Individuation 67

4.1 Forms as Principles of Individuation: the Main Thesis and Standard Arguments 67

4.2 Effects of Formal Causes 69

4.3 Formal Causes, Kinds, and Singleness 70

4.4 Formal Causes and Self-Individuation 72

5 Subjects as Principles of the Individuation of Their Accidents 73

5.1 Aquinas's Main Thesis Concerning the Individuation of Accidents 73

5.2 Being in a Subject and Singleness 76

5.2.1 Various Senses of 'Being in a Subject' 76

5.2.2 Being in a Subject, Parts, and Wholes 78

5.2.3 Being in a Subject and Individuality 80

5.2.4 The Two Senses of the Subject-Individuation Thesis 81

5.3 The Individuation of Human Virtues 82

5.4 Subjects of Accidents and the Thomistic Way of Rejecting Self-Individuation 86

5.5 The Subject-Individuation Thesis and the Formal Individuation Thesis 88

6 Matter: Noninstantiability and Self-Individuation 93

6.1 Matter and Individuality: Aquinas's Main Thesis 93

6.2 Subjects of Substantial Forms: Matter 96

6.3 Prime Subjects and Noninstantiability 98

6.3.1 Matter as a Prime Subject 98

6.3.2 An Old Objection and Various Responses to It 101

6.4 Matter and Noninstantiability of Forms 105

7 Quantity and Self-Individuation 109

7.1 Quantity and the Individuality of Substances: Aquinas's Main Thesis 109

7.2 Material Difference, Matter, and Extension 112

7.3 Division into Pieces, Position, and Individuality 115

7.4 Aquinas on the Self-Individuation of Quantity 117

7.5 Matter and Quantity. What is Materia Signata? 121

7.6 The Two Aspects of Individuality 124

7.7 Quantity and the Individuation of Parts of Substances 126

7.8 The Individuality of Human Souls. Commensuratio animae ad hoc corpus 128

8 Actual Existence and Individuality 131

8.1 The Existence-Individuation Thesis and Some Standard Arguments 131

8.2 Actual Existence and Individuality 133

8.3 Ultimate Actuality, Ultimate Distinction, and Noninstantiability Again 136

8.4 Actual Existence, Accidental Unity, and Individuality 139

8.4.1 Perse Unity, Accidental Unity, and Individuality 140

8.4.2 Perse Unity, Accidental Unity, and Existence 142

8.5 Is Actual Existence a Principle of Individuation? 143

9 Concluding Remarks: The Thomistic Theory of Individuation 147

9.1 Main Features of the Thomistic Theory of Individuation 147

9.2 The Thomistic Theory of Individuation, Scotism, and Nominalism 149

9.3 The Thomistic Theory of Individuation from a Historical Point of View 149

9.4 The Problem of Individuation: a General Framework 150

Bibliography 155

Index 161