Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation

Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation

by Alan D. Taylor
     
 

A mathematical look at why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system, first published in 2005.See more details below

Overview

A mathematical look at why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system, first published in 2005.

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780521810524
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
05/31/2005
Series:
Outlooks Series
Pages:
190
Product dimensions:
5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.51(d)

Table of Contents

1. Introduction; 2. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem; 3. Additional results for single-valued elections; 4. The Duggan–Schwartz theorem; 5. Additional results for multi-valued elections; 6. Ballots that rank sets; 7. Elections with outcomes that are lotteries; 8. Elections with variable agendas; References; Index.

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