Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics: Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics

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The volume is divided into six parts, each exploring broad themes in social choice theory and welfare economics. The first is an overview of the short - yet intense - period of the subject's historical development. The second is a discussion of the ethical aspects of social choice, encompassing such issues as equal opportunity, individual rights, and population monotonicity. Parts three and four are devoted to algebraic and combinatorial aspects of social choice theory, including analyses of Arrow's Theorem, consensus functions, and the role of geometry. Part five deals with the application of cooperative game theory to social choice. The final section is devoted to a study of aggregation with risk aversion to current and future variables, and the creation of an intertemporal framework to go beyond the usual static description of income distributions measured over a short period.
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Table of Contents

Series editor's preface
List of contributors
Introduction and overview 1
1 The first golden age of social choice, 1784-1803 13
2 The requisites of equal opportunity 37
3 Social choice of individual and group rights 55
4 Population monotonic allocation rules 79
5 Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity 127
6 Latticial theory of consensus 145
7 Arrow theorems in economic environments 163
8 Inner consistency or not inner consistency: A reformulation is the answer 187
9 Existence of a smooth social choice functor 213
10 Dynamical convergence in the Euclidean spatial model 247
11 Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: Approximate NTU cores in large economies 263
12 A note on implementation and strong dominance 277
13 Coalition-proof communication equilibria 289
14 Stability of coalition structures and the principle of optimal partitioning 301
15 The holdout game: An experimental study of an infinitely repeated game with two-sided incomplete information 321
16 Exact aggregation under risk 355
17 The stochastic dominance ordering of income distributions over time: The discounted sum of the expected utilities of incomes 375
Appendix: Conference program 409
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